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137

The true conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself; it therefore has firm principles, and these are, for it, the objective determinations and duties that are valid for themselves. Distinguished from this its content, the truth, conscience is only the formal side of the activity of the will, which, as this activity, has no distinctive content of its own. But the objective system of these principles and duties, and the union of subjective knowing with it, is present only on the standpoint of ethical life. Here, on the formal standpoint of morality, conscience is without this objective content, and is thus, for itself, the infinite formal certainty of itself, which for that very reason is at the same time the certainty of this subject.

Conscience expresses the absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness to know, within itself and out of itself, what right and duty are, and to recognize nothing except what it thus knows to be the good, while at the same time maintaining that what it thus knows and wills is, in truth, right and duty. Conscience, as this unity of subjective knowing and of that which is in and for itself, is a sanctuary that it would be sacrilege to violate. But whether the conscience of a determinate individual is in accordance with this Idea of conscience, whether what it holds or claims to be good is also really good, is recognized only from the content of this good that it is supposed to be. What is right and duty, as the rational element, in and for itself, of the determinations of the will, is essentially neither the particular property of an individual nor in the form of feeling or of some other single, that is, sensuous, knowing, but is essentially a matter of universal, thought determinations, that is, in the form of laws and principles. Conscience is therefore subject to this judgment, as to whether it is true or not, and its appeal solely to itself is directly contrary to what it wants to be — the rule of a rational, in and for itself valid, universal manner of acting. The state can therefore not recognize conscience in its peculiar form, that is, as subjective knowing, any more than science can recognize subjective opinion, or the assurance of, and appeal to, a subjective opinion, as having validity. What is not distinguished in true conscience is nevertheless distinguishable, and it is the determining subjectivity of knowing and willing that can separate itself from the true content, set itself up for itself, and reduce that content to a mere form and semblance. The ambiguity regarding conscience thus lies in this: that it is presupposed in the sense of that identity of subjective knowing and willing with the true good, and is thus asserted and recognized as something sacred, and yet, equally, as the merely subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, it lays claim to the entitlement that belongs to that identity only by virtue of its in-and-for-itself valid, rational content. In the moral standpoint, as it is distinguished in this treatise from the ethical, only formal conscience falls; the true has been mentioned only in order to indicate its difference, and to remove the possible misunderstanding that, where only formal conscience is being considered here, the true conscience were being spoken of — which is contained only in the ethical disposition that first occurs in what follows. Religious conscience, however, does not belong to this circle at all.

DE

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2 responses to “137”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 137] γ) on α) relation, β) content – γ) conscience – determining – αα) conscience ββ) dialectical, evil – (§ 132) right of the subjective will – that it should know what the good is – conscience – as arbitrary choice, as deciding.
    Right of duty, of the good, addressed to conscience – you ought to have known this – absolute, not merely external circumstances –
    δ) no principle of determination other than subjectivity, i.e. objectivity is the universal particularity (subjectivity), the determining, the positing of difference.
    Conscience is the good, as determining, willing, resolving itself. The good in identity with the certainty of itself – I, – vitality. – The innermost, the substantial.
    Certainty of itself – as certainty, knowledge of the good – being and positing – the mystery of freedom – that it is its own self-determination, – in itself – concept.
    Truthful conscience is formal, i.e. presupposes the duties – the determinate good – expresses that I am in conformity with them, my subjectivity – that I am in myself the certainty of myself – [they] are for me as the sure certainty of myself. I cannot do this.
    A conscientious man, who does his duties – but does not first make them out of himself – they are, eternal – (no one knows whence they came) – the eternal laws of the gods
    Being – they are – distinguished from being-posited.
    This system of duties is not yet present here, for we stand at the standpoint of reflection, which indeed has the idea of the good before it, but takes from it its determinacy, – or rather, the determinacy is as yet grasped only abstractly.
    This is against my conscience, conscience does not permit it – act according to conscience – in a collision of advantages and duties – to procure such an advantage for myself, or for you – an advantage at another’s expense, – against conscience – an advantage for oneself, when it is contrary to no duty and not unjust, – would in itself well be permitted – only an evil – as against right and duty –
    There are, admittedly, collisions in which duty conflicts with duty – welfare with welfare – extraordinary cases – to these subtle reflection gladly clings – partly for the sake of empty subtlety – I do not know how to decide – pushing his [?] accomplice off the plank also good – partly in order to contrive, out of the extraordinary, the exception, a universal release from duty and right. If I say, you must respect right – and whatever universal proposition of this kind – then an instance can be brought against me. – In extraordinary cases, where the objective vanishes, – the universal in itself, – and for all cases is very different – like the determinacy of bird and fish, – although there are flying fish.

