grundlinien.de

1

Introduction

The philosophical science of right has as its object the “The idea in general is nothing other than the concept, the reality of the concept, and the unity of both.“ (Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 145) of “This reality in general, as the existence of the free will, is right, which is to be taken comprehensively not only as limited legal right, but as the existence of all determinations of freedom.“ (§ 486 Enc. 1830), the concept of right and its actualization.

Philosophy has to do with ideas and therefore not with what are usually called mere concepts; on the contrary, it points out their one-sidedness and untruth, as well as the fact that the concept (not what is often heard called such, which is merely an abstract determination of the understanding) alone is what has actuality, and indeed in such a way that it gives this actuality to itself. Everything that is not this actuality posited by the concept itself is transient existence, external contingency, opinion, inessential appearance, untruth, illusion, etc. The configuration which the concept gives to itself in its actualization is, for the cognition of the concept itself, the other essential moment of the idea, distinguished from the form of being only as concept.

DE ES

Comments

4 responses to “1”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 1] 30. X. 1822
    The nature of the matter    . Not: we have these and these concepts and content – right, freedom, property, the state, and so forth – and [must] now also think this concept clearly; – formal education is of no help in deciding the matter. Rather: to consider precisely the nature of the matter itself, this is the concept of the matter, – the former only something given, taken up from God knows where, merely represented, and so on.
    Not so-called mere concepts; philosophy knows best of all that so-called mere concepts are something null – but rather essentially their actualization – realization. Actuality is only the unity of the inner and the outer – that the concept not be a mere inward thing, but likewise something real, – and that the outer, the real, not be a conceptless reality, determinate being – existence, but rather be essentially determined through the concept. – This, within the general distinction between concept and Idea, – for the unphilosophical mind – for now historically – I reserve the closer treatment for the concept of right – the concept of this Idea itself – for right is thoroughly only as Idea –

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The concept and its existence are two sides, distinct and yet one, like soul and body. The body is the very same life as the soul, and yet both can be called things lying apart from one another. A soul without a body would be nothing living, and likewise the reverse. Thus the determinate being of the concept is its body, just as this body obeys the soul that brought it forth. The seed contains the tree within itself and holds its entire power, although it is not yet the tree itself. The tree corresponds entirely to the simple image of the seed. If the body does not correspond to the soul, then this is simply something wretched. The unity of determinate being and concept, of body and soul, is the Idea. It is not merely harmony, but complete interpenetration. Nothing lives that is not in some way Idea. The Idea of right is freedom, and in order to be truly grasped, it must be recognized both in its concept and in the determinate being of that concept.

  3. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    This first paragraph defines the subject matter of the entire work. It states: “The object of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, which is the Concept of right and its actualization.”

    Let us break this down:

    Philosophical Science of Right (philosophische Rechtswissenschaft): I begin by distinguishing my project from other ways of studying law. A lawyer, for instance, is concerned with the interpretation and application of existing, or positive, laws. A historian of law is concerned with the development of legal systems over time. My purpose, however, is philosophical. It seeks to comprehend the rational foundation of right itself. It does not ask “What is the law?” (Was ist Rechtens?) but “What is Right?” (Was ist das Recht?).

    The Object is the Idea of Right (die Idee des Rechts): In my philosophical system, the term ‘Idea’ (Idee) has a very specific meaning. It is not merely a thought or a notion in someone’s head. The Idea is the unity of a Concept (Begriff) and its reality or actualization (Wirklichkeit/Verwirklichung). Therefore, to study the Idea of right is to study two things simultaneously:

    The Concept of Right (der Begriff des Rechts): This is the pure, rational essence of right. We can think of this as the principle of freedom, which I will show is the very substance of right.
    Its Actualization (dessen Verwirklichung): This refers to how the Concept of right is made real and objective in the world. It is the existence (Dasein) of the Concept in the institutions and practices of a rational society—in property, contracts, morality, the family, and the state.
    The entire book is a demonstration of how the simple Concept of right unfolds into these increasingly complex and concrete forms of actualization.

