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131

For the subjective will, the good is likewise the absolutely essential thing, and the subjective will has value and dignity only insofar as its insight and intention are in accordance with the good. Insofar as the good is here still this abstract Idea of the good, the subjective will is not yet taken up into it and posited in accordance with it; it thus stands in a relation to the good, and indeed in this relation: that the good1 ought to be substantial for it, that the subjective will ought to make the good its purpose and bring it to fulfilment — just as the good, for its part, has its mediation into actuality only in the subjective will.

  1. [Handwritten:] is to be the property of the subjective will ↩︎

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3 responses to “131”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 422, 425:

    § 422. γ) The good is at first abstractly universal; but as essential to the will it is in itself negative, and hence a particular. There is therefore many a kind of good and many a duty, whose diversity stands dialectically against one another, and brings them into collision.

    § 425. ε) This inner side is, in general, to be joined together with objectivity through action, through the activity of the subject. But since objectivity, as the other, self-subsistent extreme, constitutes a peculiar world of its own, it is contingent whether it harmonizes with subjective purposes; whether the good actualizes itself in it and evil, the purpose that is null in and for itself, is null in it; – further, whether the subject finds its welfare in it; and more particularly, whether the good subject becomes happy in it, and the evil one unhappy. – But the world is to let the good action be carried out within it, just as it is to grant the good subject the satisfaction of its particular interest, while denying it to the evil subject, and likewise to bring evil itself to nothing.

  2. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Not yet the development of the determinations – particularity not yet posited. Subjectivity as such, not yet posited within the good, hence at first a relation – relative – content in fact indeterminate – subject – hence arbitrariness.
    Relation – objectivity as against the … [?] subjective will – infinite importance of the development.
    Ought only to be determined – toward actuality – The determinacy is not yet posited – But the determinacy, as infinite – true form – is subjectivity – I, this one, personality only immediate – therefore devoid of determination, i.e. contingency, externality of the determination

    [handschriftlich] (inline) is meant to be that which belongs to the subjective will.

  3. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The good is the truth of the particular will, but the will is only what it makes of itself: it is not good from the outset, but can only become what it is through its own labor. On the other hand, the good, without the subjective will itself, is merely an abstraction lacking reality, which is to come to it only through that will. The development of the good accordingly contains three stages: 1. that the good be, for me as willing, a particular will, and that I know it as such; 2. that one say what is good, and develop the particular determinations of the good; 3. finally, the determining of the good for itself, the particularity of the good as an infinite, self-subsisting subjectivity. This inward determining is conscience.

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