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11

The will which is at first free only in itself is the immediate or natural will. The determinations of the difference, which the self-determining concept posits in the will, appear in the immediate will as an immediately present content – these are the drives, desires, [and] inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. This content, along with its developed determinations, stems indeed from the rationality of the will and is thus rational in itself, but let loose in such a form of immediacy, it is not yet in the form of rationality. This content is indeed, for me, mine in general; but this form and that content are still different, – the will is thus a will that is finite within itself.

|23| Empirical psychology recounts and describes these drives and inclinations and the needs based upon them, as it finds them, or supposes it finds them, in experience, and seeks in the usual manner to classify this given material. What the objective aspect of these drives is, and how it is in its truth without the form of irrationality in which it is a drive, and how it is at the same time configured in its existence, will be discussed below.

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6 responses to “11”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 389–392:

    § 389. This existence of the self-determination of spirit is at first the immediate one, namely that spirit finds itself as an individuality determining itself inwardly within itself or through nature. It is thus 1) practical feeling.

    § 390. The free will is the individuality or pure negativity of self-determining being-for-self, as the subjectivity simply identical with reason and thereby itself universal, the will as intelligence. The immediate individuality of the will in practical feeling therefore has indeed that content, but as an immediately individual one, hence as contingent and subjective. When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality which man has within him, to his benevolent inclinations and so forth, to his heart in general, i.e. to the subject in so far as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1) the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2) and further, in so far as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that against the latter’s one-sided abstraction it can be the totality. But feeling can equally be one-sided, unessential, bad; through the form of immediacy it is essentially the contingent and subjective. The rational in the shape of rationality, which stands over against it as something thought, is the same content which practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. For this reason it is on the one hand foolish to suppose that in the transition from feeling, e.g. to right and duty, anything is lost in content and excellence; – this transition is what first brings feeling to its truth; – it is likewise foolish to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth, and, what is the same thing, the rationality of heart and will can have its place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the individuality of feeling. – On the other hand it is suspect, and very well more than this, to hold fast to feeling and the heart against thought-out rationality, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only the particular subjectivity, the vain and the arbitrary. – For the same reason it is inept, in the consideration of feelings, to enter upon more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, is rather the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, rights and duties.

    § 391. Practical feeling, as self-determination of the thinking subject in general, contains the ought, the concrete free universality as being in itself but as related to an individuality which is, and which is determined as null in itself and as the true which is for itself only in identity with universality. Practical feeling in its immediate individuality, related with its ought to the determinacy which merely is, yields, since in this immediacy they do not yet have a necessary identity, the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable. 1) Pleasure, joy, pain and so forth, shame, remorse, contentment and so on are in part only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, in part however differentiated by their content, which constitutes the determinacy of the ought. 2) The famous question concerning the origin of evil in the world receives here its answer, in its universality, but more precisely in so far as by evil at first only the disagreeable and pain are understood. Evil is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. This ought, however, has many meanings, and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. In view of these, evil is only the right which is exercised upon the vanity and nullity of their imagining. They themselves are already evil; and that there are such and all other individualities inadequate to the Idea lies in the necessary indifference of the concept towards immediate being in general, which stands over against it in so far as the concept is a free actuality, and which is likewise released by it into free actuality, but is equally related to it and determined as the null in itself; – a contradiction which is called evil. In what is dead there is neither evil nor pain, because the concept does not exist in it, or because in inorganic nature it does not confront its determinate being. In life already, and still more in spirit, this distinction is present; and this negativity, activity, I, freedom are the principles of evil and of pain. – Jacob Böhme grasped I-hood as the torment and agony and as the source of nature and of spirit.

    § 392. The practical ought is 2) real judgement. The immediacy of feeling is, for the self-determination of the will, a negation; it therefore constitutes the subjectivity of the will, which is to be sublated so that the will may be identical for itself. Since this activity is not yet freed from form and is therefore formal, the will is still natural will, drive and inclination, and, with the closer determinacy that the totality of the practical spirit places itself into a single one of the limited determinations, passion.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 11] I find myself determined thus and so; – have these drives – also physical needs, eating and drinking – must, necessity, like the animal –
    Whether sensuous drives, only toward sensation – or of a spiritual nature – compassion, – honor, fame –
    The content of the drives and inclinations occurs later as duties and rights – duties for the subject, rights in and for themselves – Their content asserts itself.
    Drives, admittedly, which [are] essentially upon [the] form of individual consciousness.
    I different from the determinacy of these drives – they natural – determinate, each appears as independent – too.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), §§ 471–474:

    § 471. The self-determination of spirit, as occurring first in an immediate manner, is thereby merely formal, so that spirit finds itself as an individuality determining itself according to its inner nature. It is thus practical feeling.

