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70

The comprehensive totality of external activity — life — is, as against personality, which is itself this same and immediate totality, not something external. The alienation or sacrifice of life is, rather, the opposite of the existence of this personality. I therefore have, in general, no right to such alienation, and only an ethical Idea — one in which this immediately singular personality has in itself gone under, and which is its actual power — has a right to it, so that, at the same time, just as life as such is immediate, so too is death its immediate negativity, and must therefore be received from without, either as a natural occurrence, or, in the service of the Idea, at the hand of another.

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2 responses to “70”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    α) Misery, pure, abstract misfortune – misfortune as such.
    β) Disgrace; this subject too lofty.
    Loss –
    α) of the external possibility of [social] standing, of honor – can be of a very limited kind – Werther –
    β) of the republic, of Rome;
    γ) of enjoyment – interest in enjoyment – the blasé Englishman
    δ) of a good conscience – through crime –
    Judgment – α) whether legally permitted – β) whether ethically permitted – to withdraw oneself from misfortune, disgrace, dishonor – and indeed undeserved [dishonor] –
    When a human being descends into this depth – brings the entire compass of his life to [a point of] comparison, of opposition, and into question – then there arises with this the demand that he also descend into the depth of his spirit – before he judges [that] this life has no value. – If nothing is present in him by which he could procure a value for it, then he stands on a subordinate level of his ethical consciousness.
    The view of the particular individual – to condemn it as with every crime – a person badly brought up, [some] defect, something repellent in his outward appearance, [his] manners – often embittered within himself – psychological portrayal – e.g., the innkeeper [“Sonnenwirt”] in Schiller [“The Criminal from Lost Honor”].
    One can indeed understand it, but not justify it –

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The single person is, to be sure, something subordinate, which must dedicate itself to the ethical whole. If the state therefore demands one’s life, the individual must give it; but may a human being take his own life? One can, in the first place, regard suicide as a [kind of] bravery, but a poor one, [befitting] tailors and maidservants. Then, again, it can be regarded as a misfortune, in that inner disintegration leads to it. But the main question is: do I have a right to it? The answer will be that I, as this individual, am not master over my life, for the comprehensive totality of activity, [namely] life, is not something external as against personality, which is itself this [totality] immediately. If one speaks, then, of a right that the person has over his life, this is a contradiction, for it would mean that the person has a right over himself. But this he does not have, for he does not stand above himself and cannot sit in judgment over himself. When Hercules burned himself, when Brutus threw himself upon his sword, this was the conduct of the hero against his own personality; but if we are speaking of the simple right to kill oneself, this too must be denied even to the hero.

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