Distress reveals both the finitude, and hence the contingency, of right as well as of welfare — of the abstract existence of freedom, without its being the existence of the particular person, and of the sphere of the particular will without the universality of right. Their one-sidedness and ideality are thereby posited, just as this is already determined at them, in the concept itself; right has already (§ 106) determined its existence as the particular will, and subjectivity, in its comprehensive particularity, is itself the existence of freedom (§ 127), just as it1 (in the manuscript: “subjectivity”) is, in itself, as the infinite relation of the will to itself, the universal of freedom. These two moments, thus integrated at themselves into their truth, their identity — but at first still in relative relation to one another — are the good, as the fulfilled universal determined in and for itself, and conscience, as the infinite subjectivity that knows within itself and determines the content within itself.

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