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159

The right that accrues to the individual on the basis of the unity of the family, and which is at first simply his life within this unity itself, comes forward in the form of right — as the abstract moment of determinate singularity — only to the extent that the family passes over into dissolution, and those who are supposed to be its members become, in their disposition and actuality, self-subsistent persons, and what they constituted, as a determinate moment, within the family, they now retain, in separation, only according to its external aspects (property, maintenance, costs of upbringing, and the like).

DE

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2 responses to “159”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Abstract strict right – force of substantial unity – disposition – trust, discipline – right in relation to love is something other than in relation to strict right, – the latter only insofar as they are persons, and what accordingly belongs to each individually, i.e. stepping out to his share – in division – right pertains only to things or to renderings of things – the members must exist.
    Marriage law – relation to, against externality – only under the presupposition – of separation; – regard for possible separation – or right against separation – dissolution – this is the right of marriage itself, not of the individual person as such –
    Right [cannot] be asserted against love – because natural feeling counts as one’s own disposition: – in the state, what is to be performed is also demanded in the form of strict right, – without and against disposition – i.e. because [it is a] universal purpose, universal determinations, also abstraction from particularity – cold, i.e. without feeling, sentiment – not everyone without sentiment, disposition –

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The right of the family consists properly in this, that its substantiality is to have existence; it is thus a right against externality and against stepping out of this unity. Against this, however, love is again a feeling, something subjective, against which unity cannot assert itself. If, then, unity is demanded, it can be demanded only in relation to such things as are by their nature external and are not conditioned by feeling.

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