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125

|122| The subjective element, with the particular content of welfare, stands, as reflected into itself, infinite, at the same time in relation to the universal, the will existing in itself. This moment, posited at first on this very particularity, is the welfare of others too — in a complete but wholly empty determination, the welfare of all. The welfare of many other particulars in general is then also an essential purpose and right of subjectivity. But since the universal existing in and for itself, distinguished from such particular content, has here not yet been further determined than as right, those purposes of the particular may be distinct from it and in accordance with it, but may also not be.

DE ES

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2 responses to “125”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    With well-being – the best – we have [come] into a wholly calm, as it were private-civic relation – not the best of a human being, i.e., that which is in accordance with his vocation. – Happiness – there is a peculiar tedium in these words well-being and happiness – because [they involve] such an indeterminate, hollow reflection.

  2. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 125: The welfare of others

    My welfare matters to me. But I am not alone. The welfare of others is just as much a rightful purpose.

    How far does this reach?

    We can speak of the welfare of all. That sounds grand. But it is empty. For “all” are not definite people. I can really help only definite people: my neighbor, my friend, my colleague.

    And what about right?

    Welfare, mine and that of others, is something particular. Right is universal. The two can fit together. But they can also contradict each other. What does me or others good is not right for that reason alone.

    Summary: The welfare of others is a rightful purpose too. But the welfare of all remains empty. And what serves welfare can contradict right.

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