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37

2. The particularity of the will is indeed a moment of the whole consciousness of the will (§ 34), but it is not yet contained in abstract personality as such. It is therefore indeed present, but as still distinct from personality, the determination of freedom – as desire, need, drives, contingent inclination, and so on. In formal right, therefore, what matters is not the particular interest, my advantage or my welfare – nor likewise the particular determining ground of my will, insight and intention.

DE ES

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3 responses to “37”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Totality present, not yet taken up – precisely Per[son] immediate – infinite reflection, yet abstractly mediated – thus itself in the form of immediacy.
    This – mine, as [belonging to] me as one who enjoys, who is needy – house, fruits etc. for my existence – my welfare, use, pleasure, spiritual need; [this] does not constitute right – with every right [there is] an interest – but only alongside it. – Against this side there then appears the formalism of right – to assert my right even though [I have] no interest in the matter – sheer insistence on being right; – in so doing he easily injures others, in that he throws himself upon this abstract side – abstract will – empty, without content.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Because particularity is not yet present in the person as freedom, everything that depends on particularity is here a matter of indifference. If someone has no interest beyond his formal right, this can be sheer obstinacy, as often befits a narrow heart and disposition; for it is the crude person who clings [most] rigidly to his right, whereas the noble-minded person looks to what other aspects the matter may have. Abstract right is thus at first only a mere possibility, and to that extent something formal as against the whole scope of the relation. For this reason the determination of right confers an entitlement, but it is not absolutely necessary that I pursue my right, since it is only one side of the whole relation. For possibility is precisely being that carries the significance of also not being.

  3. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 37: What right does not ask

    Every human being has wishes, needs and likings. These belong to his will. But they are not yet part of the person as we just came to know it. The person is only the free I.

    What follows from this?

    Right at this first stage does not ask about my advantage. It does not ask whether something does me good. It also does not ask about my reasons or intentions. If you buy a book, you do not have to explain whether you want to read it.

    This has a good side and a bad side.

    The good side: Right holds for everyone, no matter what he plans to do.

    The bad side: Some people hold on only to their right. Two neighbors quarrel for years over ten centimeters of garden. Neither really needs the strip. It is only about being right. Often a narrow heart lies behind this. A great mind also sees the other sides of a matter.

    For a right only gives me a warrant. I may claim it. But I do not have to.

    Summary: The first right does not ask about advantage, welfare or intention. That is why people can cling to it. But it only permits, it does not demand.

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