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103

The demand that this contradiction (like the contradiction present in the other kind of wrong; § 86, § 89), which is present here in the manner in which the wrong is annulled, should be resolved, is the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and shape as well as from the contingency of power — a justice which is thus not avenging but punitive. In this lies, in the first place, the demand for a will which, as a particular subjective will, should will the universal as such. This concept of morality, however, is not merely something demanded, but has itself emerged from this very movement.

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2 responses to “103”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 501:

    § 501. The self-assertion of right in itself is mediated α) through the affirmative relation of the particular will (the judge) to right – which is at first contingent – and β) through the negation of the particular will, which could just as well behave negatively toward right too – through coercion, which is grounded in the right of the universal will, of right in itself, against the particular will, and which is possible because the will has its existence in an external thing. But coercion is no more than possible, insofar as I can withdraw myself, as free, from every existence – indeed from the very scope of existence, from life. Rightfully, however, coercion is only the sublation of a first, immediate coercion.

  2. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 501:

    § 501. The self-assertion of right-in-itself is mediated a) by the fact that a particular will, the judge, is commensurate with right and has an interest in proceeding against the crime (which, in revenge, is at first contingent), and ß) through the (likewise at first contingent) power of execution to negate the negation of right posited by the criminal. This negation of right has its existence in the will of the criminal; revenge or punishment therefore turns, 1. against the person or the property of the criminal, 2. and exercises coercion against him. Coercion, in this sphere of right generally, already takes place against the thing – in seizing it and in maintaining it against another’s seizure – since in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in an external thing (as such, or as corporeality) and can be laid hold of only in this. – But coercion is no more than possible, insofar as I can withdraw myself, as free, from every existence – indeed from the very scope of existence, from life. Rightfully, it is only the sublation of a first, immediate coercion.

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