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2 responses to “269”

1. 

   Eduard Gans (Additions)

   29. May 1833

   The state is an organism, that is, the development of the Idea into its distinctions. These differentiated sides are thus the various powers together with their functions and activities, through which the universal continually and necessarily brings itself forth and, precisely by being presupposed in its own production, preserves itself. This organism is the political constitution; it eternally emerges from the state, just as the state preserves itself through it. If the two fall apart, if the differentiated sides make themselves independent, then the unity that produces them is no longer posited. The fable of the belly and the other members applies to them. It is the nature of the organism that, unless all the parts pass over into identity, if one of them sets itself up as independent, all must perish. One gets nowhere in judging the state by means of predicates, principles, and so on; it must be grasped as an organism, just as little as the nature of God is comprehended through predicates, God’s life rather having to be intuited within itself.

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2. 

   Karl Marx

   29. March 1843

   The political constitution is the organism of the state, or the organism of the state is the political constitution. That the differentiated sides of an organism stand in a necessary connection arising from the nature of the organism is — a pure tautology. That, when the political constitution is determined as an organism, the various sides of the constitution, the various powers, behave as organic determinations and stand in a rational relation to one another, is likewise — a tautology. It is a great advance to regard the political state as an organism, and hence the diversity of the powers no longer as organic |Evidently a slip of the pen; presumably meant to read mechanical or inorganic| but as a living and rational distinction. But how does Hegel present this discovery?

   1. »This organism is the development of the Idea into its distinctions and into their objective actuality.« It does not say: This organism of the state is its development into distinctions and their objective actuality. The actual thought is: The development of the state, or of the political constitution, into distinctions and their actuality, is an organic one. The presupposition, the subject, are the actual distinctions, or the different sides of the political constitution. The predicate is their determination as organic. Instead, the Idea is made the subject, and the distinctions and their actuality are conceived as its development, its result — whereas, conversely, the Idea must be developed out of the actual distinctions. The organic is precisely the idea of the distinctions, their ideal determination. Here, however, the Idea is spoken of as a subject that develops itself into its distinctions. Besides this inversion of subject and predicate, the appearance is produced as though a different Idea from that of the organism were at issue here. One starts out from the abstract Idea, whose development in the state is the political constitution. What is at stake, then, is not the political Idea, but the abstract Idea in the political element. By saying: »this organism (namely, of the state, the political constitution) is the development of the Idea into its distinctions, etc.,« I still know nothing at all of the specific Idea of the political constitution; the very same sentence could be predicated with equal truth of the animal organism as of the political one. By what, then, does the animal organism differ from the political one? This general determination does not tell us. An explanation that does not give the differentia specifica |the particular distinguishing feature| is no explanation at all. The sole interest is to rediscover »the Idea« as such, the »logical Idea,« in every element — be it of the state, be it of nature — and the actual subjects, here »the political constitution,« become mere names for it, so that only the appearance of a real cognition is present. They are and remain uncomprehended determinations, because they are not comprehended in their specific essence.

   »These differentiated sides are thus the various powers and their functions and activity.« Through the little word »thus« the appearance of a consequence, a derivation and development, is produced. One ought rather to ask »How so?« — that »the various sides of the organism of the state« are the »various powers« and »their functions and activity« is an empirical fact; that they are members of an »organism« is the philosophical »predicate.«

   We draw attention here to a stylistic peculiarity of Hegel’s that recurs often and is a product of mysticism. The whole paragraph runs:

   »The disposition takes its particularly determinate content from the various sides of the organism of the state. This organism is the development of the Idea into its distinctions and into their objective actuality. These differentiated sides are thus the various powers and their functions and activities, whereby the universal continually — and indeed, being determined by the nature of the concept — produces itself in a necessary way, and, being likewise presupposed to its own production, sustains itself; — this organism is the political constitution.«

   1. »The disposition takes its particularly determinate content from the various sides of the organism of the state.« »These differentiated ones are … the various powers and their functions and activities.«
   2. »The disposition takes its particularly determinate content from the various sides of the organism of the state. This organism is the development of the Idea into its distinctions and into their objective actuality … whereby the universal continually — and indeed, being determined by the nature of the concept — produces itself in a necessary way, and, being likewise presupposed to its own production, sustains itself. — This organism is the political constitution.«

   One sees that Hegel attaches his further determinations to two subjects: to the »various sides of the organism« and to the »organism.« In the third sentence, the »differentiated sides« are determined as the »various powers.« Through the interpolated word »thus,« the appearance is produced as though these »various powers« were derived from the intervening clause about the organism as the development of the Idea.

