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111

b) |109| The content, even though it contains something particular (this may be taken from wherever it will), has, as the content of the will that is reflected into itself in its determinacy, and hence identical with itself and universal, α) the determination of being appropriate, in itself, to the will existing in itself, or of having the objectivity of the concept; but β) since the subjective will, as existing for itself, is at the same time still formal (§ 108), this is only a demand, and it likewise contains the possibility of not being appropriate to the concept.

DE ES

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2 responses to “111”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    β) Essential difference and relation to the universal – opposition of the objective as concept against particularity – unity is a demand.
    Objectivity here [means] universality – truth –
    [above it:] universal

  2. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 111: Should the purpose also be right?

    My purpose is mine. But is that enough? No. It should also be right.

    The moral will is no longer a mere single act of wanting. It thinks. It knows that there is something right that holds for everyone. So it makes a claim: My purpose should agree with what is right.

    But here lies the difficulty:

    For now, this is only a demand. The will wants what is right, but it does not have it for sure. It can be mistaken. It can also want the wrong thing. The agreement is possible, but not certain.

    Summary: The moral purpose should agree with what is right. Here, this is a demand. The will can meet it or miss it.

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