This identity of content, however, receives, on the moral standpoint — where freedom, this identity of the will with itself, is for the will (§ 105) — its closer, distinctive determination.
a) The content is, for me, determined as mine in such a way that, in its identity, it is not only my inner purpose but, insofar as it has attained external objectivity, also contains my subjectivity for me.
α) My content as I, substantial, objective in general. [§ 110]
β) Opposition – objectivity of the concept. [§ 111]
γ) External [will] – subjectivity of others. [§ 112]
α) abstract identity – as against subjectivity and objectivity, i.e. externality in general –
In the accomplished end, I, my work (my interest), am to retain intention –
The content of the subjective or moral will contains a determination peculiar to it: namely, even when it has attained the form of objectivity, it is nonetheless to go on containing my subjectivity throughout, and the deed is to count only insofar as it was inwardly determined by me, was my purpose, my intention. I do not recognize as mine, in the outward expression, more than lay in my subjective will, and in that expression I demand to see my subjective consciousness again.
§ 110: I want to find myself in my deed
On the moral standpoint, something special comes in. My purpose should remain mine. Even after I have carried it out.
What does this mean?
I want to recognize myself in my deed. The deed should count as mine only as far as I really willed it. What happens beyond that, I do not recognize as mine.
An example: I write a friend a letter to comfort him. He misunderstands one sentence and feels hurt. I did not will the hurt. I say: “That is not what I meant.” In this way, I appeal to my inner life.
Summary: The moral will wants to find itself again in its deed. It recognizes as its deed only what lay in its will.
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