   It then goes on to speak of the »various powers.« The determination that the universal continually »produces« itself and thereby sustains itself is nothing new, for it already lies in their determination as »sides of the organism,« as »organic« sides. Or rather, this determination of the »various powers« is nothing but a paraphrase of the fact that the organism is »the development of the Idea into its distinctions, etc.«

   The sentences: This organism is »the development of the Idea into its distinctions and into their objective actuality,« or into distinctions whereby »the universal« (the universal here being the same as the Idea) »continually — and indeed, being determined by the nature of the concept — sustains itself, produces itself in a necessary way, and, being likewise presupposed to its own production, sustains itself« — are identical. The latter is merely a closer explication of »the development of the Idea into its distinctions.« Hegel has thereby not advanced a single step beyond the general concept of »the Idea« and, at most, of the »organism« as such (for actually what is at issue is only this determinate Idea). By what, then, is he entitled to the concluding sentence: »This organism is the political constitution«? Why not: »This organism is the solar system«? Because he has subsequently determined »the various sides of the state« as the »various powers.« The sentence that »the various sides of the state are the various powers« is an empirical truth and cannot be passed off as a philosophical discovery; nor has it in any way emerged as the result of an earlier development. But because the organism is determined as »the development of the Idea,« the distinctions of the Idea are spoken of, and then the concretum of the »various powers« is inserted, the appearance arises as though a determinate content had been developed. To the sentence: »The disposition takes its particularly determinate content from the various sides of the organism of the state,« Hegel ought not to have attached: »this organism,« but rather »the organism is the development of the Idea, etc.« At least what he says holds of every organism, and there is no predicate present by which the subject »this« would be justified. The actual result he is aiming at is the determination of the organism as the political constitution. But no bridge has been built by which one could pass from the general idea of the organism to the determinate idea of the state-organism or the political constitution — and no such bridge will ever be built, in all eternity. In the opening sentence, mention is made of »the various sides of the state-organism,« which are later determined as »the various powers.« So all that is really said is: »The various powers of the state-organism,« or »the state-organism of the various powers,« is — the »political constitution« of the state. It is not out of the »organism« of »the Idea,« its »distinctions,« etc., but out of the presupposed concept »various powers,« »state-organism,« that the bridge to the »political constitution« is built.

   In truth, Hegel has done nothing but dissolve the »political constitution« into the general abstract idea of the »organism«; but in appearance, and in his own opinion, he has developed the determinate out of the »general idea.« He has made into a product, a predicate of the Idea, what is in fact its subject. He does not develop his thinking out of the object, but the object according to a thinking that is already finished with itself and has become finished with itself in the abstract sphere of logic. What is at stake is not the development of the determinate Idea of the political constitution, but rather giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea, ranking it as a member of the Idea’s biography — an evident mystification.

   A further determination is that the »various powers« »are determined by the nature of the concept« and that the universal therefore »produces them in a necessary way.« The various powers are thus determined not by their »own nature« but by an alien one. Likewise, the necessity is not drawn from their own essence, still less critically demonstrated. Their fate is rather predestined by the »nature of the concept,« sealed in the holy registers of the Santa Casa (of logic). The soul of the objects — here, of the state — is finished, predestined, before its body, which is really only appearance. The »concept« is the son in the »Idea,« the God the Father, the agens |the driving force|, the determining, differentiating principle. »Idea« and »concept« are here abstractions made independent, self-subsistent.

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