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78

The distinction between ownership and possession, between the substantial and the external side (§ 45), becomes, in contract, the distinction between the common will as agreement and the actualization of that will through performance. That agreement, once arrived at, is, taken by itself in distinction from performance, something represented, to which, therefore, in accordance with the peculiar manner in which representations have determinate being in signs (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 379 f.) 1, a particular determinate being must be given — in the expression of the stipulation through the formalities of gestures and other symbolic acts, and especially in a determinate declaration through language, the element most worthy of spiritual representation.

The stipulation is, according to this determination, indeed the form through which the content concluded in the contract has its determinate being as something at first merely represented. But representing is only a form, and does not carry the sense that the content is thereby still something subjective, something to be wished for or willed in this way or that; rather, the content is the conclusion, accomplished through the will, concerning this matter.

  1. Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 458 f. ↩︎

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5 responses to “78”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), § 409:

    § 409. The two wills that are present in the contract are, as something inward, distinct from their realization, the performance; just as (§ 406) the single will is distinct from the taking possession. The contract in the form of the ideal expression, the stipulation, already contains indeed the giving-up of a property by the one, the transition and the reception into the other will; it is therefore valid in and for itself, and does not first become so through the actual performance of the one or the other — which would involve an infinite regress or infinite division of the thing, the labor, and the time. But since the will in this sphere is at the same time still formal and arbitrary will (§ 407), it can correspond to its concept, or also not.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    – Distinction between property and possession, the substantial and the external side – also value – and specific thing –
    Will – as common in itself – particular will distinguished from it
    Will as such as inner – made external against another will. – Will has to do with will.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 493:

    § 493. The two wills and their agreement in the contract are, as something inward, distinct from their realization, the performance. The relatively ideal expression in the stipulation, however, already contains the actual giving-up of a property by the one, the transition and the reception into the other will. The contract is valid in and for itself, and does not first become so through the performance of the one or the other — which would involve an infinite regress or an infinite division of the thing, the labor, and the time. It is an external obligation (one that submits itself to coercion) which the will enters into, because it is only the will of abstract personality, and a willing directed at this or that thing. And its inwardness, which here is not the moral inwardness, is complete and exhausted in the expression of the stipulation. Its inwardness lies in the realm of representation, and the word is, within this, deed and thing. (§ 462.)

  4. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 493:

    § 493. The two wills and their agreement in the contract are, as something inward, distinct from their realization, the performance. The relatively ideal expression in the stipulation contains the actual giving-up of a property by the one, the transition and the reception into the other will. The contract is valid in and for itself, and does not first become so through the performance of the one or the other — which would involve an infinite regress or an infinite division of the thing, the labor, and the time. The expression in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. The inwardness of the will giving up the property and of the will receiving it lies in the realm of representation, and the word is, in this, deed and thing (§ 462), and indeed the fully valid deed, since the will here is not considered as moral (whether it is meant seriously or deceitfully), but rather is only a will directed at an external thing.

  5. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Just as in the doctrine of property we had the distinction between property and possession, between the substantial and the merely external, so in contract we have the difference between the common will as agreement and the particular will as performance. It lies in the nature of contract that both the common and the particular will express themselves, because here will relates to will. The agreement, which manifests itself in a sign, and the performance therefore fall apart among cultivated peoples, whereas among crude ones they can coincide. In the forests of Ceylon there is a trading people that lays down its property and calmly waits until others come and set theirs against it: here the mute declaration of the will is not distinct from the performance.

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