This collision, in which the thing is claimed on the basis of a ground of right, and which constitutes the sphere of civil litigation, contains the recognition of right as the universal and decisive factor, such that the thing shall belong to whoever has the right to it. The dispute concerns only the subsumption of the thing under the ownership of the one party or the other — a simply negative judgment, in which, within the predicate of mine, only the particular is negated.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 410–411:
§ 410. Only for the sake of the externality of possession can I be violated and coerced; but since it, even as against Me as a person, is itself essentially something external, so in and for itself no violation of my personality and no coercion can, and (§ 391) should, take place.
§ 411. The property of the many is, on the one hand, the simply identical relation of persons in recognition; – on the other hand, it is mediated through the arbitrary judgment of each individual, which makes this thing into his property as against the others. Recognition is recognition not only of the abstract but of the real personality of the others, i.e., of this judgment of theirs, and what my property is and can be depends both on theirs and on their judgment concerning mine.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 496:
§ 496. The principle of right, freedom, in that it thus gives itself existence in the external, thereby falls into several relations to this same [externality] and to the other persons. (§ 491 and 493 ff.) 1) Through this there are several grounds of right, of which — since property is exclusively individual both on the side of the person and of the thing — only one is in itself the right one, but which, as against one another, are jointly posited as semblance.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 496:
§ 496. Right, as the existence of freedom in the external, falls into a multiplicity of relations to this external and to the other persons (§ 491, 493 ff.). Through this there are (1) several grounds of right, of which — since property is exclusively individual both on the side of the person and of the thing — only one is the right one, but which, because they are against one another, are jointly posited as semblance of right, over against which this is now determined as the right in itself.
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