47

As a person, I am myself immediately a single individual; in its further determination this means, first of all: I am alive in this organic body, which, as regards its content, is my universal, undivided, external existence – the real possibility of all further determinate existence. But as a person I have, at the same time, my life and body, like other things, only insofar as it is my will.

That, on the side according to which I exist not as being-for-itself but as the immediate concept, I am alive and have an organic body, rests on the concept of life and that of spirit as soul – on moments taken from the philosophy of nature (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 259 ff., cf. §§ 161, 164, and 298) 1 and from anthropology (ibid., § 318).
I have these limbs, this life, only insofar as I will; the animal cannot mutilate or kill itself, but the human being can.

  1. Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 337 ff. ↩︎

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Comments

2 responses to “47”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Private owner as this one – and precisely as this one I am within natural life.
    a) my body
    α) in relation to myself – I find myself in possession
    Thus, too, according to needs, I appropriate external things –
    Animals have no right to their body

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Animals do indeed have themselves in possession: their soul is in possession of their body; but they have no right to their life, because they do not will it.

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