grundlinien.de

71

Transition from Property to Contract

Determinate being [Dasein], as determinate being, is essentially being for another (see above, Rem. to § 48); property, on the side on which it is a determinate being as an external thing, is for other external things and stands within the connection of this necessity and contingency. But as the determinate being of the will, it is, as being for another, only for the will of another person. This relation of will to will is the peculiar and true ground on which freedom has determinate being. This mediation — no longer having property merely by means of a thing and my subjective will, but equally by means of another will, and hence within a common will — constitutes the sphere of contract.

It is just as necessary, through reason, that human beings enter into contractual relations — giving, exchanging, trading, and so forth — as that they possess property (§ 45 Rem.). If, for their consciousness, it is need in general, benevolence, utility, and the like that lead them to contracts, then, in itself, it is reason — namely the Idea of the real (i.e. existing only in the will) determinate being of free personality. Contract presupposes that those entering into it recognize one another as persons and owners; since it is a relation of objective spirit, the moment of recognition is already contained and presupposed within it (cf. § 35; § 57 Rem.).

DE ES

Comments

5 responses to “71”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 405:

    § 405. My will is thereby, in the first instance, external and for others. In that I, as person, am the infinite relation of myself to myself, I am the absolute repulsion of myself from myself, have my actualization only in the being of other persons, and only therein am I, for the first time, an actual person for myself.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 71] It is always a higher conception – purpose – that one sets against life – relation to morality – in the case of suicide – a higher idea, in which I make myself judge –
    Courage – of a tailor, a maid, a manservant; – want, destitution, down to innate[?] indolence – courage only as against something[?] fearful – great – powerful – that is, here against my greatness, – my excellence – A wretched fellow does away with himself – a girl who has a child, has stolen, does not know how to help herself, cannot bear the shame; – an incongruity that ought not to occur – is not held to be anything great – but Werther, otherwise a person of great thought, great feeling – that is, his greatness, over which he is supposed to become master – It is the same thing – he is caught up in his feeling, in his situation – such love, such natural feeling is to be satisfied – is supposed to carry a higher interest within it – does not know how to help himself – it is the same thing – hollowness, emptiness of life, of spirit – something negative – set against the need for interest –
    I am master over my life – every other person equally so – Hobbes: anyone can kill another, – hence all men are equal – I alone have the true judgment – Everyone forms a judgment as to whether I deserve to live – [Karl L.] Sand – a wretched fellow – whether I am it – only I am supposed to have the true judgment. I least of all.
    Honor – Hannibal, Cato, Brutus – great individuals – this is to be withdrawn from them – from these circumstances that dishonor them – right of the honor of individuality against these circumstances – the honor – against me in these circumstances.
    Hercules burns himself upon the pyre – poisoned by the robe of Deianira – takes on the fate himself –
    If a truly high right has been acquired, these circumstances are not adequate to it, too incongruous – a hero – everyone makes himself into such a hero –
    Tosses itself about between opposites
    α) A wretch who does not deserve to live – who is too wretched for this life – this life is something better than you deserve –
    β) A lofty one, of whom life, this life – station – these circumstances – is not worthy – I am too excellent – this, my life, is the excellent thing – such vanity, arrogance –
    Courage – higher duties – a general at the head [of his men] – flings himself among the enemy, is killed – French ship captains – at Isle de France[?] have themselves killed – this is not what is demanded of them –
    Misfortune in general – could not endure life. But it is another thing to respect, to honor

    [zu § 71 Anm.] Transition
    α) I remain owner – of the universal – give up the particular
    β) Universality as common will – over the particular – the value lies in the particular –
    γ) Exchange – process – acquisition of a thing that belongs to another p[articular] will.
    a) Existence of freedom – the thing is mine
    b) But the thing is a particular one – the sublating of its particularity is – a) this I can only appropriate to myself through use – destruction of it – β) the sublating of its particularity – through alienation
    In the one case as in the other I am no longer owner. – A contradiction remains, that the immediate thing is supposed to be my property; – and yet I am supposed to be owner, my freedom is to have existence –
    To the immediate singularity of the thing I have, as a person, no other relation than to consume it, use it – or to renounce it –
    Side of existence α) as an external thing, β) for another free will –
    This true existence of the free will for the other, with the other – recognized through him – I remain owner.
    Herein, to me, as owner, in the proper element of freedom – objectively – not feared, but highly esteemed – they leave it[?] to my power –
    but objectively α) externality, existence, β) worthy as an existent element of the free will –
    Contract – real existence of property.
    Transition – a) Immediate taking of possession
    There immediately follows b) mediate [possession] – through the will of another.
    The preceding mediations are subjective – through signs, through my activity.
    [above it:] Widows in East India

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 490:

    § 490. In property the person is joined together with itself. But the thing is at the same time an abstractly external one, and I am external therein. This externality is, more precisely, that I, as person — who am the infinite relation of myself to myself, the repulsion of myself from myself — have the higher side of my actualization in the being of other persons and in my relation to them.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 490:

    § 490. In property the person is joined together with itself. But the thing is an abstractly external one, and I am abstractly external therein. The concrete return of myself into myself within this externality is that I — the infinite relation of myself to myself — am, as person, the repulsion of myself from myself, and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons, in my relation to them, and in the being-recognized by them, which is reciprocal.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In contract I have property through a common will: for it is the interest of reason that the subjective will become more universal and raise itself to this realization. The determinacy of this will thus remains in the contract, but in community with another will. The universal will, by contrast, appears here only still in the form and shape of commonality.

Leave a Reply