    [zu § 137 Anm.] There is an absolute standard of conscience, and indeed it is so – conscience itself possesses it – I did not know it, my conscience did not tell me so – that is just a bad conscience – divine conscience – God as witness – God is the God of truth – not to yield against oneself –
    Bad conscience – this judgment is none of my concern – it is simply my conscience; because principles of right etc. are not in my conscience, they have no claim upon me; I take only what I find in my conscience, no other source – an erring conscience – With this a man gives up his dignity, his substantiality. His assurance counts for nothing, it is contrary to his absolute honor – if it is as he says, then he is like a harmful animal, whose nature is nothing but evil and destructive, [an animal] to be struck dead, – or at least to be driven out of society – such [creatures] society cannot use. – Nor shall you need me; I am for myself, an end in myself. – Very well, so be it – but for you [to be] needed, i.e. to stand in legal, ethical community – not merely in contract – and even contract presupposes trust. The actions, the utterances of human beings are such particulars over against one another that we are secure and at ease in their presence only through the general assurance, the trust, that they are seriously meant, or at least unprejudiced. – A crowd of people passes by in the street; I speak with a crowd, I rely on it that they do not want to plunder me, murder [me], etc. – they approach me, are clothed (among Orientals one searches [their] clothes). If I had to presuppose that they were erring consciences, that they recognized as right only what they found in their subjective conscience, so that in it they found the opposite of everything that is right and ethical, then I would be worse off than among robbers, for of the latter I know that they are robbers – but those [others] have the outward appearance and all the phrases – even those of religion, of right, of the good, of conscience –
    Many misunderstandings on the part of religion – of the Christian standpoint – in its earliest appearance – To the righteous no law is given. α) Only to the righteous – easily twisted in such a way – that everyone at once, already in and for himself, takes himself to be the righteous one – and indeed on the ground that no law is recognized by him, this negativity is supposed to constitute the righteous one; rather
    β) what the righteous one does – is the law itself – αα) [it] is not given to him – as with Jewish laws – police laws etc.; every law-abiding person does [so] – people are often resentful that such things are ordained, that such a law is given – as though the presupposition lying in this ordaining were that they would not do it, would be unlawful, etc. ββ) The laws, the universal principles, are indeed limited – all the more, the more positive their content is – eating the showbread, plucking ears of grain on the Sabbath – but in case of need – not universally – majesty of conscience – but only in extraordinary cases, i.e. itself conscientious.
    What can truly volatilize subjectivity – are its own deeds, its own particularities – to make what has happened, within itself, unhappened – to absolve itself – not from the good, the law, but from evil – this infinite energy, majesty of conscience, I as abstract, as infinite, in which the finite vanishes – but only insofar as this certainty is identical with the substantial, the true.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    When we speak of conscience, it can easily be supposed that, on account of its form, which is the abstractly inward, it is already in and for itself the truthful. But conscience as truthful is this determination of itself: to will what is in and for itself the good and duty. Here, however, we are dealing only with the abstract good, and conscience is still without this objective content, is as yet only the infinite certainty of itself.

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