Transition from Property to Contract

Determinate being [Dasein], as determinate being, is essentially being for another (see above, Rem. to § 48); property, on the side on which it is a determinate being as an external thing, is for other external things and stands within the connection of this necessity and contingency. But as the determinate being of the will, it is, as being for another, only for the will of another person. This relation of will to will is the peculiar and true ground on which freedom has determinate being. This mediation — no longer having property merely by means of a thing and my subjective will, but equally by means of another will, and hence within a common will — constitutes the sphere of contract.

It is just as necessary, through reason, that human beings enter into contractual relations — giving, exchanging, trading, and so forth — as that they possess property (§ 45 Rem.). If, for their consciousness, it is need in general, benevolence, utility, and the like that lead them to contracts, then, in itself, it is reason — namely the Idea of the real (i.e. existing only in the will) determinate being of free personality. Contract presupposes that those entering into it recognize one another as persons and owners; since it is a relation of objective spirit, the moment of recognition is already contained and presupposed within it (cf. § 35; § 57 Rem.).