    § 472. The will is this nature of spirit as a subjectivity simply identical in itself with reason and thereby itself universal; in the immediate individuality of practical feeling it therefore has indeed the content of reason, but as an immediately individual one, hence as a natural and at the same time contingent and subjective content, and equally as a content determining itself out of the particularity of need, of opining and so forth, and out of the subjectivity that sets itself for itself against the universal. When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality, as of religion, which man has within him, to his benevolent inclinations and so forth, to his heart in general, i.e. to the subject in so far as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1) the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2) and further, in so far as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that against the latter’s one-sided abstraction it can be the totality. But feeling can equally be one-sided, unessential, bad. The rational in the shape of rationality, which stands over against it as something thought, is the same content which the good practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. For this reason it is on the one hand foolish to suppose that in the transition from feeling to right and duty anything is lost in content and excellence; this transition is what first brings feeling to its truth. It is equally foolish to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth, and, what is the same thing, the rationality of heart and will can have its place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the individuality of feeling as such. If feelings are of a genuine kind, they are so through their determinacy, i.e. their content, and this is genuine only in so far as it is universal in itself, i.e. has thinking spirit for its source. The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation it has once arbitrarily made between the powers of the soul, feeling, and thinking spirit, and in coming to the representation that in man there is only one reason, in feeling, willing and thinking. The difficulty connected with this is that the Ideas which belong to thinking spirit alone, God, right, ethical life, can also be felt. Feeling, however, is nothing other than the form of the immediate, peculiar individuality of the subject. On the other hand it is suspect, and very well more than this, to hold fast to feeling and the heart against thinking rationality, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only the particular subjectivity, the vain and the arbitrary. – For the same reason it is inept, in the scientific consideration of feelings, to enter upon more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, rather constitutes the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, the rights and duties.

    § 473. Practical feeling contains the ought, its self-determination as being in itself, related to an individuality which is and which is determined as null in itself and as valid only in identity with the former. Since the two do not yet have a necessary identity in this immediacy, this relation of need to determinate being is the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable. Pleasure, joy, pain and so forth, shame, remorse, contentment and so on are in part only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, in part however differentiated by their content, which constitutes the determinacy of the ought. The famous question concerning the origin of evil in the world enters, at least in so far as by evil at first only the disagreeable and pain are understood, at this standpoint of the formal practical. Evil is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. This ought has many meanings, and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. In view of these, evil is only the right which is exercised upon the vanity and nullity of their imagining. They themselves are already evil. That there are such and all other individualities inadequate to the Idea lies in the judgement of the concept within itself (living soul, spirit, reason and so forth) and into being, and in its indifference towards immediate being in general, which, released through the concept itself into free actuality, equally remains related to it and, as being for itself, is inadequate to it, is against it and hence in itself the null; – a contradiction which is called evil. In what is dead there is neither evil nor pain, because in inorganic nature the concept does not confront its determinate being. In life already, and still more in spirit, this distinction is present, and thereby an ought enters; and this negativity, activity, I, freedom are the principles of evil and of pain. – Jacob Böhme grasped I-hood as the torment and agony and as the source of nature and of spirit.

    § 474. The practical ought is real judgement. The immediate adequacy of the determinacy which is to need, itself merely found, is for the self-determination of the will a negation and inadequate to it. That the will, i.e. the unity of universality and determinacy, should satisfy itself and be for itself, the adequacy of its inner determination and determinate being ought to be posited through it. The will is, as regards the form of the content, still natural will, as in need in general, which, however, as something to be satisfied through the will, is now drive and inclination, and, with the closer determinacy that the totality of the practical spirit places itself into a single one of the limited determinations, passion.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), §§ 471–473:

