Part Two. Morality
The moral standpoint is the standpoint of the will insofar as the will is not merely in itself but is infinite for itself (previous §). This reflection of the will into itself, and its identity for itself as against being-in-itself and immediacy and the determinacies that develop therein, determines the person into a subject.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 416:
§ 416. The particularity of the person becomes, through the judgment of free personality, an essential moment. On the one hand, subjective interest and particular welfare thereby become a purpose; on the other hand, the universal will that is in and for itself has its actuality through subjectivity, insofar as, by giving up its immediacy, it has the disposition, insight, and intention of the good.
Second stage – its object is the first – I am for myself as will being-for-itself, know of myself as the being-for-myself – am determined as subjective, determined to be subjective will – as for myself – excluding – distinguished from the objective in general. – Precisely the will determined as infinite – has posited ideally within itself the being-in-itself –
α) subject β) thing γ) conceptual determination
α) knows itself as free, i.e. that freedom is in it, it is freedom’s existence – it is its existence –
β) will wills itself, its freedom, its being-within-itself
γ) will infinite for itself – Idea – right of the subjective will, that it should have existence, should hold –
In itself, the purely subjective will and the will that is in itself are identical
Subjective freedom – pure relation of the will within itself, to itself – and in itself precisely this – everything as its own – the inner –
Not yet posited as such – at first appearance – the subjective will distinct from the objective, in-itself concept.
Inwardness of the free will
Right holds; but my intention, my purpose, resolve, principle, conscience.
Subjective will – Idea on one side – of the will – I will – ideally within me – existence as purpose, resolve, the good –
This subjective moment of freedom is called, for itself, preeminently, also freedom –
our freedom – free within itself – evil, etc., here the standpoint
– Not slave, not serf – free man, real owner is called free – ingenuus – but above all I posit – modern –
My freedom consists in this: being present with my knowledge and insight and intention (what intention I had, how the matter stood within me inwardly) – judgment, inner assent and approval, e.g. being [allowed] to express my thoughts.
Subjective will is, more precisely, moral (or immoral) rather than adequate to the concept –
Subject – to distinguish itself from another, essential determination of difference. I know of myself as being for myself.
Subjectivity of the will is
α) existence of the will in general, § 106.
β) (is Idea within itself) itself has an existence – being, § 107
γ) is the formal, § 108.
Abstract reflection into itself – relation to another –
[below:] the inner as something other than the outer.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 503:
§ 503. The free individual, who in (immediate) right is only a person, is now determined as subject – a will reflected into itself, such that the determinacy of the will as such is present in it, as existence, as its own. The determinacy of the will is, more closely considered, partly that which is in itself – belonging to the reason of the will, the in itself rightful and ethical; – partly the natural determinacy of need and drive; – partly the existence present in the expression in deed, which betakes itself thereto and makes itself belong to it. The subjective will is morally free to the extent that these determinations are posited inwardly as its own and are willed by it. Its expression in deed, together with this freedom, is action, and only such does he recognize, in its externality, as his own, and allow to be imputed to him.
It is chiefly this subjective or moral freedom that is called freedom in the European sense. By its right, the human being must in general expressly possess a knowledge of the difference between good and evil in general, and the ethical as well as the religious determinations ought not merely to make their claim upon him as external laws and precepts and be observed by him, but ought to have their assent, recognition, or even their ground in his heart, disposition, conscience, insight, and so forth. The subjectivity of the will in itself is an end in itself, an absolutely essential moment.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 503:
§ 503. The free individual, who in (immediate) right is only person, is now determined as subject – a will reflected into itself, such that the determinacy of the will as such is present in it as existence, as its own, distinct from the existence of freedom in an external thing. Inasmuch as the determinacy of the will is posited thus, inwardly, the will is at the same time also a particular one, and the further particularizations of it, and their relations to one another, emerge. The determinacy of the will is, in part, that which is in itself – that of the reason of the will, the in-itself rightful (and ethical); in part, the existence present in the expression in deed, which betakes itself thereto and comes into relation with it. The subjective will is morally free to the extent that these determinations are posited inwardly as its own and are willed by it. Its expression in deed, together with this freedom, is action, in the externality of which it recognizes as its own, and allows to be imputed to itself, only what it has known and willed thereof within itself. It is chiefly this subjective or moral freedom that is called freedom in the European sense. By virtue of its right, the human being must possess, expressly of his own, a knowledge of the difference between good and evil in general; the ethical as well as the religious determinations ought not merely, as external laws and precepts of an authority, to make their claim upon him to be obeyed by him, but ought to have their assent, recognition, or even their ground in his heart, disposition, conscience, insight, and so forth. The subjectivity of the will in itself is an end in itself, an absolutely essential moment. The moral must be taken in the wider sense, in which it does not signify merely the morally good. »Le Moral« in the French language is opposed to »Physique« and signifies the spiritual, the intellectual in general. The moral here, however, has the meaning of a determinacy of the will, insofar as it lies within the interior of the will as such, and therefore comprises within itself purpose and intention, as well as the morally evil.
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