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17

|27| The contradiction which arbitrariness is (§ 15) manifests itself, as the dialectic of the drives and inclinations, in the appearance that they mutually interfere with one another, such that the satisfaction of one requires the subordination or sacrifice of the satisfaction of another, and so on. Furthermore, since a drive is merely a simple direction of its own determinacy and thus does not have its measure within itself, this subordinating or sacrificing determination is the contingent decision of arbitrariness, whether it proceeds with a calculating understanding as to which drive yields more satisfaction, or according to any other arbitrary consideration.

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6 responses to “17”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 398:

    § 398. The will is in this way free for itself, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its immediate determinate being; yet in so far as the content in which it resolves itself to this individuality and actuality is still a particularity, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of realizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it is at the same time already gone, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination through another, of a satisfaction which just as much is not one, through another, ad infinitum.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 17] Drive is contingent; its being-negated must likewise be posited.
    To abandon oneself to a single drive — is destructive — this is its dialectic — to regard it as purely positive — nothing negative, nothing to be limited, is its one-sidedness. To limit [it] — not to leave it in its [mere] being —

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 480:

    § 480. The will is in this way free for itself, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its immediate determining; yet in so far as the content in which this its formal universality resolves itself to actuality is still none other than an immediate particularity, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of realizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it is at the same time already gone, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination or enjoyment through another and of a satisfaction which just as much is not one, through another, ad infinitum.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 478:

    § 478. The will as arbitrary will is for itself free, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate self-determining. Yet in so far as the content in which this its formal universality resolves itself to actuality is still none other than that of the drives and inclinations, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of realizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it is at the same time already gone, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination or enjoyment through another and of a satisfaction which just as much is not one, through another, ad infinitum. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is the universal one, which the thinking will makes its purpose as happiness.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Drives and inclinations are, in the first instance, the content of the will, and only reflection stands above them; but these drives themselves become driving, press upon one another, disturb one another, and all want to be satisfied. If, setting aside all the others, I simply immerse myself in one of them, I find myself in a destructive restrictedness, for I have thereby given up precisely my universality, which is a system of all the drives. But just as little is anything achieved by a mere subordinating of the drives, which is what the understanding usually arrives at, because no measure for this ordering can be given here, and the demand therefore usually runs out into the tedium of general commonplaces.

  6. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 17: When the drives quarrel

    Arbitrariness also shows itself in another place: in the quarrel of the drives.

    The drives do not get along. They all push at the same time. In the evening I want to sleep, but I also want to read, and friends have called. If I follow the one, I must put the other off or sacrifice it.

    Which one should I prefer? The drive itself does not tell me. A drive knows only one direction: toward its goal. It has no measure within itself.

    So arbitrariness decides again. Perhaps the understanding calculates: Which drive gives me the most satisfaction? Perhaps some other consideration decides. In any case, it remains a matter of chance.

    Two ways out seem obvious, and both are useless.

    I could give myself over entirely to one drive and forget all the others. Then I become narrow, and this narrowness destroys me. For I am not just one drive. I am the whole of all my drives.

    Or I somehow put some drives below others. “Everything in moderation,” the understanding advises. But what measure? It cannot say. So the good advice ends in boring general sayings.

    Summary: The drives quarrel with each other, and none carries its measure within itself. Arbitrariness decides only by chance. So we need a different standard. The next steps look for it.

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