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106

|106| Since subjectivity now constitutes the determinacy of the concept, and is distinguished from the concept as such — the will existing in itself — and since, indeed, the will of the subject, as the individual existing for itself, at the same time is (still having immediacy attached to it as well), subjectivity constitutes the existence of the concept. — With this, a higher ground has been determined for freedom: in the Idea, the side of existence, or its real moment, is now the subjectivity of the will. Only in the will as subjective can freedom, or the will existing in itself, be actual.

The second sphere, morality, thus presents, on the whole, the real side of the concept of freedom, and the process of this sphere is to sublate the will that is at first only for itself — a will immediately identical in itself only with the will existing in itself, or the universal will — with respect to this difference, into which it deepens itself, and to posit it for itself as identical with the will existing in itself. This movement is accordingly the working-out of this now-attained ground of freedom, subjectivity — which is at first abstract, namely distinguished from the concept — so as to make it equal to the concept, and thereby to procure for the Idea its true realization: that the subjective will determines itself to be equally objective, and hence truly concrete.

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3 responses to “106”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 417:

    § 417. The moral standpoint is thereby the judgment of reflection of freedom, or the relation in which personal subjectivity posits itself as absolutely self-subsistent, and therefore repels the moments of the will into self-subsistent extremes – the universal rational will, and an external self-subsistent world. Subjectivity is the middle term of these, and is just as immediately identical with them as it, because they are self-subsistent, places itself and them, and them with one another, into a merely relative relation.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In strict right, it did not matter what my principle or my intention was. This question of the will’s self-determination and motive force, as well as of its purpose, now enters here with the moral. Since a human being wants to be judged according to his self-determination, he is free in this respect, however the external determinations may stand. One cannot break into this inner conviction of the human being; no violence can be done to it, and the moral will is therefore inaccessible. A person’s worth is assessed according to his inner action, and thus the moral standpoint is freedom being-for-itself.

  3. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 106: A new ground for freedom

    Freedom now has a new, higher ground. This ground is the inner life of the human being, his own will.

    Why is this progress?

    In right, freedom was outside, in things and contracts. Now it is in me. It can become actual only in a will that knows itself.

    No one can break in here:

    No one can take my conviction from me. Others can lock me up. They can take things from me. But what I inwardly hold to be right remains mine. Now we measure a person’s worth by his inner life.

    And the task?

    For now, this inner life is only my own. It is not yet one with what holds for everyone. The whole second part shows how the will closes this gap. It should learn to will what is right from within.

    Summary: Freedom is now at home in the inner life of the human being. There it can become actual. The task is to join the inner life with the universal.

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