In the relation of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is, just as much as it is in itself identical and posited by them in the contract as common, likewise a particular will. Because they are immediate persons, it is contingent whether their particular will accords with the will that is in itself, which has its existence solely through that particular will. As particular, for itself distinct from the universal, it comes forward, in the arbitrariness and contingency of insight and volition, against what is in itself right — wrong.

The transition to wrong is made by the higher logical necessity that the moments of the concept — here, right in itself, or the will as universal, and right in its existence, which is precisely the particularity of the will — be posited as distinct for themselves, which belongs to the abstract reality of the concept. — But this particularity of the will for itself is arbitrariness and contingency, which, in the contract, I have given up only as arbitrariness over a single thing, not as the arbitrariness and contingency of the will itself.