grundlinien.de

57

The human being, according to his immediate existence in himself, is something natural, external to his concept; it is only through the formation of his own body and mind, and essentially through his self-consciousness apprehending itself as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes the property of himself as against others. This taking possession of himself is, conversely, equally the putting into actuality of what he is according to his concept (as a possibility, capacity, or predisposition), whereby he is, for the first time, both posited as his own and, as an object, distinguished from simple self-consciousness, and thereby becomes capable of receiving the form of a thing (cf. Rem. to § 43).

The asserted justification of slavery (in all its more particular grounds — physical force, captivity in war, the saving and preservation of life, sustenance, upbringing, benefits conferred, one’s own consent, and so forth), as well as the justification of dominion as mere lordship in general, and every historical view of the right of slavery and of lordship, rests upon taking the human being as a natural entity in general, according to an existence (to which arbitrary will also belongs) that is not adequate to his concept. The assertion of the absolute wrong of slavery, on the other hand, holds fast to the concept of the human being as spirit, as in itself free, and is one-sided in that it takes the human being as free by nature, or, what is the same thing, takes the concept as such in its immediacy, and not the Idea, as the truth. This antinomy, like every antinomy, rests upon formal thinking, which holds fast to and asserts the two moments of an Idea in separation from one another, each on its own, so that neither is adequate to the Idea, and each remains in its untruth. Free spirit is precisely this (§ 21): not to be merely the concept, or to be in itself, but to supersede this formalism of itself, and with it its immediate natural existence, and to give itself an existence which is solely its own, a free existence. The side of the antinomy that asserts the concept of freedom therefore has the merit of containing the absolute starting point — but only the starting point — for the truth, while the other side, which remains fixed at conceptless existence, does not contain the standpoint of rationality and right at all. The standpoint of the free will, with which right and the science of right begin, is already beyond the untrue standpoint on which the human being is taken as a natural entity and merely as a concept existing in itself, and is on that account capable of slavery. This earlier, untrue appearance concerns spirit at the stage where it is still only at the standpoint of its consciousness; the dialectic of the concept and of the merely immediate consciousness of freedom there brings about the struggle for recognition and the relation of lordship and bondage (see the Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 115 ff., and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 325 ff.) 1. But that objective spirit, the content of right, should not itself again be grasped merely in its subjective concept — so that the fact that the human being, in and for himself, is not destined for slavery should not again be taken merely as an ought — this comes about only through the recognition that the Idea of freedom is truly actual only as the state.

Encyclopaedia [of the Philosophical Sciences], 3rd ed., § 430 ff.

  1. Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 430 ff. ↩︎

DE ES

Comments

2 responses to “57”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 57] § 57 is mentioned – in connection with forming – is heterogeneous.
    Man must form himself. This is historical, i.e., belongs in time, in the history prior to freedom – there is history.
    It is mentioned in connection with slavery, in order to indicate where it belongs, how it must be judged – slavery is something historical – that is, it falls, belongs within a condition prior to right – it is relative – The whole condition ought not to be, is [not] a condition of absolute right – but within such a condition it is necessarily lawful. That is, that self-consciousness of freedom which stands at such a stage has its determinate being. – If one says slavery is wrong in and for itself, that is entirely correct. Necessity of the state. – But objective right is essentially just as much a subjective right for itself, that is, it is not a stone, something external, merely fixed, but is the will of spirit – of universal spirit, of universal formation. – Wrong is thus in itself and for itself, that is, it is one’s own universal self-consciousness – not wanting to be a slave – nor wanting to be a master; no master, no slave – but likewise no slave, no master – There can be no talk [of the] guilt of this or that individual – of this one or that one – that they are slaves – but of all, of the whole. – Often in the West Indies the negroes have revolted; on the islands even now one reads, every year and several times a year, of conspiracies – but they become victims of the universal condition. – Yet they can die as free; the condition of the individual is conditioned by the universal. – Conspiracies themselves are proof of a merely partial disposition – Likewise there can be no talk of the guilt of this one or that one, that they are masters. – On what the change of the universal condition depends –
    Altogether an empty, contradictory question, what right is in the state of nature – under the condition of an unlawful condition. – So long as one asks only after the concept in itself, one cannot say that slavery is wrong – for the concept in itself is not the Idea, does not contain self-consciousness in and for itself.
    Forming is a setting-forth of something inward – here already a splitting – into external universality – and into an inner [universality]
    § 57. a) Always two kinds of objects in taking possession – externality and I; – I – according to my concrete side, distinct from myself as abstraction. β) That concrete [side] is immediately desire, aptitudes, capacities – only natural; – thus not identical with subjectivity, i.e., with me as knowing, willing, pure subjectivity, not within my power, [not the] presence of spirit – I as subject the ruling, the using [power] – thus [I] seize something external, tame it. So here this too must be spoken of – and because these skills, as distinguished from me, can be posited as so distinguishable, made so external – that they too can be wholly alienated by me as things. γ) Representation – to recall something external, to make it my own; likewise, conversely, representation – to make something inward external. For it is in itself mine, thus inward; formation posits it as something distinguished from me – as subjected to my natural will –
    Man himself is free, is in general in possession of himself, only through formation. (see alongside, in the note). But freedom does not become something alienable, and so is not to be mentioned here – The forming toward freedom itself (its realization) and toward its preservation is the state.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    If one holds fast to the side that man is free in and for himself, one thereby condemns slavery. But that someone is a slave lies in his own will, just as it lies in the will of a people, when it is subjugated. It is thus not merely a wrong on the part of those who make slaves or who subjugate, but of the slaves and the subjugated themselves. Slavery falls within the transition from the naturalness of human beings to the truly ethical condition; it falls within a world in which wrong is still right. Here wrong is valid, and is found just as necessarily in its place.

Leave a Reply