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118

|114| The action, furthermore, as translated into external existence, which develops in every direction according to its connection within external necessity, has manifold consequences. The consequences, as the shape that has the purpose of the action for its soul, belong to the action (are what pertains to it) — but at the same time, as the purpose that has been posited into externality, the action is abandoned to external powers, which attach to it something quite other than what it is for itself, and roll it onward into remote, alien consequences. It is likewise the right of the will to impute to itself only the former, since only these lie in its purpose.

What are contingent and what are necessary consequences contains an indeterminacy, arising from the fact that inner necessity, in the finite, enters into existence as external necessity, as a relation of individual things to one another, things which, as self-subsistent, are indifferent to one another and come together only externally. The principle of despising the consequences in one’s actions, and the other principle of judging actions by their consequences and making these the measure of what is right and good — both are equally abstract understanding. The consequences, as the action’s own immanent shaping, only manifest its nature and are nothing other than the action itself; the action cannot, therefore, disown and despise them. But conversely, there is likewise comprised among them what externally intervenes and is contingently added, which does not concern the nature of the action itself. — The development of the contradiction that the necessity of the finite contains is, in existence, precisely the turning of necessity into contingency, and conversely. |115| To act therefore means, from this side, to abandon oneself to this law. — Herein lies the fact that it redounds to the criminal’s advantage if his action has less evil consequences, just as a good action must put up with having had no, or fewer, consequences, and that a crime from which the consequences have more fully developed is charged the more heavily to its account. — The heroic self-consciousness (as in the tragedies of the ancients, Oedipus and the like) has not yet advanced, out of its solid integrity, to the reflection that distinguishes deed and action, the external occurrence from purpose and knowledge of the circumstances, nor to the splintering of the consequences, but takes upon itself the responsibility in the entire compass of the deed.

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3 responses to “118”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 118] To judge an action by its consequences. –
    α) A person must not be too anxious and scrupulous with regard to consequences – he can overcome them – to a scrupulous person – this and countless things can follow –
    β) Also cautious, if only to avoid the appearance of evil – put no bravado into it – unconcerned, a thousand vexations.
    Dolus indirectus
    Purpose asserts the particular, what attaches itself to it as something other, not contained in the purpose – I thus disown the action, as a universal, as none of mine –
    The wholly immediate aspect of the action – and its nature –
    Nothing particular stands in a merely external connection with others – rather, it is in itself a universal.
    Consequences for the sake of the principle – Robespierre – slavery – the principle and the concrete condition – It is not a one-sided doing – rather, mutual self-consciousness belongs to its execution; culture – upbringing, circumstances are concrete – to release a mass from its order – one must know what one is doing – Abstract principle
    – Guilt or innocence – in relation to ill – and of the ill in relation to guilt. – Suffering in general, – punishment included among it, – as a consequence of the action generally – or also not – relation, the demand for a connection between suffering and the will of a particular action or of the general character as such – this rather something undeserved.
    α) Superficially [:] the good should fare well – the wicked ill – this is bound up partly with conceptions of providence – a discussion that does not belong here – partly, in the world, in this generality, it lies in the nature of the state that the upright person, with his property, finds roughly the fruits of his diligence, occupation, and satisfaction for his talents, etc. – but always as an individual. Contingency also enters in here – lottery. – But guilt and innocence pertain more closely to the will – and through the will of another – (not through nature – suffering innocently through storm, earthquake) – suffering innocently through the will of another, through a complication of circumstances that do [not] lie in the will – arouses great interest. α) An unwarranted will, coarseness, passion – is no ethical interest – likewise the contingent violence of desire, of the sensuous will – it is indifferent whether it is external nature or inner contingency.

