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107

The self-determination of the will is at the same time a moment of its concept, and subjectivity is not only the side of its existence but its own determination (§ 104). The will determined as subjective, free for itself, at first as concept, must itself have existence in order to be as Idea. The moral standpoint is therefore, in its shape, the right of the subjective will. According to this right, the will recognizes something and is something only insofar as it is its own, only insofar as the will is therein as something subjective.

The same process of the moral standpoint (see the remark to the preceding §) has, from this side, the shape of being the development of the right of the subjective will, or of the manner of its existence — such that it further determines what it recognizes as its own in its object, so as to be its true concept, the objective in the sense of its universality.

DE

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2 responses to “107”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Existence of freedom – it determines itself as subjectivity – its essential determinacy – ground of existence in general – freedom is to exist with this determinacy – right of subjective freedom –
    My moral right is that something be my purpose, end, interest – be recognized and held to be good by me – Interest mea, ut ego intersim.
    That this moment of my subjectivity – be in it, exist there, is its right – right of intention – insight – of conscience – infinite right.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    This whole determination of the subjectivity of the will is in turn a whole which, as subjectivity, must also have objectivity. It is only in the subject that freedom can first be realized, for the subject is the true material for this realization; but this existence of the will, which we called subjectivity, is different from the will that is in and for itself. The will must, namely, free itself from this other one-sidedness of mere subjectivity, in order to become a will that is in and for itself. In morality it is the particular interest of the human being that is at issue, and this is precisely its high worth: that the human being knows himself as absolute and determines himself. The uneducated person lets everything be imposed on him by the force of strength and by natural determinacies; children have no moral will but let themselves be determined by their parents; but the educated person, becoming inward, wills that he himself be present in everything he does.

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