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131

For the subjective will, the good is likewise the absolutely essential thing, and the subjective will has value and dignity only insofar as its insight and intention are in accordance with the good. Insofar as the good is here still this abstract Idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet taken up into it and posited in accordance with it; it thus stands in a relation to the good, and indeed in this relation: that the good1 (in the manuscript: is to be the property of the subjective will) ought to be substantial for it, that the subjective will ought to make the good its purpose and bring it to fulfilment — just as the good, for its part, has its mediation into actuality only in the subjective will.

DE

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2 responses to “131”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Not yet the development of the determinations – particularity not yet posited. Subjectivity as such, not yet posited within the good, hence at first a relation – relative – content in fact indeterminate – subject – hence arbitrariness.
    Relation – objectivity as against the … [?] subjective will – infinite importance of the development.
    Ought only to be determined – toward actuality – The determinacy is not yet posited – But the determinacy, as infinite – true form – is subjectivity – I, this one, personality only immediate – therefore devoid of determination, i.e. contingency, externality of the determination

    [handschriftlich] (inline) is meant to be that which belongs to the subjective will.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The good is the truth of the particular will, but the will is only what it makes of itself: it is not good from the outset, but can only become what it is through its own labor. On the other hand, the good, without the subjective will itself, is merely an abstraction lacking reality, which is to come to it only through that will. The development of the good accordingly contains three stages: 1. that the good be, for me as willing, a particular will, and that I know it as such; 2. that one say what is good, and develop the particular determinations of the good; 3. finally, the determining of the good for itself, the particularity of the good as an infinite, self-subsisting subjectivity. This inward determining is conscience.

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