    § 471. The practical spirit has its self-determination within it at first in an immediate manner, hence formally, so that it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inner nature. It is thus practical feeling. Therein it has, since it is in itself a subjectivity simply identical with reason, the content of reason indeed, but as an immediately individual one, and hence also as a natural, contingent and subjective content, which is determined just as much out of the particularity of need, of opining and so forth, and out of the subjectivity that sets itself for itself against the universal, as it can be in itself adequate to reason. When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality as well as of religion which man has within him, to his benevolent inclinations and so forth, to his heart in general, i.e. to the subject in so far as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1. the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2. and further, in so far as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that against the latter’s one-sided abstractions it can be the totality. But feeling can equally be one-sided, unessential, bad. The rational, which is in the shape of rationality as something thought, is the same content which the good practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. For this reason it is on the one hand foolish to suppose that in the transition from feeling to right and duty anything is lost in content and excellence; this transition is what first brings feeling to its truth. It is equally foolish to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth, and, what is the same thing, the actual rationality of heart and will can have its place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the individuality of feeling as such. If feelings are of a genuine kind, they are so through their determinacy, i.e. their content, and this is genuine only in so far as it is universal in itself, i.e. has thinking spirit for its source. The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation it has once arbitrarily made between the powers of the soul, feeling, and thinking spirit, and in coming to the representation that in man there is only one reason, in feeling, willing and thinking. Connected with this, a difficulty is found in the fact that the Ideas which belong to thinking spirit alone, God, right, ethical life, can also be felt. Feeling, however, is nothing other than the form of the immediate, peculiar individuality of the subject, into which that content, like every other objective content to which consciousness also ascribes objectivity, can be posited. On the other hand it is suspect, and very well more than this, to hold fast to feeling and the heart against thought-out rationality, right, duty, law, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only the particular subjectivity, the vain and the arbitrary. – For the same reason it is inept, in the scientific consideration of feelings, to enter upon more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, rather constitutes the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, the rights and duties. For the peculiar consideration of practical feelings as of inclinations there would remain only the selfish, bad and evil ones; for only they belong to the individuality that holds fast to itself against the universal; their content is the opposite of that of rights and duties, but precisely thereby they receive their closer determinacy only in the opposition to these.

    § 472. Practical feeling contains the ought, its self-determination as being in itself, related to an individuality which is, and which is to count as valid only in its adequacy to the former. Since both still lack objective determination in this immediacy, this relation of need to determinate being is the wholly subjective and superficial feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable. Pleasure, joy, pain and so forth, shame, remorse, contentment and so on are in part only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, in part however differentiated by their content, which constitutes the determinacy of the ought. The famous question concerning the origin of evil in the world enters, at least in so far as by evil at first only the disagreeable and pain are understood, at this standpoint of the formal practical. Evil is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. This ought has many meanings, and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. In view of these, evil is only the right which is exercised upon the vanity and nullity of their imagining. They themselves are already evil. – The finitude of life and of spirit falls within their judgement, in which they have the other, separated from them, at the same time within them as their negative, and thus are the contradiction which is called evil. In what is dead there is neither evil nor pain, because in inorganic nature the concept does not confront its determinate being and does not at the same time remain its subject in the difference. In life already, and still more in spirit, this immanent distinction is present and thereby an ought enters; and this negativity, subjectivity, I, freedom are the principles of evil and of pain. – Jakob Böhme grasped I-hood as the torment and agony and as the source of nature and of spirit.

    § 473. The practical ought is real judgement. The immediate, merely found adequacy of the determinacy which is to need is, for the self-determination of the will, a negation and inadequate to it. That the will, i.e. the unity of universality and determinacy which is in itself, should satisfy itself, i.e. be for itself, the adequacy of its inner determination and of determinate being ought to be posited through it. The will is, as regards the form of the content, at first still natural will, immediately identical with its determinacy, drive and inclination; in so far as the totality of the practical spirit places itself into a single one of the many limited determinations posited with the opposition in general, [it is] passion.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The animal too has drives, desires, inclinations, but the animal has no will and must obey the drive unless something external holds it back. The human being, however, stands as the wholly undetermined above the drives and can determine and posit them as his own. The drive lies in nature, but that I posit it in this I depends on my will, which therefore cannot appeal to the fact that it lies in nature.

  6. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 11: The natural will (drives and inclinations)

    What does this will look like, the one that is free only in its potential? We call it the natural will.

    Its content consists of drives, desires and inclinations. Hunger and thirst, love, ambition, the wish for rest. We simply find them in ourselves. We did not pick them.

    Are these drives irrational? No. They come from the reason of the will. So their content is rational in itself. But they appear like events of nature: suddenly, without order, simply there. Their form is not yet the form of reason.

    A drive is mine, yes. But it happened to me. Content and form do not fit together yet. That is why this will is finite.

    What sets us apart from animals here? Animals have drives too. But they have no will. An animal must follow its drive if nothing outside stops it. A human being, by contrast, stands above his drives. He can say: I make this drive my own. Or not.

    Something important follows from this. The drive lies in nature. But my will decides whether I follow it. So I cannot excuse myself by saying that it is natural. “I just felt like it” is no excuse.

    Psychology describes the drives and sorts them into boxes. But it never gets beyond listing them. What the drives truly are only shows itself later. There they take on their rational shape.

    Summary: The natural will finds drives within itself. Their content is rational, but their form is not yet rational. And because human beings stand above their drives, they must answer for them.

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