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81

In the relation of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is, just as much as it is in itself identical and posited by them in the contract as common, likewise a particular will. Because they are immediate persons, it is contingent whether their particular will accords with the will that is in itself, which has its existence solely through that particular will. As particular, for itself distinct from the universal, it comes forward, in the arbitrariness and contingency of insight and volition, against what is in itself right — wrong.

The transition to wrong is made by the higher logical necessity that the moments of the concept — here, right in itself, or the will as universal, and right in its existence, which is precisely the particularity of the will — be posited as distinct for themselves, which belongs to the abstract reality of the concept.1 — But this particularity of the will for itself is arbitrariness and contingency, which, in the contract, I have given up only as arbitrariness over a single thing, not as the arbitrariness and contingency of the will itself.

  1. Hegel gives no reference. The “higher logical necessity” is that of the judgement: the concept divides itself originally, and its moments – here right in itself and its existence – are posited as distinct for themselves (Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 166 ff.). – See Die Grammatik der logischen Begriffe (in German): Moment and setzen. ↩︎

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4 responses to “81”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Diff[erence] between the universal will of right and the particular will. In contract right for itself emerges –
    – over against the particular will, it is posited as determinately distinguished from the particular.
    Determinate being of the will as a universal one, over against the particular –
    What is stipulated in the contract is right – as such, i.e., in universal determination.
    Transition. α) Determination – the universal will, at first only as posited; – performance a necessary consequence, – but equally dependent on arbitrary choice –
    It is objective to me – my individual will as determinate being, and indeed at the same time in and through an other will – Hence right – but this determinate being – as will – only contingent, only a determination of commonality – β) There is to be the determinate being of the will – as will – will relating itself to itself as will. Right as right; the further development of the determination of right toward this – i.e., right posited, not this or that single [right], but right in its universality – i.e., stripped of the particular interest – in the subjective will – and not as [existing] in a particular matter, but rather it is right as such that is at issue. – This ground, this determinate being, is the subjective will – that right as such has been willed – that the determinate being of the will in general be willed, that right be realized. – I have property, i.e., this and that thing; – I will this thing, – this particular content – but now the particular content becomes right itself.
    Here the starting point – common will – property has a contingency, an externality – hitherto only desire, or else some other external contingency, whether I can have this or that – in nature –, or whether the contingent will of another wishes to relinquish the thing to me – but this arbitrary choice of his concerns only the particular thing, concerns my desire, whether he wants to satisfy it or not, – not yet right as such – It has no absolute right to be satisfied, – i.e., the determinate being of desire as such is not the determinate being of the will –
    But now – my right as such – i.e., the determinate being of my will contains not merely a thing, – but the will of another –
    Hence will in relation to a will –
    Here begins the element that leads to the standpoint of morality – for morality is the inwardness of the will – i.e., the will that wills itself; – will [being] its own object – but morality as being for itself – will returned into itself –
    Here, at first, the relation of will to will, but to an other will, for the immediate difference of the will from itself as such is [present] as the will of another.
    In general right – in – itself, – as against contingent will.
    Value and communal will, – both a contingent universality. What binds and is bound – in the will of both – is this, that therein lies something existing in itself – right in itself – i.e., the determinate being of the will as such – in the contract both have not only divested themselves of their particular will, but have also presupposed that the determinate being of the will as such should hold good – the right in this matter – this is the inner essential presupposition – Breach of contract, non-performance, is against right as such – i.e., not merely against my particular will as particular – recognition not merely because he is in possession, – but of his will as such – in the stipulation – hence insight into the nature of stipulation is of the highest importance, that the contract be regarded as valid once stipulated, for therein lies determinate being as the spiritual determinate being of the will – thus right as such –
    The abstract external determinate being of the will, not merely the empirical one, because it is within his power and he will defend himself – (savage peoples, Moors, only this kind of apprehension – reflection of cunning, of advantage, of utility, perhaps also of religion, of humanity) – hence it is so important that peoples arrive at contractual relations among themselves and toward others –

  2. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 495:

    § 495. The difference in contract, however, which is at first a difference from person to person, passes from the difference between such a substantial element, which at first is present only as an agreement arisen from arbitrary will, and the accidental, into the higher difference of the pure substantial element contained therein against that side of the contingent will — of the universal in and for itself, of right as such, against wrong.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 495:

    § 495. The contract, as an agreement arisen from arbitrary will and concerning a contingent thing, contains at the same time the positedness of the accidental will; this is likewise also not adequate to right, and thus brings forth wrong, whereby, however, right, which is in and for itself, is not sublated, but rather only a relation of right to wrong arises.

  4. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In contract we had the relation of two wills as a common will. This identical will, however, is only a relatively universal, posited universal will, and thus still stands in opposition to the particular will. In the contract, in the agreement, there does indeed lie the right to demand the performance; but this in turn is a matter for the particular will, which as such can act contrary to the right that exists in itself. Here, then, the negation that already lay earlier in the will existing in itself comes to the fore, and this negation is precisely wrong. The course of the matter as a whole is to purify the will of its immediacy and thus to call forth, out of its commonality, the particularity that arises in opposition to it. In contract, those who have come to an agreement still retain their particular will; the contract has thus not yet emerged from the stage of arbitrariness, and remains accordingly exposed to wrong.

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