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141

Transition from Morality into Ethical Life

For the good, as the substantial universal of freedom, but still abstract, there are therefore equally required determinations in general and the principle of these determinations, but as identical with it, just as, for conscience, the merely abstract principle of determining, the universality and objectivity of its determinations, is required. Both, each thus for itself raised to totality, become the undetermined that ought to be determined. — But the integration of both relative totalities into absolute identity has already been accomplished in itself, since precisely this subjectivity, hovering for itself in its vanity, of the pure certainty of itself is identical with the abstract universality of the good; — the thus concrete identity of the good and the subjective will, the truth of both, is ethical life.

The closer nature of such a transition of the concept becomes intelligible in the Logic. Here it need only be said that the nature of the limited and finite — and such, here, are the abstract good, which only ought to be, and the equally abstract subjectivity, which only ought to be good — has, at itself, its opposite: the good, its actuality, and subjectivity (the moment of the actuality of the ethical), the good; but that, as one-sided, they are not yet posited as what they are in themselves. This becoming-posited they attain in their negativity, in this: that they, as they one-sidedly constitute themselves as totalities for themselves — each not having in itself what is in itself in it: the good without subjectivity and determination, and the determining element, subjectivity, without the being-in-itself — sublate themselves and thereby reduce themselves to moments, to moments of the concept, which becomes manifest as their unity and has, precisely through this positedness of its moments, attained reality, and is thus now as Idea — concept, which has developed its determinations into reality, and is, at the same time, in their identity, their being-in-itself essence. — The existence of freedom, which was immediately right, is determined, in the reflection of self-consciousness, as the good; the third, here in its transition, as the truth of this good and of subjectivity, is thus equally the truth of both the latter and of right. — The ethical is subjective disposition, but of the right that is in itself; that this Idea is the truth of the concept of freedom cannot be a presupposition, taken from feeling or from wherever else, but — in philosophy — can only be something proven. This deduction of it is contained solely in this: that right and moral self-consciousness show themselves, at themselves, to go back into it as into their result. — Those who believe they can dispense with proof and deduction in philosophy show that they are still far removed from the first thought of what philosophy is, and may perhaps otherwise have their say, but in philosophy those have no right to a voice who wish to speak without a concept.

DE

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2 responses to “141”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 141] The good, – and conscience; forms – conscience as the determining – being-for-itself, infinite form without content, activity, ideality, unrest, having and allowing nothing fixed – the good in itself, that which is, the eternal, the unchangeable – infinite content without form, therefore no content.

