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15

According to this determination, the freedom of the will is arbitrariness [Willkür]—in which both of these are contained: the free reflection, abstracting from everything, and the dependence upon a content and material given internally or externally. Because this content, necessary in itself as an end, is at the same time determined as possible in relation to that reflection, arbitrariness is contingency as it exists in the form of the will.

The most common notion of freedom is that of arbitrariness—the midpoint of reflection between the will as determined merely by natural drives and the will which is free in and for itself. When one hears it said that freedom in general consists in being able to do what one wants, such a notion can only be taken as a complete lack of intellectual cultivation, in which there is as yet not the slightest inkling of what the will that is free in and for itself, Right, Ethical Life [Sittlichkeit], etc., actually are. Reflection—the formal universality and unity of self-consciousness—is the will’s abstract certainty of its freedom, but it is not yet the truth of that freedom, because it does not yet have itself as its own content and end; the subjective side is therefore still something different from the objective side; the content of this self-determination remains, for that reason, purely finite. |26| Arbitrariness, instead of being the will in its truth, is rather the will as contradiction. — In the controversy carried on especially at the time of Wolffian metaphysics, as to whether the will is actually free or whether the knowledge of its freedom is only a delusion, it was arbitrariness that was kept in view. Determinism correctly countered the certainty of that abstract self-determination with the content which, as something found at hand [vorgefundener], is not contained within that certainty and therefore comes to it from the outside—even if this ‘outside’ is drive, representation, or a consciousness filled in such a way that the content is not the product of the self-determining activity as such. Since only the formal element of free self-determination is immanent in arbitrariness, while the other element is a given, arbitrariness may indeed be called a delusion if it is supposed to be freedom itself. Freedom in all reflection-philosophy—as in the Kantian and then the Friesian total shallowing [Verseichtigung] of the Kantian—is nothing other than that formal self-activity.

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6 responses to “15”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 397:

    § 397. The will, which as passion is abstract understanding and encloses itself in one of its determinacies, is in the universal purpose of happiness freed from this singularization; the many particular inclinations, however, still counting as immediate, self-subsistent determinations, are at the same time sublated in the unity of the purpose, happiness, and posited as non-self-subsistent. The will, as this indeterminate universality reflected into itself, stands above the individual inclination; the latter first becomes its own in that the will concludes itself together with it and thereby gives itself determinate individuality and actuality; – it is thus at the standpoint of having to choose between inclinations, and is arbitrary will.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 15] Prattle of arbitrary will, — tossing itself about among every whim —
    A being, determined as merely possible, is something contingent — it can be, and also not be —
    Determinism
    One part holds fast to the formal reflection of the will.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 479:

    § 479. In the universal purpose of happiness the will is freed from the singularization in which it is caught as a particular drive or passion. Such a particularity is in so far no longer immediate, but first becomes its own in that the will concludes itself together with it and thereby gives itself determinate individuality and actuality. It is thus at the standpoint of having to choose between inclinations, and is arbitrary will.

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 477:

    § 477. Such a particularity of the drive is in this way no longer immediate, but first becomes its own in that the will concludes itself together with it and thereby gives itself determinate individuality and actuality. It is at the standpoint of choosing between inclinations, and is arbitrary will.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Since I have the possibility of determining myself this way or that — that is, since I can choose — I possess arbitrary will, which is what is commonly called freedom. The choice I have lies in the universality of the will, in that I can make this or that into what is mine. This ‘mine,’ as a particular content, is not adequate to me, and is thus separated from me, and is only in the possibility of being mine, just as I am the possibility of uniting myself with it. Choice therefore lies in the indeterminacy of the I and in the determinacy of a content. The will is thus, for the sake of this content, not free, although it formally has the aspect of infinity in itself; none of these contents corresponds to it: in none of them does it truly have itself. Contained in arbitrary will is the fact that the content is determined to be mine not through the nature of my will, but through contingency; I am thus just as dependent on this content, and this is the contradiction that lies in arbitrary will. The ordinary person believes himself free when he is permitted to act arbitrarily, but it is precisely in arbitrary will that his unfreedom consists. When I will what is rational, I do not act as a particular individual, but according to the concepts of ethical life in general: in an ethical action I assert not myself, but the matter at hand. But the human being, in doing something perverse, brings his particularity to the fore most of all. What is rational is the highway on which everyone walks, where no one stands out. When great artists complete a work, one can say: so it must be; that is, the artist’s particularity has entirely vanished, and no manner appears in it. Phidias has no manner; the figure itself lives and comes forth. But the worse the artist is, the more one sees him himself, his particularity and arbitrary will. If one stops at the consideration, within arbitrary will, that the human being can will this or that, this is indeed his freedom; but if one holds fast to the view that the content is a given one, then the human being is thereby determined and is, precisely in this respect, no longer free.

  6. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 15: Arbitrariness

    What kind of freedom is this, the freedom that can choose? We call it arbitrariness.

    It contains two things. First, the freedom to look away from everything: I do not have to do any of it. Second, dependence: What I choose comes to me ready-made, from inside or from outside. Which content it turns out to be in the end is a matter of chance. Arbitrariness is chance in the shape of the will.

    Most people mean exactly arbitrariness when they think of freedom. For them, freedom means: being able to do what you want. We say it clearly: If freedom means only this to someone, he still completely lacks education in thinking. He has no inkling of what free will, right and ethical life are.

    Why is arbitrariness not true freedom? I am sure, yes, that I choose freely. But none of the contents is really me. I do not find myself in any of them. I choose a content and at the same time depend on it. Arbitrariness is a contradiction.

    In the past, people argued for a long time: Is the will really free, or do we only imagine it? Some said: But I can feel that I choose freely. The others said: What you choose comes from your drives and notions, and so from outside. Both had arbitrariness in view. And the second group was right. If arbitrariness is supposed to be freedom, then freedom is an illusion.

    In Kant, too, freedom is nothing but this self-activity without a content of its own. And Fries made Kant’s view on this completely shallow.

    Where, then, does true freedom lie? A hint: Whoever wants what is rational does not act as this particular individual. He lets the matter speak, not himself. Whoever does something misguided, by contrast, shows the most of his own quirks. The rational is like the main road: Everyone walks on it, and nobody stands out.

    It is the same in art. In front of a great work, people say: This is how it must be. You no longer see the artist in it. The worse the artist is, the more you see the artist himself: his quirks, his arbitrariness.

    Summary: Arbitrariness means being able to choose. This is the common idea of freedom. But whoever merely chooses stays dependent on what he chose. True freedom lies elsewhere: in wanting what is rational.

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