144

Third Part. Ethical Life

α) The objective ethical, which takes the place of the abstract good, is the substance made concrete through subjectivity as infinite form. It therefore posits distinctions within itself, which are thereby determined through the concept and through which the ethical has a firm content, one that is necessary for itself and a subsistence elevated above subjective opinion and liking — laws and institutions that are in and for themselves.

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5 responses to “144”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 431:

    § 431. The free substance, in which the absolute ought is just as much being, is, as a people, actuality. The abstract diremption of its negativity into existence is the individuation into persons, of whose immediate independence it is the inner power and necessity. The person, however, as thinking intelligence, recognizes the substance as its own essence, and in this disposition ceases to be an accident of it; it beholds its absolute final purpose in actuality just as much as an attained here-and-now as it brings it forth through its activity, yet as something that equally simply is; thereby, without the reflection of choice, it accomplishes its duty as its own and as an existent, and in this necessity has itself and its freedom.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Differences – α) legal determination of content, β) difference from self-consciousness – individual duties – nature of the matter

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 514:

    § 514. The free substance, in which the absolute ought is just as much being, has actuality as the spirit of a people. Its abstract diremption is the individuation into persons, of whose independence it is the inner power and necessity. The person, however, as thinking intelligence, knows the substance as its own essence, ceases in this disposition to be an accident of it; beholds it as its absolute final purpose in actuality likewise as an attained here-and-now, as it brings the same forth through its activity, yet as something that equally simply is, and thereby, without the reflection of choice, accomplishes its duty as its own and as an existent, and in this necessity has itself and its actual freedom.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 514:

    § 514. The substance that knows itself as free, in which the absolute ought is just as much being, has actuality as the spirit of a people. The abstract diremption of this spirit is its individuation into persons, of whose independence it is the inner power and necessity. The person, however, as thinking intelligence, knows that substance as its own essence, ceases in this disposition to be an accident of it, and beholds it as its absolute final purpose in actuality both as an attained here-and-now, in that it brings the same forth through its activity, yet as something that rather simply is; thus, without the reflection of choice, it accomplishes its duty as its own and as an existent, and has, in this necessity, itself and its actual freedom.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In the whole of ethical life both the objective and the subjective moment are present: but both are only forms of one and the same. The good is here substance, that is, the fulfillment of the objective with subjectivity. If one considers ethical life from the objective standpoint, one can say that the ethical human being is unconscious of himself. In this sense Antigone proclaims that no one knows whence the laws come: they are eternal. That is, they are the determination that is in and for itself, flowing from the nature of the matter. But no less does this substantial element also have a consciousness, although to this there always accrues only the position of a moment.

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