5

The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminacy or of the pure reflection of the ego into itself, in which every limitation, every content immediately present by nature, needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined by any means whatsoever, is dissolved; the boundless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of itself.

|17| Those who regard thinking as a particular, distinct faculty, separate from the will as a likewise distinct faculty, and who even go so far as to consider thinking as detrimental to the will—especially the good will—immediately show from the outset that they know nothing at all of the nature of the will; a remark that will often have to be made regarding the same subject. — If one side of the will as determined here—this absolute possibility of being able to abstract from every determination in which I find myself or which I have posited in myself, the flight from every content as a limit—is that toward which the will determines itself, or is held fast by representation as freedom itself, then this is negative freedom or the freedom of the understanding. — It is the freedom of emptiness, which is elevated to actual shape and passion; remaining merely theoretical, it becomes in the religious sphere the fanaticism of pure Indian contemplation, but turning toward actuality, it becomes in the political as well as the religious sphere the fanaticism of the destruction of every existing social order and the removal of individuals suspected of favoring an order, as well as the annihilation of any organization that seeks to emerge once again. Only by destroying something does this negative will have the sense of its own existence; it may well imagine that it wills some positive state, e.g., the state of universal equality or of a universal religious life, but in fact it does not will the positive actuality thereof, for this immediately brings about some order, a particularization of institutions as well as of individuals; it is, however, from the annihilation of particularization and objective determination that the self-consciousness of this negative freedom arises. Thus, what it imagines it wills can in itself be only an abstract representation, and its actualization can only be the fury of destruction.

DE ES


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6 responses to “5”

  1. P. Wannenmann

    [Wannenmann § 3]

    The science of right has the free will for its principle and beginning. This concept therefore falls, as regards its coming to be, outside that science and is thus to be taken up here as given from philosophy. The will contains, first, the element as absolute negativity, pure indeterminacy or the pure reflection of the I into being within itself, which has within it no restriction, no content determined by nature, needs, desires and drives or in whatever way, and immediately present, — the limitless infinity of the absolute abstraction of pure thinking, of universality.

  2. C.G. Homeyer

    [Homeyer § 4]

    The concept of the free will, because it is the principle and hence the beginning of the science of right, falls outside it as regards its coming-to-be and is to be taken up here as given. The will contains 1. the element of pure indeterminacy or the pure reflection of the I into being within itself, which has in it no limitation, no content determined and immediately present through nature, [through] needs, desires and drives, or in whatever manner — the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction and of universality.

    [H] Every part has a before and an after. So this science is preceded by the proof that there is a free will.

    The proof from empirical psychology, that certain phenomena of spirit, e.g. remorse [or] guilt, cannot be explained otherwise [than by freedom], is insufficient. [W] The determinists believe that remorse and guilt are [a] delusion. [H] Hence freedom has been assumed outright as a fact of consciousness without further proof. But philosophy is not satisfied with this; it wants to comprehend the fact. [W] I find in myself that I determine myself; this is of course [a] fact, but philosophy cannot stop there; it demands that freedom be necessary. This proof must be contained in the preceding parts of the science.

    [H] The true proof is to be conducted differently: all nature, everything living, relates necessarily to spirit, but [it] is not in accordance with the concept of spirit; the resolution of the contradiction [then] leads to the freedom of spirit. [W] Dialectic is the soul of all that is itself. The soul passes over to consciousness; the resolution of the contradiction of consciousness is spirit. In free spirit, in freedom, is truth. In the other I relate only to myself. The subjective and [the] objective are identical. The result of philosophy is at the same time also the substance. [H] The principle of freedom is the highest, into which all modes of existence dissolve as into their ground, since these always contradict themselves and break themselves apart.

    [H+W] First moment. Pure indeterminacy, the I, pure thinking, contentless pure intuiting is in everyone’s consciousness. Everyone knows that he can abstract from all feelings, all content, even from the last, from life. [Hence] I can think life [as the] pure I which holds all feelings within itself.

    [W] The concept of the will can only be grasped as the unity of its two moments. The one is the consciousness that I can abstract from absolutely everything. The moment of this purity is pure thinking, the pure I, the pure reflection of the I into itself. I can negate everything — this is [an essential] moment in my self-consciousness. [H] Image [of this pure thinking]: light, the colourless, the pure in nature. Gymnosophists seek to hold fast to this moment of abstraction at all times. [W] Thus the Indians keep to this intuition; they withdraw from everything and know themselves [at one] with themselves in the simplicity [of this intuition]. The I in this sense is absolutely infinite — like space. This is [of course] only the universal of the will — the emptiness of abstraction. Freedom must [rather] externalize itself. [But] universality is absolutely the foundation. [H] That this pure universality is necessary, essential, is to be proved outside our science. It is the universal, the abstract of freedom.

