B. Fraud
Right in itself, in its distinction from right as particular and existent, is indeed determined, as something demanded, to be the essential factor, but is thereby at the same time only something demanded — on this side, something merely subjective, and hence inessential and merely apparent. Right, the universal, thus reduced by the particular will to something merely apparent — reduced, in the first instance, in the contract, to a merely external commonality of will — is fraud.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 413:
§ 413. But secondly, in the syllogism of right the persons themselves relate to one another as immediate extremes reflected into themselves, and their actual recognition comes about only through the sublation of each one’s immediacy through his free self-determination, not through compulsion. The reflection of the individual into his subjective immediacy and the negation of the universal side in the predicate of what is his own, namely the negation of the free personality of the other, is an infinite judgment, which as an action is the crime.
Right – as semblance – is the relation within the sphere of wrong in general – but here semblance is made into a predicate, a determination of right itself; – the subjective, semblance for itself, is asserted, right reduced to an empty existence
Right as abstractly for itself – without and against the in-itself – particular right without the in-itself – my subjective freedom, the subjective side of my will: it is right in my eyes –
Does not go against the (particular) will of the other, but against right in itself and against the thing. Fraud deprives me of the thing, but leaves my subjective will free.
Naive wrong goes against the subjective will of the other, but not against the thing –
Particular will respected
in naive wrong, universal will in itself respected
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 498:
§ 498. 2) The semblance of right is distinct from right-in-itself; the former, willed as such against right-in-itself by the particular — and thus by an evil — will, with the recognition of right severed from its value, – gives the wrong of fraud; – the infinite judgment as identical (§ 173) – the formal relation as against the content, i.e., against the value (§ 494).
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 498:
§ 498. 2. If, however, the semblance of right as such is willed against right-in-itself by the particular will, which thereby becomes evil, then the external recognition of right is severed from its value, and only the former is respected while the latter is violated. This gives the wrong of fraud; – the infinite judgment as identical (§ 173), – the formal relation maintained, with the content omitted.
The particular will is respected at this second stage of wrong, but universal right is not. In fraud the particular will is not violated, since the person defrauded is led to believe that right is being done to him. The right that is demanded is thus posited as something subjective and merely apparent, and this is what constitutes fraud.
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