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19

In the demand for the purification of the drives lies the general idea that they are freed from the form of their immediate natural determinacy and from the subjective and contingent nature of their content, and are led back to their substantial essence. |28| The truth of this indeterminate demand is that the drives should be the rational system of the will’s determination; to grasp them as such from the Concept is the content of the science of Right.

The content of this science can be presented in all its individual moments—e.g., Right, property, morality, family, state, etc.—in the form that man has by nature the drive to Right, also the drive to property, to morality, also the drive of sexual love, the drive to sociability, etc. If one wants to have a philosophical guise in a more distinguished manner instead of this form of empirical psychology, this is—according to what has passed and still passes for philosophy in recent times, as noted before—cheaply obtained by saying that man finds in himself as a fact of his consciousness that he wills Right, property, the state, etc. Later, another form of the same content, which appears here in the shape of drives, namely that of duties, will emerge.

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5 responses to “19”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 393–394:

    § 393. Inclinations and passions have the same self-determinations for their content as the practical feelings. Because the one like the other are immediate self-determinations which do not yet have the form of rationality, they are manifold particular ones. They have the rational nature of spirit on the one side for their foundation; on the other side, however, as belonging to the still subjective, individual will, they are just as essentially affected with contingency and relate themselves to the individual as to one another according to an external, unfree necessity. Of the inclinations precisely the same holds as of the feelings; they are self-determinations of the will which is free in itself, but which in the content of its self-determination is not yet free for itself as intelligence, not yet universal and objective. Passion already contains this in its determination, that it is restricted to a particularity of the will’s determination and to subjective individuality, whatever its content may otherwise be. But with the inclinations the question is rather raised which are good and evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good, and, since they are particular over against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, seeing that they are nevertheless present in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations the case is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection the theoretical spirit is; – a collection which is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their general drive not to be something subjective, but to be realized. Their genuine rationality, however, cannot show itself in a consideration of external reflection, in part not under the presupposition that they are assumed and fixed as self-subsistent natural determinations and immediate drives, in part because it is rather the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity and immediacy and to give them the form of rationality and objectivity, in which they are necessary relations and rights and duties. It is this objectification itself which then exhibits their import as well as their relation to one another, their truth in general. As Plato, with genuine sense, showed that what justice is in and for itself, in so far too as he comprehended under the right of spirit its whole nature, could be exhibited only in the objective shape of justice, namely in the construction of the state as of ethical life. – Which, then, are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is, turns into the exposition of the relations which spirit brings forth in that it sublates its subjectivity and realizes itself; – an objectivity in which precisely its self-determinations in general lose the form of inclinations, as the content loses subjectivity, contingency or arbitrariness.

    § 394. The universal in these drives is the individual subject, the activity of satisfying them or of formal rationality, namely of translating out of subjectivity into objectivity. In the latter the former has returned into itself; that the thing which has come about contains the moment of subjective individuality, is interest. – Because the activity is individual subjectivity in that dialectical movement, nothing comes about without interest.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 19] Form also becomes content.
    To purify — an indeterminate word — not excess, modus — and the like — at first only: not to disturb the others — to subordinate one another mutually.
    α) but one purpose is not of equal rank with another, — to satisfy [them] in an equal way — is an empty word, bare r[easoning]. The drive for fame requires quite different exertion, time, expenditure of spirit — than the other drives —
    β) subordination, — presupposes a preference — essential in itself — according to the concept of the will; for by nature each is; — none [has] any preference — an end in and for itself

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), §§ 475–476:

    § 475. Inclinations and passions have the same self-determinations for their content as the practical feelings. Because the one like the other are immediate self-determinations which do not yet have the form of rationality, they are manifold particular ones. They have the rational nature of spirit on the one side for their foundation; on the other side, however, as belonging to the still subjective, individual will, they are just as essentially affected with contingency and relate themselves to the individual as to one another according to an external, unfree necessity. Of the inclinations precisely the same holds as of the feelings; they are self-determinations of the will which is free in itself, but which in the content of its self-determination is not yet free for itself as intelligence, not yet universal and objective. Passion already contains this in its determination, that it is restricted to a particularity of the will’s determination and to subjective individuality, whatever its content may otherwise be. On account of this formal character, however, passion is neither good nor evil; this form therefore expresses only that a subject has placed the whole living interest of its spirit, talent, character, enjoyment into one content. Nothing great has been accomplished without passion, nor can it be accomplished without such. It is only a dead, indeed all too often hypocritical morality which inveighs against the form of passion as such. But with the inclinations the question is immediately raised which are good and evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good, and, since they are particular over against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, seeing that they are nevertheless present in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations the case is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection the theoretical spirit is supposed to be; – a collection which is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their general drive not to be something subjective, but, through the activity of the subject itself, to sublate their subjectivity, to be realized. Their genuine rationality cannot show itself in a consideration of external reflection, which presupposes and retains self-subsistent natural determinations and immediate drives. It is rather the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity as well as their natural immediacy and to give their content rationality and objectivity, in which they are necessary relations and rights and duties. It is this objectification which then exhibits their import as well as their relation to one another, their truth in general. As Plato, with genuine sense, showed that what justice is in and for itself, in so far too as he comprehended under the right of spirit its whole nature, could be exhibited only in the objective shape of justice, namely in the construction of the state as of ethical life. Which, then, are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is, turns into the exposition of the relations which spirit brings forth in developing itself as objective spirit; – a development in which its self-determinations in general have lost the form of inclinations, as the content has lost subjectivity, contingency or arbitrariness. The treatment of drives, inclinations and passions according to their genuine, ethical import is therefore essentially the doctrine of duties. To them nothing peculiar remains except the particularity that deviates from the ethical, the evil drives and passions.

