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8

The further determination of particularization (β. § 6) constitutes the difference between the forms of the will: a) insofar as the determinacy is the formal opposition of the subjective and objective as an external, immediate existence, this is the formal will as self-consciousness, which finds an external world before it and, as the individuality returning into itself within its determinacy, is the process of translating the subjective purpose into objectivity through the mediation of activity and a means. |21| In spirit as it is in and for itself—within which determinacy is simply its own and true (Encyclop., § 363) 1—the relationship of consciousness constitutes only the side of the appearance of the will, which is no longer considered here on its own account.

  1. Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 443 ↩︎

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5 responses to “8”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 8] 1. Will in general. Form of purpose – superfluous for the further discussion.
    Material – given, found object, alteration, means – form of immediacy – as immediacy against the immediate – sensuous existence.
    2. Determinacy of the will – determinacy, particularization at first in general – each a particular – without distinction. Return is here accomplishment; – sublation of the opposition of subjectivity and externality.
    α) The abstractly universal [moment] of the activity of the will. Activity of self-consciousness, when the opposition has this determinacy. Sensuous mode of accomplishment – In each and every act of will – accomplishments of right the same – taking possession – crime – punishment – labor, the state – in any case spirit turning to spirit, – will turning to will. Accomplishment – that the other will lets it stand as valid.
    The relation of consciousness adds this side – Here what is considered are the determinations of the will – as such indeed to be realized in this way – but determinations – according to their nature and content – whether subjective or objective – Here validity α) rational in and for itself, β) in its own peculiar material, medium, i.e. in the subjective will – insofar as this is opposed to or not yet in conformity with the rational – opposition only of the universal rational will and the subjective will. Opposition within the will itself – not of consciousness. Both sides spiritual. – Here objectification of the will in itself – concept, thought.

    All determinations of the will can be called purposes, determinations that are meant to hold – but there is no interest in regarding them in this way, because the content of the purpose, as of one not yet carried out, – and the objective purpose, are one and the same content.
    What is to be carried out here is the concept of freedom – it [is] the purpose; its execution, its objectification, is its development, the positing of the moments – (as determinations of freedom contained within it) – moments, which the concept – objectification here means this distinction – at one time included within the concept, at another time set apart –
    Shape of consciousness – also honor, fame, fear, hope, envy – consciousness of others regarding me – eating – how the object is determined, lack –

  2. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 470:

    § 470. The practical spirit, as formal will, contains at first a doubled ought: 1) in the opposition of the determinacy posited out of it against its immediate determinate being, against its determinate being and condition, which in consciousness develops at the same time into a relation to external objects. 2) That first self-determination is at first not raised into the universality of thinking, which therefore in itself constitutes the ought over against it as regards form, and can constitute it as regards content as well; – an opposition which at first is only for us.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 470:

    § 470. The practical spirit, as formal or immediate will, contains at first a doubled ought: 1. in the opposition of the determinacy posited out of it against the immediate determinate being which thereby re-enters, against its determinate being and condition, which in consciousness develops at the same time into a relation to external objects. 2. That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is at first not raised into the universality of thinking, which therefore in itself constitutes the ought over against it as regards form, and can constitute it as regards content as well; – an opposition which at first is only for us.

  4. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The consideration of the determinacy of the will belongs to the understanding and is at first not speculative. The will is in general determined not only in the sense of content, but also in the sense of form. Determinacy according to form is purpose and the carrying out of the purpose: the purpose is at first only something inward to me, something subjective, but it is also meant to become objective, to cast off the deficiency of mere subjectivity. One may ask here: why is this a deficiency? If that which has a deficiency does not at the same time stand above its deficiency, then the deficiency is, for that thing, no deficiency at all. For us the animal is something deficient, but not for itself. The purpose, insofar as it is at first only ours, is for us a deficiency, for freedom and will are for us a unity of the subjective and the objective. The purpose is therefore to be posited objectively, and thereby it does not fall into a new one-sided determination, but arrives only at its realization.

  5. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 8: From plan to deed (the form of the will)

    Now we look more closely at how the will determines itself. First, the simplest form.

    I have something in mind. For example: I want to build a table. At first, this plan is only inside me. It is inner (subjective). Outside is the world. It is simply there and does not care about my plan.

    What do I do? I look for a means: wood and tools. And I become active: I saw and I plane. In this way, I translate my plan into the world. In the end, the table stands there. Now my plan is outside too, visible to everyone (objective).

    Here two sides face each other: I with my purpose, and the world that I find before me. We call this the formal will.

    Why does the plan want to go outside at all? Because a plan that stays in the head lacks something. But who feels a lack? Only someone who also stands above it. An animal does not suffer from missing something. In our eyes, the animal lacks something. In its own eyes, it does not. But we know: Freedom is the unity of inside and outside. That is why the purpose pushes outward. It does not become one-sided in doing so. Only then does it become real.

    One more limit: This facing of I and world is only the surface of the will. This is how the will appears. From now on, something else will occupy us: a will whose content is entirely its own.

    Summary: The will first has the form of a plan. I carry this plan out into the world through activity and means. But this is only its outer side.

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