grundlinien.de

82

Third Section. Wrong

In the contract, right in itself is present as something posited, its inner universality as something common to arbitrary will and particular will. This appearance of right, in which right itself and its essential determinate being, the particular will, coincide immediately — that is, contingently — proceeds, in wrong, into semblance — into the opposition of right in itself and the particular will, in which right becomes a particular right. But the truth of this semblance is that it is null, and that right restores itself through the negating of this its negation, through which process of its mediation — of returning to itself out of its negation — it determines itself as actual and as valid, whereas at first it was only in itself and something immediate.

DE ES

Comments

2 responses to “82”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    The making-itself-count of right in itself –
    I remain owner against wrong – I, empirically, have this determination as it were as a contingent one – but its nature is that other; the essential subject is now [not] the single personality, but right in itself –
    Particular will, because will is also right – determinate being of the will, of freedom.
    Particularity – necessary – falls into the contingent, into arbitrary choice – the point where morality, culpability, begins –
    Necessity not opposed to culpability – rather excluding it.
    Semblance – the universal’s being posited – as a particular –
    proving itself, through the sublation of the particular will, [in its return] to itself.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Right in itself, the universal will, as essentially determined through the particular, stands in relation to something unessential. It is the relation of essence to its appearance. Even if the appearance is in conformity with essence, yet viewed from another side it is again not in conformity with it, for appearance is the stage of contingency, essence in relation to the unessential. In wrong, however, appearance passes over into mere semblance. Semblance is determinate being that is inadequate to essence, the empty separating-off and positedness of essence, such that in both the difference exists as [mere] diversity. Semblance is therefore the untrue, which vanishes in wanting to exist for itself, and in this vanishing essence has shown itself as essence, that is, as the power over semblance. Essence has negated the negation of itself and is thus confirmed. Wrong is such a semblance, and through its vanishing right receives the determination of something fixed and valid. What we have just called essence is right in itself, over against which the particular will, as untrue, sublates itself. If earlier it had only an immediate being, it now becomes actual, in that it returns out of its negation; for actuality is that which is efficacious and preserves itself in its otherness, whereas the immediate is still receptive to negation.

Leave a Reply