    [zu § 118 Anm.] Dramatic interest. α) Action – outcomes as results of the will – β) of both – for both are wills – essentially, – γ) of the substantial will, – entitled; – this, in accordance with the Idea, dramatic [interest] should not merely interest [us], move [us], – compassion, but essential interest, – among human beings – as real – acting. – The true interest here [lies] not in suffering innocently, but α) the honor of the will of him who suffers; what befalls him through his own guilt – β) what he has done, of which he is guilty, – entitled to it – at the same time a substantial will – hence innocent; – as to substance – guilty as to form – γ) not a matter of chance, but αα) the will of another – has produced this reversal of the consequences, which are evil, negative, for the subject, – β) or has already, beforehand, willed the situation for himself in such a way – has willed such a sacrifice for a purpose, taken it upon himself voluntarily – not suffered innocently – put himself in danger – done [his] duty – military [service] – in αα) the will of the other, – in order to be essential – equally entitled – Orestes: punishment, injury – higher collision of the ethical powers, i.e. a negative – Orestes – punishes not only Aegisthus, but also [his] mother – she [is] monstrously entitled against him (– even against Agamemnon): this is ethically interesting, because her will is essential. – In the modern [sense], “guilt” [means] a base, evil will – how [can there be] affirmative interest in him? – What is fitting is simply that he be hanged – which he does not will – this alone is the possible action under such circumstances – Hostile Brothers, fate – ancient fate [as] inner, true ethical necessity – modern[,] chance – blind necessity. – The fate of the family [is] the inner savagery of [its] conditions. Brothers, passion for a girl, chance, not ethical necessity – and crude flaring-up, momentary, in the other, to [the point of] murder – the rest (the mother) – a quite superfluous embellishment. – In mod[ern times] α) tyrants, – against a will – no worthy spectacle, unhappy, but not tragic, β) an evil will becomes guilty – and is punished; – criminal justice –
    Drama. Actions [are] essential.
    Art – individuals who are wholly themselves [in] what they are – elucidated through contrast – modern times – official and civic relations – mores – customs – [these constitute] a universal character – one [person is] what the other [is] – upright, not as his individual character.
    In office I must do a great many things which I do for the sake of the office, for the sake of order (matriculating, and so forth, attending this or that lecture course – one does not know from the outset what this is [for]).
    Ancient art – free individuals – entirely themselves – wholly of one piece – Hence [it] does not enter, in its dramatic representations, into the half-measure whereby someone is something, does [something], has done [something], and also has not done [it] – his actuality – without his will. – They therefore want to be guilty both of what they have done, and of what they suffer.
    Suffering, [being] negative, cannot be willed directly.
    But in such a way that they themselves are guilty of this suffering – i.e. are seized only through their own deed –
    They are, in this, noble, heroic individuals – not innocent as such. They have done something to which there is a high entitlement – Orestes punishes the murderess of his father – but [she] is [his] mother – a monstrous violation of something equally infinitely entitled – inseparable [from it] – Antigone renders her brother the last honor – violates the command of the state, which is equally infinitely entitled. – Not innocence, not [something] known, not [something] willed – the interest in them [lies in] their having α) acted, β) [in a way] that is entitled – or at least not impermissible – the misfortune in this of having violated yet another [person] – Oedipus – the knowing one –
    Innocence – not tragic, at least not heroic – [strives] to shift off from itself as much as possible,
    Has willed [it] – honor – not to detach oneself from one’s deed, [its] externality – to will also to submit oneself to what follows from it – to take it upon oneself – the misfortune equally fitting there –
    Unhappy, tormented – seized not through his action, but through his property, body, life, family, children – circumstances, carelessness, situation – Not necessary, i.e. not rational, not a reversal of his action itself, but a reversal only in the wrongful opinion of others.
    [This] belongs to the sphere of natural crudeness and baseness – an unwarranted evil passion seizes upon the other’s external weakness – not his ethical weakness, his crime, or the one-sidedness of his ethical life – [this] is no ethical relation at all – a wholly external affair – circumstances that create the appearance – people who have an evil will –
    Misfortune merely as such has no ethical interest – just as wrong, nor punishment [either], are mere evils.
    Dramatic – his honor – the honor that it is his own affair, sprung from his will – acting and entitled acting – modern – the contingency of character.
    Transition from purpose to intention: purpose: action, but this in manifold connection, consequences – contingent or necessary – thus is natural occurrence constituted from the standpoint of reflection. – But the truth of this common necessity and connection is the universal. I, [as] a thinking being, and this universal – relating itself to itself – that is mine, [and] with that the consequences are cut off, led back into itself. – Reflection [is] at the same time an opposition to the individual. – A human being must have an intention in acting, not merely a purpose – because [he is] a thinking being.
    The immediate content of the action as reflected into itself.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In the fact that I recognize only what was my representation lies the transition to intention. For only what I knew of the circumstances can be imputed to me. But there are necessary consequences attached to every action, even if I bring forth only a single, immediate thing, and these consequences are, in this respect, the universal that the action contains within itself. The consequences that could have been prevented I cannot, indeed, foresee, but I must know the universal nature of the individual deed. The matter here is not the individual thing but the whole, which relates not to the determinate character of the particular action but to its universal nature. The transition from purpose to intention consists, then, in this: that I ought to know not merely my individual action but the universal that is bound up with it. Appearing in this way, the universal is what is willed by me, my intention.

  3. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 118: The consequences of an action

    An action does not stand still. It has consequences, and the consequences have consequences again.

    Which consequences belong to my action?

    Some consequences belong to the action itself. They only show what the action is. Someone who sets a fire makes a house burn. He cannot deny this consequence.

    Other consequences come in from outside. The wind turns, and the fire jumps to the neighbor’s barn. This has less to do with the action itself. Here outside powers step in.

    The will has the right to impute to itself only the first kind. Only these lay in its purpose.

    Two false rules:

    One says: Do not care about the consequences. The other says: Judge every action only by its consequences. Both are too simple. The consequences tell us something about the action. But chance also mixes in.

    This has a hard side. Suppose someone commits a crime and has luck. Then the smaller consequences work in his favor. And a good action must put up with it when it achieves little. Whoever acts gives himself up to chance.

    The old heroes:

    In the Greek tragedies, the hero takes all the guilt on himself. Oedipus does not ask what he knew. He carries everything that followed from his action. Back then, people had not yet learned to separate the deed from the knowledge.

    Summary: Some consequences belong to the action, others come in by chance. I must answer only for the first kind. But whoever acts always gives himself up to chance as well.

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