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114

The right of the moral will contains three sides:

a) The abstract or formal right of the action — that, as it is carried out in immediate existence, its content in general is mine, so that it is the purpose of the subjective will.

b) The particular aspect of the action is its inner content: α) how its universal character is determined for me — what constitutes the value of the action and that by which it counts for me, the intention; — β) its content, as my particular purpose belonging to my singular subjective existence, is welfare.

c) This content, as inner, raised at the same time into its universality, into the objectivity that is in and for itself, is the absolute purpose of the will, the good, in the sphere of reflection with the opposition of subjective universality — partly of evil, partly of conscience.

DE

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2 responses to “114”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    The whole moves within oppositions: α) what is, and β) what it is for me and in me.
    a) Purpose – what is immediate, and how this existence is for me.
    b) Intention, self-reflection –
    α) the value of the thing – the universal – reflection, a predicate distinct from the individual[:] useful, purpose –
    β) Abstract reflection into myself, formally undetermined subjectivity, interest – as against existence – the thing –
    γ) Content – my particularity – distinct – as against right – interest fulfilled – is the formal unity –
    c) Absolute reflection of the content and of particularity – of what is mine, into myself –
    α) Determination of the good as duty – for me –
    β) of its content
    γ) Formalism α) evil, β) conscience, γ) transition
    b) Opposition of the inner and the outer (intention – and what the deed is)
    The outward – wider context – universal – other than the particular
    Intention is something universal,
    α) distinct as such from the particular as such, the action
    β) interest, that I – formal universality –
    γ) content, determinate particularity, welfare, opposition to the universal – right.
    c) The difference of the action from the purpose – its reflection into itself –
    The relation of the action to a universal – relative universality is what is reflected into itself in the action; hence particularity – and its subordination; what is intention is also already purposed; the content of the intention and of the purpose, i.e., what is peculiar to it, can differ – be subordinated – the one more universal than the other – posited only as essential. Determinate content, but here only drives, inclinations –
    Value of the action for me –
    α) Intention – can be different [from] the absolute universality – as form – and from the immediate action –
    β) This particularity as particular contents –
    [γ)] Purpose [:]
    a) Knowledge of the immediate circumstances – immediate judgment.
    b) Knowledge of the reflected thing, not merely of its immediacy, α) of its own qualitative content, β) of subjective, peculiar content – γ) opposition of α) and β), judgment of reflection.
    c) Knowledge of the concept (judgment of the concept) α) of the immediate good: it is so, determined by law, β) subjective determination of duty, out of myself; reflection upon the good, γ) opposition of α) and β), namely as of the universal, objective, or … [?], and the particular good: αα) conscience in general, collision; ββ) the particularity of the will as opposed to the objective good; γγ) the abstract good, and the subject as what determines – likewise evil αα) the particular as against the objective as abstract good …

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    For any action to be moral, it must, first of all, accord with my purpose, for the right of the moral will is that only what inwardly existed as purpose be recognized in its existence. The purpose concerns only the formal aspect, namely that the external will also be, in me, something inward. In the second moment, by contrast, what is asked after is the intention of the action, that is, the relative worth of the action in relation to me; the third moment, finally, is not merely the relative but the universal worth of the action, the good. The first division of the action is that between what was purposed and what exists and has been brought forth; the second division is between what exists externally as universal will and the inward particular determination that I give it; the third, finally, is that the intention should also be the universal content. The good is intention raised to the concept of the will.

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