    Insights from the Lectures (based on student notes, e.g., Hotho, Griesheim):

    In my lectures, I often began by emphasizing this distinction to my students. I would explain that philosophy must grasp its own time in thought. The science of right is not about creating a utopia or prescribing what a state ought to be in some abstract sense. Rather, it is about recognizing the rational as it is actual and the actual as it is rational. As the Preface states, “the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of the dusk.” Philosophy comprehends a form of life that has already achieved a certain maturity. The task is to find the inner logic—the Idea—within the existing structures of right.

    The lectures clarify that the “actualization” of right is not just any existing legal system, which might be arbitrary or unjust, but the rational system that the Concept of right itself produces.

    Connection to the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences:

    The Philosophy of Right is an expanded version of the section on “Objective Spirit” in my Encyclopaedia. The corresponding introductory paragraph there is § 487.

    § 487 of the Encyclopaedia (1830 Edition):
    “This existence [of the free will] is, in the first instance, the sphere of Right (Recht) as such. It is something immediate, which the will gives to itself…”

    This paragraph places the concept of Right squarely within my total system. The Philosophy of Right does not begin in a vacuum. It follows the development of “Subjective Spirit” (consciousness, intelligence, will). The Encyclopaedia shows how the will, having achieved self-consciousness and freedom for itself (§ 481-482), now must give this freedom an external existence in the world.

    The very first, most abstract way it does this is by establishing Right. Right is the immediate Dasein (existence) of the free will.
    Thus, the Encyclopaedia provides the systematic context: Right is the first stage of Objective Spirit, where freedom is no longer merely an internal state of the individual but becomes a reality in the shared world of interacting individuals. The Philosophy of Right then takes this starting point and develops it in full detail.

  4. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Supplement to § 1: The Remark (Anmerkung)
    The Purpose of the Remark:

    The primary function of this Remark is to clarify the specific, technical meaning of the philosophical terms I employ, most importantly ‘Idea’ (Idee) and ‘Concept’ (Begriff). I needed to distinguish my usage from both everyday language and the way these terms were used by my predecessors, particularly Kant. The Remark is a warning against a common misunderstanding of philosophy itself.

    Explanation of the Remark:

    The Remark begins by directly addressing the relationship between Concept and Actualization (or Existence, Dasein). The common, non-philosophical view—what I call the perspective of the “Understanding” (Verstand)—treats these two as separate and externally related. From this viewpoint:

    A concept is a subjective representation in our minds. It is a general characteristic abstracted from various particular objects.
    An object is something “out there,” existing independently of our concept of it.
    If this were the case, to say that the ‘Idea is the unity of the Concept and its actualization’ would be trivial or false. It would be trivial if it just meant that for something to be real, it must match our subjective idea of it. It would be false because many of our subjective concepts do not have a corresponding reality, and many real things do not conform to a rational concept.

    My speculative philosophy rejects this separation. The Remark insists that in philosophy, the Concept is not a mere subjective form but the very substance and inner principle of the thing itself. The Concept is the object’s own self-determining principle, its inner logic. The process of philosophy is to grasp this logical structure.

    Therefore, the Idea (Idee) is the demonstration that the Concept is not impotent but is the power that generates its own concrete existence. The Idea of Right is not just my personal theory of right; it is the rational principle of freedom as it brings itself into being in the world through objective institutions. Philosophy’s task is to comprehend this unified process, not to hold a concept in one hand and reality in the other and compare them.

    From the Lectures:

    In my lectures, I would often elaborate on this by criticizing the Kantian “thing-in-itself” (Ding an sich). For Kant, our concepts could only ever grasp phenomena (appearances), while the true reality of the thing-in-itself remained unknowable. My philosophy aims to overcome this barrier. The Remark to § 1 is the first shot in this battle within the Philosophy of Right. I argue that what is truly real is knowable, because what is truly real is the Idea—and the Idea is rational. As I state elsewhere, “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.” This Remark lays the groundwork for that famous assertion.

Leave a Reply