First Section. Property
The person must give itself an external sphere of its freedom in order to be as Idea. Because the person is, in this first and still wholly abstract determination, the will that is infinite in and for itself, that which is distinguished from it, and which can constitute the sphere of its freedom, is likewise determined as immediately different from it and separable.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 402:
§ 402. Spirit in the immediacy of its absolute freedom is an individual, but one who knows his individuality as absolutely free will; he is 1) person, the abstract and, in this respect, subjective self-knowing of this freedom.
Property in general – person and thing, the relation of the two to one another.
a) Taking possession – mine; lasting, universal predicate in general.
b) Use of the thing – process of the thing, insofar as it is mine.
c) Alienation – removal of the thing
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 488:
§ 488. Spirit in the immediacy of its freedom being for itself is an individual, but one who knows his individuality as absolutely free will; he is person, the self-knowing of this freedom, which, being wholly abstract and empty, does not yet have its particularity, determinacy, and fulfillment in itself, but in an external thing. This, as against the subjectivity of intelligence and of arbitrary will, is something will-less, without right, and is made by it into its accident, the external sphere of its freedom—possession.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 488:
§ 488. Spirit in the immediacy of its freedom being for itself is individual, but one who knows his individuality as absolutely free will; he is person, the self-knowing of this freedom which, being in itself abstract and empty, does not yet have its particularity and fulfillment in itself, but in an external thing. This, as against the subjectivity of intelligence and arbitrary will, is something will-less and without right, and is made by it into its accident, the external sphere of its freedom, – possession.
The rational element of property lies not in the satisfaction of needs, but rather in the fact that the mere subjectivity of personality is thereby sublated. Only in property is the person as reason. Even though this first reality of my freedom in an external thing is thus a poor reality, abstract personality, precisely in its immediacy, can have no other existence than one in the determination of immediacy.
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