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42

That which is immediately different from the free spirit is, for it and in itself, the external as such – a thing, something unfree, impersonal, and without rights.

Thing, like the objective, has opposite meanings: on the one hand, when one says, that is the point – it is the thing, not the person, that matters – the meaning is that of the substantial; on the other hand, as against the person (that is, not the particular subject), the thing is the opposite of the substantial, that which, by its very determination, is merely external. – What is external for the free spirit – which must indeed be distinguished from mere consciousness – is so in and for itself; this is why the conceptual determination of nature is precisely to be externality within itself.

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2 responses to “42”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 42] Externality – nature – manifold ways of the same – here particular matter – already application. Positive science has to go through this particular kind – according to which side.

    [zu § 42 Anm.] Thing that is property – α) that which as external is mine – of the person – is – β) of spirit – as not external – but rather precisely [with] externality sublated and appropriated by me inwardly –
    Thing that it is immediately; – in this first relation properly three kinds of thing – kinds of the external
    α) Such [things as are] immediately only externally abstract, being external to me;
    β) external to natural existence and at the same time belonging to me without opposition
    γ) The spiritual, – reduced by me to externality. The latter I make external only in order to alienate it.
    Here [is the] relation. Acquisition of property – making the external into mine.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Since subjectivity is lacking in the thing, it is external not merely to the subject but to itself as well. Space and time are external in this way. I, as sensuous, am myself external, spatial and temporal. I, in having sensuous intuitions, have them of something that is external to itself. The animal can intuit, but the soul of the animal does not have the soul, does not have itself as an object, but rather something external.

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