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117

The will that itself acts has, in its purpose directed at the existence that lies before it, a representation of its circumstances. But because it is, on account of this presupposition, finite, the objective appearance is contingent for it and may contain in itself something other than what is in its representation. The right of the will, however, is to recognize, in its deed, only this as its action, and to have responsibility only for that which, of the deed’s presuppositions, it knew to be in its purpose — what of it lay in its purpose. — The deed can only be imputed as the responsibility of the will — the right of knowledge.

DE

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  1. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The will has before it an existence upon which it acts; but in order to be able to do this, it must have a representation of that existence, and true guilt lies in me only insofar as the existence before me lay within my knowledge. The will, because it has such a presupposition, is finite — or rather, because it is finite, it has such a presupposition. Insofar as I think and will rationally, I do not stand at this standpoint of finitude, for the object upon which I act is not an other over against me; but finitude carries within it a constant limit and restriction. I have before me an other that is merely something contingent, a merely externally necessary thing, which may coincide with me or may be different from me. But I am only what stands in relation to my freedom, and the deed is guilt of my will only insofar as I know about it. Oedipus, who slew his father without knowing it, is not to be accused as a parricide; but in the ancient legislations, subjective factors, imputation, were not valued as highly as they are today. This is why, among the ancients, sanctuaries arose, so that one fleeing from vengeance might be protected and received.

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