    [zu § 141 Anm.] The good, the abstract in-itself, is volatilized through the subject[ivity,] the idealization of all determinate duty – made into a pure abstraction; the determining passes over into subjectivity. This, isolating itself abstractly, has no in-itself, has only arbitrary choice as its determination – precisely it wills to be without determination – this its apex. –
    This indeterminacy, however, is rather the opposite of arbitrary choice, – it is the self-identical, the universal of the will – Were it to recognize itself thus, it would give up subjectivity, – rather, [it is] the concept of the will. – To represent itself thus is thus a self-thinking universality. –
    α) Refutation – where then do you take the determination for acting from? For action, for actuality, there must be determination – nothing but arbitrary choice – contingency. – Or if it is to be good, universal, then it is objective, in and for itself, eternal – not merely something posited, by me, through me, which I would ironically have merely made so. – The true is nothing ironic.
    β) dialectical transition: the abstract subjectivity of the will is in itself the universal, the good, the being-in-itself – opining – I do within myself whatever pleases me, whatever I, this particular one, may will – spirit of the world, substance – humiliation, the matter must come to pass, – to recognize no matter [as valid]; I am rather the fulfilled, determinate, universal matter. Liberated from the matter. – The good has this absolute irony over this divine subjectivity. Therein lies absolute determination, – namely subjectivity is the determining activity of reason – but only this side – it is rational only in its oppositionless unity with the universal – its determinations only truly within the ground of universality – not a determining of arbitrary choice – The good receives its determinations through the moment of subjectivity. This is true [only] in unity with the universal. Subjectivity determines as universally good, as objective, i.e. as being, in itself, but is ironic about this – takes itself back, namely takes back the universal, the in-itself.
    a. With the identity of subjectivity and the good, the one-sidedness of both disappears.
    α) the good is
    αα) not abstract subjectivity, infinite determining
    ββ) not finite – but system –
    β) subjectivity – the determining [is]
    αα) not against the good,
    ββ) not merely subsuming this or that, but
    γγ) as system, in accordance with the concept.
    b. Right and morality, freedom also particularization – determinate being – external, and determining within the will (particular content) –
    c. Historical remark
    Freedom in its essential universality itself the object. Not to lose sight of the essential will, freedom – the determination of right – passes over into subjectivity in general.
    Retrospect – difference between the Idea of the free will, which [?] fades away within itself, and ethical life –
    We are only ever at the same Idea – both one and the same, never beyond it, never losing it –
    – But the two sides are distinguished in their determination.
    Ethical life is the Idea as actual life – truth – in-itself and for-itself – is now the object of self-consciousness – as it is for us from the beginning.
    To grasp the Idea thus, to determine it thus, requires that subjectivity be conceived not only in general, but in the formal determination in which it is posited as identical with the universal.
    Subjectivity – return into itself – α) knowledge of what is immediate – β) universal nature of ac[tion] –
    γ) universal nature according to its concept – the good.
    Subjectivity, … [?] drive, natural will is personal will, of this or that matter – with complete indifference of interest – subjectivity is indeed intent, knowledge of the circumstances – purpose is self-determination out of the category of the good – is out of conviction – all these are modes of subjectivity.
    But the one mode of subjectivity through which [it] is posited as absolute, namely as identical with the good – the choice between good and evil – the form of being – is itself universality, – the form of being or determinate being is consciousness – and the determinacy of the concept –
    The former gives the configurations we have seen – the latter the determinacy of the concept. Strict right: α) freedom, β) particularity, external content – this [?] balanced out for itself [?]
    The concept of freedom thus grasped has for its existence self-consciousness – subjectivity, and one such that, conversely, its determinacy is only that universal, that concept existing for itself. – I – the mode of my determinate being [is] the universal. – Conversely, the universal – the mode of its determinate being [is] self-consciousness – but that which only is within the universal here – lives, i.e. is actual, unity of the inner and the outer, such that one can no longer say what the inner and the outer are – The good is lifeless – without the subjectivity for which it is essentially the absolute end – self-consciousness spiritually lifeless, which is only natural, has its drives for its determination, – or only its excellence – the abstract good –
    Where right – i.e. private right – is administered, such a condition [is] not yet an ethical one. What belongs to this is that subjectivity, particularity, be determined as universal – this [is] actuality – all modes of actuality only consequences of this – for subjectivity is what actualizes.
    [above:] Subjectivity is itself the concept.
    [below:] My determinations fall within the matter.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Both principles that we have considered so far, the abstract good as well as conscience, lack their opposite: the abstract good evaporates into something wholly powerless, into which I can bring any content whatever, and the subjectivity of spirit becomes no less devoid of content, since it lacks objective significance. There can therefore arise a longing for an objectivity in which man would rather debase himself to servitude and to complete dependence, merely in order to escape the torment of emptiness and negativity. When in recent times some Protestants have gone over to the Catholic Church, this happened because they found their inner life devoid of content and reached for something fixed, a support, an authority, even though it was not exactly the firmness of thought that they thereby obtained. The unity of the subjective and of the good that is objective in and for itself is ethical life, and in it, according to the concept, reconciliation has taken place. For if morality is the form of the will in general on the side of subjectivity, then ethical life is not merely the subjective form and the self-determination of the will, but has as its content that which is its very concept, namely freedom. The [sphere of] right and the [sphere of the] moral cannot exist on their own, and they must have the ethical as their bearer and foundation, for right lacks the moment of subjectivity, which morality in turn has for itself alone, and so neither of the two moments has actuality on its own. Only the infinite, the Idea, is actual: right exists only as a branch of a whole, as a climbing plant twining round a tree that is firm in and for itself.

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