That, as against this taking of the thing merely as this particular thing, and as against the merely opining as well as the arbitrary will, the objective or universal element should be recognizable in part as value, should in part hold good as right, and that the subjective arbitrariness opposed to right should in part be superseded — this, too, is here at first likewise only a demand.
No punishment is imposed for civil and naive wrong, for here I have willed nothing against right. In the case of fraud, however, punishments do come into play, because what is at stake here is the right that has been violated.
§ 89: What helps against fraud
What must happen against fraud? Three things.
First, the true value should be recognizable. Not just what someone thinks of a thing.
Second, right should hold good, not the whim of the individual.
Third, the arbitrary will of the fraudster should not hold good. He should not get away with his trick.
But for now, all this is only a demand. There is no power yet to enforce it.
A difference from the honest dispute:
Whoever loses an honest dispute gets no punishment. After all, he did not want anything against right. He only made a mistake. Fraud is different. Here the wrongdoer has violated right itself. That is why fraud calls for punishment.
Summary: Against fraud, value and right should hold good again. Here this is still a demand. Unlike the honest dispute, fraud deserves punishment.
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