16

The will can likewise abandon (§ 5) what it has chosen in its resolve (§ 14). With this possibility, however, of proceeding beyond any other content which it substitutes for it, and so on to infinity, the will does not escape from finitude, since every such content is distinct from the form and is therefore finite; while the opposite of determinacy—namely indeterminacy, irresolution, or abstraction—is only the other, equally one-sided moment.

DE ES


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One response to “16”

  1. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 16: Choosing something else again and again

    What I have chosen, I can also give up again. After all, I can look away from everything. We already know that.

    So I choose something new. And then something else again. And so on, without end.

    Is this not the highest freedom? No. Think of someone who keeps switching channels while watching TV. He is not freer than someone who watches a film to the end. He just never sees anything whole.

    Every new content is again something finite. It does not match the form of the will. And the opposite does not help either. Some people do not commit and stay undecided. They only stand on the other side, which is just as one-sided. So the will does not get out of finitude. It runs in place.

    Summary: Endless switching is not freedom. The will swings back and forth between committing and giving up again. And in doing so, it stays finite.

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