    § 476. The subject is the activity of satisfying the drives, of formal rationality, namely of translating out of subjectivity into objectivity, in which the subject concludes itself together with itself. That the thing which has come about contains the moment of subjective individuality and of its activity, is interest. Nothing therefore comes about without interest. An action is a purpose of the subject, and it is likewise its activity which carries out this purpose; only through this, that the subject is in this manner in the most unselfish action, i.e. through its interest, is there any acting at all. – To the drives and passions one opposes on the one hand the insipid dream of a natural happiness in which needs would find their satisfaction without the activity of the subject to bring forth the adequacy of immediate existence and of its inner determinations. On the other hand morality is opposed to them. But drive and passion are nothing other than the vitality of the subject, according to which it is itself present in its purpose and the execution of it. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the universal, something inactive. In the subject it has what activates it, and as immanent to the subject it is interest of the drive and, as laying claim to the whole effective subjectivity, passion.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), §§ 474–475:

    § 474. Inclinations and passions have the same determinations for their content as the practical feelings, and likewise have the rational nature of spirit on the one side for their foundation; on the other side, however, as belonging to the still subjective, individual will, they are affected with contingency and appear as particular, standing externally to the individual as to one another and hence relating themselves according to an unfree necessity. Passion contains in its determination that it is restricted to a particularity of the will’s determination, into which the whole subjectivity of the individual sinks itself, whatever the import of that determination may otherwise be. But on account of this formal character passion is neither good nor evil; this form expresses only that a subject has placed the whole living interest of its spirit, talent, character, enjoyment into one content. Nothing great has been accomplished without passion, nor can it be accomplished without such. It is only a dead, indeed all too often hypocritical morality which inveighs against the form of passion as such. But with the inclinations the question is immediately raised which are good and evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good, and, since they are particular over against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, seeing that they are nevertheless present in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations the case is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection the theoretical spirit is supposed to be – a collection which is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their general drive not to be something subjective, but to sublate subjectivity through the activity of the subject itself, to be realized. Their genuine rationality cannot show itself in a consideration of external reflection, which presupposes self-subsistent natural determinations and immediate drives and thereby lacks the one principle and final purpose for them. It is rather the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity as well as their natural immediacy and to give their content rationality and objectivity, in which they are necessary relations, rights and duties. It is this objectification which then exhibits their import as well as their relation to one another, their truth in general; as Plato, with genuine sense, showed that what justice is in and for itself, in so far too as he comprehended under the right of spirit its whole nature, could be exhibited only in the objective shape of justice, namely in the construction of the state as of ethical life. Which, then, are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is, turns into the exposition of the relations which spirit brings forth in developing itself as objective spirit; – a development in which the content of self-determination loses contingency or arbitrariness. The treatment of drives, inclinations and passions according to their genuine import is therefore essentially the doctrine of legal, moral and ethical duties.

    § 475. The subject is the activity of satisfying the drives, of formal rationality, namely of translating the content out of subjectivity – the content being in so far a purpose – into objectivity, in which it concludes itself together with itself. That, in so far as the content of the drive is distinguished as a thing from this its activity, the thing which has come about contains the moment of subjective individuality and of its activity, is interest. Nothing therefore comes about without interest. An action is a purpose of the subject, and it is likewise its activity which carries out this purpose; only through this, that the subject is in this manner [also] in the most unselfish action, i.e. through its interest, is there any acting at all. – To the drives and passions one opposes on the one hand the insipid dream of a natural happiness in which needs would find their satisfaction without the activity of the subject to bring forth the adequacy of immediate existence and of its inner determinations. On the other hand duty for duty’s sake in general, morality, is opposed to them. But drive and passion are nothing other than the vitality of the subject, according to which it is itself present in its purpose and the execution of it. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the universal, something inactive, and has what activates it in the subject; that it is immanent to the subject is interest and, as laying claim to the whole effective subjectivity, passion.

  5. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 19: Purifying the drives

    We often hear the demand: You must purify your drives. What does this mean?

    Roughly this: The drives should lose their rawness. They should no longer push blindly. The accidental part should also go, that is, whatever just happens to occur to me. What should remain is their real core.

    This is rather vague. What should we actually do? Keep to moderation? Rank the drives one below the other? But in what order? By nature, no drive is nobler than another.

    And yet there is some truth in the demand. The drives contain an order. We only have to find it. Out of the desire to have grows property. Out of love grow marriage and family. Out of the wish for other people grow society and the state. Rightly understood, the drives form a rational whole: the order of what a free will wants.

    Developing this order out of the core, out of the concept, is the task of the whole science of right.

    We could make it easier for ourselves. We could simply say: Man has a drive toward right, one toward property, one toward family, one toward sociability. That is convenient, but it proves nothing. We only list what we find.

    Even more convenient is the grand version. It says: “I find in my consciousness that I want right, property and the state.” It sounds like philosophy. And it costs nothing.

    Later we will meet the same content again, this time as duty. What appears here as a drive says there: This is what you ought to do.

    Summary: At its core, purifying the drives means finding their rational order. No good intention achieves this. Only the science of right does. That is exactly what this book sets out to do.

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