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104

Transition from Right into Morality

Crime and avenging justice exhibit, namely, the shape of the development of the will as having gone forth into the distinction between the universal will in itself and the individual will existing for itself in opposition to it, and further, that the will in itself has returned into itself by sublating this opposition and has thereby itself become for itself and actual. Thus right is and counts, having been vindicated against the individual will that is merely for itself, as actual through its necessity. — This shaping is at the same time likewise the further-developed inner conceptual determinacy of the will. According to its concept, its actualization consists in this: to sublate, at itself, the being-in-itself and the form of immediacy in which it at first is and has this as a shape in abstract right (§ 21) — thus first to posit itself in the opposition between the universal will existing in itself and the individual will existing for itself, and then, by sublating this opposition, the negation of the negation, to determine itself as will in its existence, such that it is not merely a free will in itself but is for itself, as a negativity relating itself to itself. Its personality, which is all that the will is in abstract right, it now has as its object; the subjectivity of freedom that is thus infinite for itself constitutes the principle of the moral standpoint.

If we look back more closely at the moments through which the concept of freedom develops itself from the at first abstract determinacy of the will, relating itself to itself, and thus into the self-determination of subjectivity, then this determinacy is, in property, the abstract mine, and hence resides in an external thing; in contract, it is the mine that is mediated by will and only common to two wills; in wrong, the will of the sphere of right — its abstract being-in-itself or immediacy — is posited as a contingency through the individual will, itself contingent. On the moral standpoint this is overcome in such a way that this very contingency, reflected into itself and identical with itself, is the infinite contingency of the will resting within itself — its subjectivity.

DE

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2 responses to “104”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 104] α) Will, freedom, – to objectify itself – in an external immediate existence –
    β) Difference, will and wills – Abstr[action], first right, will in itself – and particular will in the same subject, particular interest –
    Meaning of existence, as relation to a will, determined –
    γ) Two independent wills in contract – of equal
    determination –
    αα) different in general,
    ββ) opposed; not merely two different wills in general, but particular against universal.
    δ) of unequal, opposed determination. Wrong against right –
    ε) abstract particularity, – pure subjectivity.
    α) Will in itself, immediate concept of the will;
    β) existence is particular subjective will, i.e. being-for-itself, infinite subjective will.
    Will that is free for itself – appearance of existence – for itself, first difference, then infinite reflection into itself – the positing of these configurations, moments, in that the conceptual determinations are as will being-for-itself. –
    Realization of right – is the infinite movement of the will out of its opposition to itself – i.e. subjectivity – the infinite particularity – being-within-itself – against – distinguished from – objectivity.
    Particularity, existence – of the will that is in itself – is the subjective will itself.
    Right holds against the particular, abstractly for-itself will.
    But its holding is itself being-for-itself.
    negative. Formal: sublation of subjectivity.
    a) through sublation of the thing, b) of my particular will in this thing – c) through sublation of the opposing will.
    Progress of the concept – a) immediacy, b) sublation
    of immediacy, c) return into itself, no longer immediate.
    Will is
    a) right; existence of freedom in an external individual thing; – elevation of the individual into universality
    b) to free itself from this immediacy – mediation. Relation to another will, the will’s becoming-inward. Thing as the will of another – right for me and for another. Contract is a relation of will to will, but of another – relation of the will to itself, its reality as within itself. Free in this thing, free within myself.
    c) right as right, for itself – is as valid; – as necessary existence; what can stand opposed to right is only wrong – right is valid, is confirmed – this the confirmation of right – as a determination of it, but not merely a determination – but as actuality – for itself again will within itself
    right for itself – infinitely returned into itself as such, infinity within itself.
    Returned not merely as conceptual determination, but as existence, as subjectivity, will within itself – will as for itself
    α) in contract – its interest –
    β) anger, against wrong – singular being-for-itself of feeling. But in itself, in a just will, no longer as something singular for itself – right for itself – at first abstr[action], being-for-itself, moral will, will within itself, reason.

    [zu § 104 Anm.] First
    α) immediately singular [will] (desire)
    β) particular – i.e. common
    γ) will in itself.
    Right as right holds – relation of right to itself – only through mediation – negation of the contingent, single will. –
    Right in itself – in relation to subjective will (not pedagogically, discipline, education of states) but to the rightful will, will in the sphere of right – (hence revenge, punishment not against children, the uneducated – only coercion as such, force turning itself against externality).
    Will for itself – within it; – formal universality – with itself, as with itself –
    Three forms of the progression of the determination: a) of the subject (person), b) of the thing, c) of the conceptual determination of [right].
    a) of the person (of the will) in its object, itself
    objective
    α) existence as singular, existent will, wills itself, this
    β) singular existence as at the same time the will of another. Existence of common will in value
    γ) right, existence of the universal will in itself, of the in-itself, i.e. of the true will, is Idea.
    Will is as such for itself – but how – a) as desire, singular β) …
    b) of the thing
    α) this individual thing
    β) common thing – value, – and property of everyone, and as separated, between owners. Existence of freedom; the individual thing vanishes. What does the will that is in itself will? right, i.e. the existence of freedom as such
    γ) the thing itself, substance, right; –
    c) of the conceptual determination of right
    α) right in general, immediately, for us, only in itself
    β) right posited, particular positedness as common will – binding, as in itself, yet contingent,
    γ) right – posited.
    Interest, objectivity of right – positedness –
    α) immediately for us, β) posited, – merely particular – here as subjective arbitrariness, γ) posited, – as it is in itself – as right, – right for itself –
    This determination for us or in itself – right for itself – is still, as right, the subjectivity of right.
    Subjectivity is will – as such within itself – thus right as within the will
    That right as right is essentially within the will – thus within its purpose – its insight, intention –
    Subjective will as the existence of the will.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    To truth it belongs that the concept should be, and that this existence should correspond to it. In right, the will has its existence in something external; but what is further required is that the will should have this same existence within itself, in something internal: it must be, for itself, subjectivity, and must have itself over against itself. This relation to itself is the affirmative, but this it can attain only through the sublation of its immediacy. The immediacy that is sublated in crime thus leads, through punishment—that is, through the nullity of this nullity—to affirmation – to morality.

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