  3. Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 5] 1. Will in general.
    positing oneself as universal – thinking, the positing of the universal as such; willing myself as universal – I [as] object of thinking – I as being – whoever has not thought himself is not free – whoever is not free has not thought himself, that is, not in such a way that this thinking-of-oneself, this being universal – should be precisely his being –

    [zu § 5 Anm.] α) The animal omits this or that out of fear, lets something else hold sway within it – man, through determination out of himself, for the sake of a purpose that is his own – for the sake of something positive that he wills – man can kill himself –
    The animal [has] a negative content, – remains negative – a determination foreign to it, to which it only grows accustomed – is depressed, unfaithful to its nature –
    Man, in that he renounces – for the sake of a purpose – gives up this, which he would like to have – but he remains himself, unbowed –
    Can also be will-less, let himself be compelled, of this later, to what extent compulsion –
    β) formal consideration – not for the sake of a purpose and for the sake of content – of content only later
    γ) freedom of emptiness, which fixes itself, posits its being solely in this abstraction – freedom of the understanding – everything determinate is – a limit, a limitation.
    Formal. Rapturous enthusiasm for a determinacy. Other. Appearance – isolated for itself – recalled in the note – determinacy, appearance – none to determine.

  4. Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Contained in this element of the will is the fact that I can free myself from everything, give up all ends, abstract from everything. Man alone can let everything fall, even his own life: he can commit suicide; the animal cannot do this; it always remains merely negative, caught within a determination alien to it, to which it merely becomes habituated. Man is the pure thinking of himself, and only in thinking does man possess this power of giving himself universality, that is, of extinguishing all particularity, all determinacy. This negative freedom, or this freedom of the understanding, is one-sided, but this one-sidedness always contains an essential determination within itself: it is therefore not to be discarded; but the defect of the understanding is that it raises a one-sided determination to the sole and highest one. Historically, this form of freedom occurs frequently. Among the Indians, for example, it is held to be the highest thing merely to persist in the knowledge of one’s simple identity with oneself, to remain in this empty space of one’s inwardness, like the colorless light in pure intuition, and to renounce every activity of life, every end, every representation. In this way man becomes Brahman: there is no longer any difference between finite man and Brahman; every distinction has rather vanished in this universality. This form appears more concretely in the active fanaticism of political as well as religious life. To this belongs, for example, the time of Terror of the French Revolution, in which every distinction of talents, of authority, was to be abolished. This age was a trembling, a quaking, an intolerance toward everything particular; for fanaticism wills something abstract, no articulation: wherever distinctions come forth, it finds this contrary to its indeterminacy and abolishes them. This is also why the people, during the Revolution, destroyed again the institutions that they themselves had made, because every institution is contrary to the abstract self-consciousness of equality.

  5. The Logical Development

    First moment of the will — pure indeterminacy, pure reflection of the I into itself, absolute abstraction or universality.

    The analysis of the will into its moments begins with the simplest: with the capacity to look away from every content. Whatever fills the will — need, drive, what is found — it can detach itself from it; precisely this detaching is what “reflection into itself” means, not thinking about oneself but a return from everything determinate to oneself. Because nothing remains in this but the empty I, this moment is called universality in the sense of abstraction, and its infinity is that of a limit that appears nowhere, because there is nothing there that would be limited. Hegel at the same time states that this moment, taken for itself, is one-sided, and in the Remark he shows where it leads when it is taken for the whole of freedom: to a willing that feels itself only in destruction, because every order would already be a particularization.

  6. Hegel (Simple)

    § 5: The first step of the will (being able to say no)

    The will has three sides. Here we look at the first one. Its name is pure indeterminacy.

    What does that mean? I can free myself from everything.

    I can ignore my hunger.

    I can forget where I am and who I am.

    I can withdraw into my bare thinking.

    Then nothing limits me anymore. I am only “I”. This is pure abstraction.

    Explanation: Some people think that thinking and willing are two different things. Some even think that thinking does harm, above all to the good will. People who talk like this know nothing about the will. For only because I can think can I free myself from my drives. Willing is thinking.

    The danger: Some believe that this breaking free is already the whole of freedom. Then they have negative freedom before them. We also call it the freedom of the understanding. It is dangerous because it is empty.

    If it stays mere contemplation, it turns into fanaticism in religion. In India, people withdraw entirely into pure contemplation. They want nothing more from the world. In the end, they want to be nothing at all.

    If it turns toward the real world, it becomes the fanaticism of destruction. Every order, every institution, every group is a determination, and so a limit. This freedom clears them away. And it clears away anyone it suspects of siding with an order.

    And here is the sharpest point. It believes it wants something good, for example universal equality. But it cannot want it at all. For suppose this state becomes real. Then it brings an order with it again. It brings institutions again, and differences again. Only in destroying does this will feel that it exists. So of everything it wants, only the fury of destruction remains.

    Summary: Being able to say no is the beginning of freedom. But whoever only says no destroys the world.

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