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10

This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is in the first instance immediate. Thus the will is free only in itself, or for us, or it is the will in general in its concept. Only when the will has itself as its object1 is it for itself what it is in itself.

According to this determination, finitude consists in the fact that what something is in itself or according to its concept is an existence or appearance different from what it is for itself; thus, for example, the abstract externality of nature is space in itself, but time for itself. |22| Two things are to be noted concerning this: first, that because only the idea is true, if one grasps an object or determination only as it is in itself or in its concept, one does not yet have it in its truth; furthermore, that something as it is as concept or in itself likewise exists, and this existence is a distinct configuration of the object (like space above); the separation of being-in-itself and being-for-itself which is present in the finite constitutes at the same time its mere determinate being or appearance – (as an example of this will immediately occur in the natural will, and then in formal right, etc.). The understanding stops at mere being-in-itself and thus calls freedom, according to this being-in-itself, a capacity [faculty], since in this way it is indeed only a possibility. But the understanding regards this determination as absolute and perennial, and considers its relation to what it wills, and generally to its reality, as merely an application to a given material, which does not belong to the essence of freedom itself; in this way, it deals only with the abstractum, not with its idea and truth.

  1. Hegel’s Handexemplar. i.e. has as its content and purpose ↩︎

DE ES

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6 responses to “10”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 388:

    § 388. Spirit as intelligence is at first, however, abstractly for itself; as free will it is fulfilled, because it is as concept, as self-determining. This fulfilled being-for-self or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 10] Immediate will – will in itself – is immediate only in its concept. This [is] a highly important speculative remark – the true only through the movement – of its being-other – and its having-returned-into-itself – and this immediate will is itself the being-other of the will.
    [It] is the subjectivity of the concept – (this reflection makes it into the immediate) is first will, hence immediate – not yet advanced further. But it lies precisely within the concept itself that the will should be – the reflecting, the going-beyond-itself, and the sublating of this its being-other. – has [it] as object, i.e. as content and purpose –
    As before: the unlimited is the abstract, precisely it itself is limited, the one of the limit[ation] – for to limit[ing] belong two, –
    Immediate
    α) as opposed simply to the mediated in general, i.e. to the relative – the relational – contract – property –
    β) [as opposed] to the ideal – the mediating posited as sublated –
    § 10. What is true will; free will, that has itself as its object – its freedom – wills only it – it as its existence – e.g. precisely in right –

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 469:

    § 469. Spirit as will knows itself as determining itself, and thus as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled being-for-self or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit, whose concept is reason. – The finitude of the will consists in its formalism, according to which it is, as self-determining, with itself and hence free, but this being fulfilled through itself is at first only the abstract determinacy, its own determinacy in general, and has not yet identified itself with developed reason. The determination of the will which is in itself is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and hence the purpose of the latter is to fulfil itself with this its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will – to give itself the content which it can have only as something that thinks itself. True freedom, ethical life, is this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness and so forth.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 469:

    § 469. Spirit as will knows itself as resolving upon itself within itself and as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled being-for-self or individuality constitutes the side of existence or reality of the Idea of spirit; as will spirit enters into actuality, as knowing it stands on the ground of the universality of the concept. – As giving itself its content, the will is with itself, free in general; this is its determinate concept. – Its finitude consists in the formalism of this, that its being fulfilled through itself is the abstract determinacy, its own determinacy in general, which is not identified with developed reason. The determination of the will which is in itself is to bring freedom into existence in the formal will, and the purpose of the latter is accordingly to fulfil itself with its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its determinate being. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the way of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to a thinking will – to give itself the content which it can have only as a will that thinks itself. True freedom is, as ethical life, this: that the will has as its purposes not a subjective, i.e. selfish, content, but a universal one; such a content, however, is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, uprightness, and so forth.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The will that is will merely according to its concept is free in itself, but at the same time also unfree, for it would be truly free only as a truly determinate content; then it is free for itself, has freedom as its object, is freedom. What is only as yet according to its concept, what merely is in itself, is only immediate, only natural. This is also familiar to us from ordinary conception. The child is in itself a human being, has reason only in itself [so far], is as yet only the possibility of reason and freedom, and is free only in this way according to the concept. What is thus only as yet in itself is not yet in its actuality. The human being who is in itself rational must work himself through, by the production of himself, by going out beyond himself, but equally by forming himself inward, so that he also becomes it for himself.

  6. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 10: Free in potential, not yet free in reality

    At the beginning, the content of the will is simply there. The will did not produce it itself. It finds it already there.

    What follows from this? The will is free, yes. But at first it is free only in itself. That means: in its potential. We who look at it see its freedom. The will itself does not yet have its freedom before its eyes. It is free and at the same time unfree.

    A comparison: A child is already a human being. It has reason, but only as a potential, as a possibility. It still has to work its way toward being a rational, free human being. It must go out of itself, learn and educate itself. In this way, it becomes for itself what it already is in itself.

    The same holds for the will. It is free for itself only when it has itself as its object. That is, when it wants freedom itself.

    Here we also see what “finite” means. Something is one thing in its potential, but it still shows itself as something else. Potential and appearance fall apart.

    We should remember two things. If you know a thing only in its potential, you do not yet know it in its truth. And the mere potential also exists already, in a shape of its own. After all, the child really exists, as a child.

    The danger: The understanding likes to stop at the potential. Then it calls freedom a capacity. It thinks: I am free because I could if I wanted to. In this way, freedom remains a mere possibility. In its view, what I really want is just an application to some material. That does not belong to freedom itself, it says. So the understanding holds an empty shell of freedom in its hand, not its truth.

    Summary: At first the will is free in its potential, but not yet in reality. It only becomes really free when it wants freedom itself.

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