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86

In the parties, the recognition of right is bound up with an opposed particular interest, and with an opinion answering to it. Against this semblance, right in itself likewise emerges, within that very semblance (previous §), as represented and demanded. But it is, at first, only as an ought, since the will is not yet present as one that has freed itself from the immediacy of interest — as one that, though particular, would have the universal will as its purpose; nor is it here yet determined as a recognized actuality of such a kind that the parties would have to renounce their particular opinion and interest in the face of it.

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4 responses to “86”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 412:

    § 412. On account of the external relation contained in this judgment, it has contingency: first, in such a way that although the universal substance of the predicate, namely the free will of personality, is recognized, there is a deviation in the subsumption of this thing under the particular will of this person; – a simple negative judgment, which expresses the civil lawsuit, for whose settlement a third judgment, one without interest in the matter, is required.

  2. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 497:

    § 497. Against this form of semblance, the one right in itself, still in immediate unity with the various grounds of right, is at the same time posited, willed, and recognized as affirmative. The difference lies only in the subsumption of this thing under the right in itself by the particular will of these persons; – the unpremeditated wrong, – a simple negative judgment, which expresses the civil lawsuit, for whose settlement a third judgment is required, one which, as the judgment of the right in itself, has no interest in the matter, and which is the power to give itself existence against that semblance.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 497:

    § 497. In that, against this semblance, the one right in itself, still in immediate unity with the various grounds of right, is posited, willed, and recognized as affirmative, the difference lies only in this, that this thing is subsumed under the right by the particular will of these persons; – the unpremeditated wrong. – This wrong is a simple negative judgment, which expresses the civil lawsuit, for whose settlement a third judgment is required, one which, as the judgment of the right in itself, has no interest in the matter and is the power to give existence to itself against their semblance.

  4. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    What is right in itself has a determinate ground, and my wrong, which I take to be right, I too defend on some ground. It is the nature of the finite and the particular to give room to contingencies; collisions must therefore occur here, for we are here at the stage of the finite. This first wrong negates only the particular will, while the universal right is respected; it is thus the mildest wrong of all. If I say that a rose is not red, I still acknowledge that it has color; I therefore do not deny the genus and negate only the particular, the red. So too, right is here acknowledged: every person wills what is right, and only what is right is to fall to them; their wrong consists only in this, that they take what they will to be right.

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