Because the will is Idea, or actually free, only insofar as it has determinate being, and the determinate being into which it has placed itself is the being of freedom, violence or coercion destroys itself immediately in its own concept, as a manifestation of a will that supersedes the manifestation or determinate being of a will. Violence or coercion is, therefore, abstractly considered, wrongful.
[zu § 92/93] Coercion is force directed against a natural existence in which a will is lodged – if this will is a particular will opposed to the universal will, then it is in itself coercion – or else the will is as yet only in itself –
To take up this will that is [merely] in itself, that is not yet a conscious will – occurs along the path toward the conscious will.
§ 92: Violence destroys itself
The will is free only when it exists in the world. In my property, in my body, in my deeds. There my freedom has its determinate being.
What does violence do now?
Violence, too, is the act of a will. But it turns against exactly the determinate being of a will. It destroys what another will has put into the world.
There is a contradiction in this. A will shows itself by negating will as such. It saws at the branch it sits on.
So the rule is: Violence and coercion, taken by themselves, are wrong.
Summary: Violence is a will that destroys the determinate being of will. In this, it contradicts itself. Taken by itself, it is always wrong.
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