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9

b) Insofar as the determinations of the will are the will’s own—its particularization reflected into itself in general—they are “The asunderness of the world of appearance is totality and is entirely contained in its relation-to-self. The relation of appearance to itself is thus completely determined, having form within itself and, because of this identity, as an essential subsistence. Thus, form is content and, according to its developed determinacy, the law of appearance. Into form as not reflected into self falls the negative of appearance, the unself-subsistent and changeable—it is the indifferent, external form.
Note: Regarding the opposition of form and content, it is essential to maintain that content is not formless, but just as much possesses the form within itself as form is an external to it. There is a doubling of form present: once as reflected into itself, it is the content; another time as not reflected into itself, it is the external existence indifferent to the content. In-itself, the absolute relation of content and form is present here, namely their turning into one another, so that content is nothing but the turning of form into content, and form is nothing but the turning of content into form. This turning is one of the most important determinations. However, this is only posited in the absolute relation.” (§ 133 Enz. 1830 Content and Form). This content, as content of the will, is its purpose according to the form specified in a)—partly an internal or subjective purpose in representational willing, partly a purpose actualized and carried out through the mediation of activity which translates the subjective into objectivity.

DE ES

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2 responses to “9”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 9] b. Particularization as posited within it, – its content – on the side of the consciousness of the individual will, thus purpose. All determinations of the will are to that extent purposes – here only as determinations.
    What matters is this particular content.
    At first formal, or posited in general through the will – formal freedom – natural drives – anger – also I, do it, will it, when I am outside myself in passion, also formally my will – Precisely suffering, passive will, outside itself –
    Here the separation of the actual free will – i.e.
    α) will in general, [the] inner –
    β) will in its purpose, its determination, outward expression, i.e. determinacy through and with itself – its content wholly its own

  2. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 9: What I want (the content of the will)

    Just now, the I stood facing the world. That was the form. Now we ask about the content. So the question is: What do I actually want?

    The will determines itself. These determinations do not come from outside. They are its own. That is why we call them its content.

    This content has a special shape: It is a purpose. I do not simply want just anything. I want to achieve something.

    The purpose exists in two ways.

    It can still be inside me. Then I picture to myself what I want. The purpose is a plan.

    It can already be outside. Then my activity has made it real. The purpose is now a finished deed.

    Both are the same purpose. Once as a plan, once as a deed.

    Summary: What the will wants is its content, and this content is a purpose. First it is a plan inside me. Then it is a finished deed in the world.

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