218

Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil society, crime is no longer merely the violation of a subjectively infinite [right], but of the universal thing, which has an existence firm and strong in itself. There thus enters in the point of view of the danger that the act poses to society, whereby, on the one hand, the magnitude of the crime is increased; but, on the other hand, the power of society, having become secure of itself, lowers the external importance of the violation, and thus brings about a greater leniency in its punishment.

That, in one member of society, all the others are violated does not change the nature of the crime according to its concept, but rather according to the side of external existence, of the violation, which now affects the representation and the consciousness of civil society, and not only the existence of the one directly violated. |217| In the heroic ages (see the tragedies of the ancients), citizens do not regard themselves as violated by the crimes that the members of royal houses commit against one another. — Since crime, in itself an infinite violation, must, as an existence, be assessed according to qualitative and quantitative differences (§ 96), a difference now essentially determined as representation and consciousness of the validity of the laws, the danger to civil society is a determination of its magnitude, or also one of its qualitative determinations. — This quality, or magnitude, however, is variable according to the condition of civil society, and in this lies the justification for punishing a theft of a few sous, or of a turnip, with death, in one condition, and a theft amounting to a hundred times, or more, of such values, with a mild punishment, in another. The point of view of danger to civil society, while it seems to aggravate crimes, is rather what has chiefly diminished their punishment. A penal code therefore belongs, chiefly, to its own time, and to the condition of civil society within that time.

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2 responses to “218”

  1. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The circumstance that a crime committed within society appears greater and is nevertheless punished more mildly seems to be contradictory. But if, on the one hand, it would be impossible for society to leave the crime unpunished, because it would then be posited as right, still, because society is secure of itself, the crime is always only a particular instance directed against it, something unstable and isolated. Through the firmness of society itself, the crime acquires the status of a merely subjective matter, one that seems to have sprung not so much from a deliberate will as from natural impulses. Through this view the crime acquires a milder standing, and the punishment therefore also becomes milder. If society is still unstable in itself, then examples must be made through punishments, for punishment is itself an example set against the example of the crime. But in a society that is firm within itself, the positedness of the crime is so weak that the annulment of this positedness must be measured accordingly. Harsh punishments are therefore not in and for themselves something unjust, but stand in relation to the condition of the age: a criminal code cannot hold good for all times, and crimes are illusory existences which can incur a greater or lesser rejection.

  2. Hegel (Simple) Avatar
    Hegel (Simple)

    § 218: Crime and society

    In civil society, property and person count through the law. So whoever commits a crime there does not only harm one single person. He harms the universal thing.

    What follows from this?

    Now it also counts how dangerous a deed is for society. On the one hand, this makes the crime bigger. On the other hand, a firm society is sure of itself. A single thief does not shake it. So it can punish more mildly.

    A contradiction?

    Only on the surface. A shaky society must punish harshly. It must set an example against the example of the crime. A firm society does not need this. For it, the crime is something isolated.

    The measure changes:

    How dangerous a deed is depends on the condition of society. Here lies the justification for punishing the theft of a few pennies or of a turnip with death. And it also justifies a mild punishment for a theft a hundred times bigger. So harsh punishments are not unjust in themselves. They fit their time.

    A look back:

    In the old tragedies, kings murder one another. The citizens do not feel harmed by this. In civil society, it is different. There, a crime hits everyone.

    Summary: In society, the danger of a deed also counts. So a firm society can punish more mildly. Every penal code belongs to its time.

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