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311

The deputation, as proceeding from civil society, further has the sense that the deputies be acquainted with its specific needs, obstacles, and particular interests, and belong to them themselves. Since, in accordance with the nature of civil society, it proceeds from its various corporations (§ 308), and since the simple manner of this process is not disturbed by abstractions and atomistic conceptions, it thereby immediately satisfies that point of view, and election is either something altogether superfluous or is reduced to a trifling play of opinion and arbitrariness.

It presents itself as a matter of course that, among the deputies, for each particular major branch of society — for commerce, for manufacturing, and so forth, for example — there should be individuals who know it thoroughly and themselves belong to it; in the conception of a loose, indeterminate mode of election, this important circumstance is abandoned to mere contingency. But each such branch has, as against the others, an equal right to be represented. If the deputies are regarded as representatives, this has an organically rational sense only on the condition that they are not representatives of individuals, of a multitude, but rather representatives of one of the essential spheres of society, representatives of its great interests. Representing thus no longer has the meaning that one person stands in the place of another; rather, the interest itself is actually present in its representative, just as the representative is there for the sake of his own objective element. Regarding election by the many individuals, it may further be remarked that, necessarily, especially in large states, an indifference to the casting of one’s vote sets in, since a single vote has an insignificant effect amid the multitude, and those entitled to vote — however highly this entitlement may be represented and rated to them — simply fail to appear to cast their vote; so that the very opposite of its determination results from such an institution, and the election falls into the power of the few, of a party, and thus of the particular, contingent interest that was precisely meant to be neutralized.

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  1. Karl Marx Avatar
    Karl Marx

    First, Hegel links the deputation, in its determination as »legislative power« (§§ 309, 310), to the deputation »as proceeding from civil society«, i.e. to its representative determination, by means of a simple »further«. The enormous contradictions that lie in this »further« he likewise utters thoughtlessly.

    According to § 309, those deputing are supposed »not to assert the particular interest of a community, a corporation, against the universal, but essentially this [the universal] itself«.

    According to § 311, they proceed from the corporations, represent these particular interests and needs, and are not to be disturbed by »abstractions« — as if the »universal interest« were not likewise such an abstraction, an abstraction precisely from their corporate etc. interests.

    According to § 310, it is required »that through actual conduct of business etc. they should have acquired and proven an official sense and the sense of the state«. In § 311 corporate sense and civic sense are required.

    In the Addition to § 309 it is said: »Representation is grounded in trust.« According to § 311, »election«, this realization of trust, this activation, this appearance of it, »is either something altogether superfluous, or reduces itself to a slight play of opinion and arbitrariness«.

    That on which representation is grounded, its essence, is thus for representation »either something altogether superfluous« etc. Hegel thus sets up, in one breath, the absolute contradictions: representation is grounded on trust, on the trust of man in man, and it is not grounded on trust. It is, rather, a mere formal game.

    The particular interest is not the object of representation, but the human being and his citizenship, the universal interest. On the other hand: the particular interest is the material of representation, the spirit of this interest is the spirit of the representative.

    In the Remark to this paragraph, which we shall now consider, these contradictions are carried through still more glaringly. At one time representation is the representation of the human being, at another of the particular interest, of the particular material.

    »The interest presents itself of its own accord that among the deputies there should be, for every particular great branch of society, e.g. for trade, for manufactures etc., individuals who know it thoroughly and themselves belong to it; — on the conception of a loose, indeterminate election, this important circumstance is abandoned to mere contingency. But every such branch has an equal right, as against every other, to be represented. If the deputies are regarded as representatives, this has an organically rational sense only insofar as they are not representatives as of individuals, of a mass, but representatives of one of the essential spheres of society, representatives of its great interests. Representing thereby also no longer has the meaning that one is in the place of another, but rather the interest itself is actually present in its representative, just as the representative is there for his own objective element.«

    Of election by the many individuals it may further be remarked »that necessarily, especially in large states, indifference toward the giving of one’s vote arises, since in the mass it has an insignificant effect, and those entitled to vote, however highly this entitlement may be reckoned and represented to them, simply fail to appear to cast their vote — so that from such an institution the very opposite of its determination rather follows, and the election falls into the power of a few, of a party, hence of the particular, contingent interest which was precisely supposed to be neutralized.«

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