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124

Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual (including the recognition of that individual in honour and fame) is itself contained in the carrying out of purposes valid in and for themselves, it is an empty assertion of abstract understanding to demand that only such a purpose should appear as willed and attained, or to hold the view that objective and subjective purposes exclude one another in willing. Indeed, this view becomes something bad when it passes over into maintaining that subjective satisfaction — since it is present (as it always is in a completed work) — was the essential intention of the agent, and the objective purpose merely a means to it. — What the subject is is the series of its actions. If these are a series of worthless productions, then the subjectivity of the willing is likewise worthless; if, on the other hand, the series of its deeds is of a substantial nature, then so too is the inner will of the individual.

The right of the subject’s particularity to find itself satisfied — or, what is the same thing, the right of subjective freedom — constitutes the turning and centre point in the difference between antiquity and the modern age. This right, in its infinity, is expressed in Christianity, and has been made the universal actual principle of a new form of the world. Among its closer configurations belong love, the romantic, the purpose of the eternal blessedness of the individual, and so on — then morality and conscience, and further the other forms that will partly come forward in what follows as the principle of civil society and as moments of the political constitution, and partly appear generally in history, especially in the history of art, of the sciences, and of philosophy. — This principle of particularity is, to be sure, a moment of opposition, and at first, at least, just as much identical with the universal as distinguished from it. Abstract reflection, however, fixes this moment in its difference and opposition to the universal and thereby produces a view of morality according to which morality can only perennially consist in a hostile struggle against one’s own satisfaction — the demand

“and then to do with repugnance what duty commands you.”1

(1. Cf. Schiller’s distich “Decisum”: “… Und mit Abscheu alsdann tun, was die Pflicht dir gebeut.”)

It is this very understanding that produces that psychological view of history which knows how to belittle and disparage all great deeds and individuals by turning the inclinations and passions that likewise found their satisfaction in substantial activity, as well as fame, honour, and other consequences — in short, the particular side, which it had previously decreed to be something bad in itself — into the chief intention and the operative motive of the actions; it maintains that, because great actions and the activity consisting in a series of such actions have brought forth something great in the world and have had, for the acting individual, the consequence of power, honour, and fame, it is not that greatness but only this particular and external thing that fell to the individual from it that belongs to him; because this particular thing was a consequence, it was therefore also the purpose, and indeed even the sole purpose. — Such reflection clings to the subjective side of great individuals, since it is itself of that kind, and overlooks, in this self-made vanity, the substantial element in them; it is the view of “the valets of psychology, for whom there are no heroes, not because there are no heroes, but because they are only valets” (Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 616).

DE

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2 responses to “124”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Opposition – α) not necessary – β) briefly noted: not essential, not absolute, – on the contrary. αα) not excellent intentions and bad actions, ββ) not bad intentions and excellent actions, γγ) not excellent intentions and no actions at all – occupying oneself inwardly with intentions – not the actuality of the individual – the intention does not remain inward, but is given along with the action itself; – it is the moral quality of the action, i.e., its universal purpose, its relation to a purpose that, in the spiritual realm, is universal as regards content; α) killing, whether [there were] external circumstances – β) intended, whether [there were] consequences, i.e., the universal quality of the action according to its externality – the connection of the particular case with other circumstances – γ) subjective intention, revenge or justice; – purpose in the world of freedom, the nature of nature as spiritual αα) taken from what is inward – ββ) existence, posited in relation to the will of others, i.e., actuality as such in the world of freedom. The intention is attained, i.e., not only as mine, but also as a universal matter on spiritual ground. – Here a higher, different ground of existence – [this] constitutes the nature of the action as something more actual. My action is effective on this ground, and likewise subject to judgment. – I have not kept my intention to myself, but have also posited it objectively –
    A distinction made by the understanding, as to which, among the many determinations in an action, is the intention – [as if] this determinacy were the purpose – mediocrity raises itself up, – [saying] I have no such passion. It is as if it were merely a matter of subjectivity, not of the thing itself.
    Acting is the positing of the intention, making it objective, precisely so that it should not remain subjective –
    Opining, being able, possibility. – Action is actuality. Here particularity counts, circumstances, all the advantages and disadvantages of birth, of talent, of character – the extent of deeds, of effects – must be regarded without envy. I have not been this one, am not this one. I, for my part, under my [own] circumstances, must actually be what I can be – What man ought, that he can, Fichte – such empty general words. What each ought is different in each case – Moral appraisal of human beings – judgment of oneself and of others, of oneself in comparison with others, and of others in comparison with oneself.
    Substantial nature, that is the thing itself – the objective, the rational, the necessary.
    Worthless productions. Value here is the character of the action – according to its inner purpose, the spiritual actuality, whose principle [it is].
    Intention – at first the interest of the particular will – the spiritual content of the action posited through the will – (revenge) justice, self-interest, universal purpose, etc. – thus the matter on the one hand; on this the nature of the action depends; this in and for itself – soul, body – the spirit of the action – is the will of the subject (imputation) – children do not know whether [something is] right or wrong –
    Arbitrary choice can make the action into a means – whether the substantial [element] of the action was this – makes no difference for me – more on this later – The spiritual [element] of the action must have absolute value –

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    „In magnis voluisse sat est“ has the correct meaning that one ought to will something great; but one must also be able to carry out what is great: otherwise it is an empty willing. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that have never turned green.

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