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29

That a determinate being should in general be the determinate being of the free will – this is right. Right is thus, in general, freedom, as Idea.

The Kantian definition (see Kant’s Doctrine of Right, Introduction – cf. Metaphysics of Morals, Part I: Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, § B) – and one more generally adopted as well – according to which the chief element is the limitation of my freedom or arbitrary will such that it may coexist with the arbitrary will of everyone else in accordance with a universal law – this definition contains, on the one hand, only a negative determination, that of limitation, while on the other hand its positive element, the universal or so-called law of reason, the correspondence of the arbitrary will of the one with that of the other, amounts merely to the familiar formal identity and the principle of non-contradiction. This definition of right embodies the view that has been widespread chiefly since Rousseau, according to which it is not the will as rational, existing in and for itself, nor spirit as true spirit, but rather the will of the particular individual, in his own distinctive arbitrariness, that is supposed to be the substantial basis and the primary thing. Once this principle is adopted, the rational can of course appear only as a limitation upon this freedom, and not as something immanently rational, but only as an external, formal universal. That view is as devoid of all speculative thought, and as thoroughly rejected by the philosophical concept, as it has been productive – both in people’s minds and in actuality – of appearances whose dreadfulness finds its only parallel in the shallowness of the thoughts on which they were founded.

DE ES

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  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 29] The great standing of right – spirit making itself actual; – nature is what it is; it is comprehended – that spirit – as a nature – should be the system of a world, – custom, the order [of a] representation, idea necessary – for itself. Whether that which is, in idea, a necessary determination, is what people call right –
    Right appears in the nearest representation as a possibility to do or also not to do. I do nothing wrong if I do not assert my right – higher, concrete determinations are not only r[ights], but also duties –
    Contingency, whether it holds or not – only not to violate the right of the other. Right shall hold – α) I will, β) valid, γ) why valid? Universality – freedom – α) wrong – β) proceeding from my will; α) will alone the ground of validity – that one lets it hold –
    Concrete right the absolute necessity of spirit α) existence – I can assert this or that right, give up the right to it itself – bestow it – but it is necessary that I be a legal person – that I have the right – that it also have existence – will, subjective, it may be that it does not hold. But it shall hold, because will, what I do – this is not merely an entitlement or permission. Not because it is a right, but because [it is] formal. This constitutes the side of its contingency – absolute right also determined as to its content. – Ethical life has a right, – existence2)
    α) in an external thing, property
    β) idea, substantial relation in me; subject, insight, conviction not preferred here, habit, custom, – can be an essential moment of the idea – permission – whether this or that existence of freedom is to be, this is here self-consciousness –
    γ) –
    It is a necessary moment α) on the side of ethical life – its existence – β) on the side of self-consciousness, its essence, its concept, to make itself into the idea.
    That spirit come to its right, that is, that its rational determinations, the developed ones, be set forth – not remain enveloped – with a simple people this is the case – and that this hold, that is, be as this will and custom of self-consciousness – – a realm of spirits in its laws – laws of substance, – self-consciousness the reality.
    What right is – definition – one must not turn to the jurists – right from laws
    Here: what is right in and for itself, that is, how can law be?
    Limitation, – a monstrous error – bondage One hears talk of it everywhere, – Cortes in Lisbon.

    [zu § 29 Anm.] α) Freedom – its existence – is necessary in and for itself.
    α) Freedom for the fr[ee], but
    β) as something objective – that is, external, also determination and difference
    γ) ways of these differences, make up the division
    β) Is this, then, what we call right? – Feeling, representation in formal thinking – my freedom therein –
    γ) This definition could also be arrived at in a genetic way.
    But in the representation of right – many other determinations, which are only consequences, and onto which reflection first falls, in order to take them as the essential determination – insight, that [it is] a consequence
    α) What I have a right to, that I may do, entitled, permitted – but it [is] not commanded – but the other not – why not? – because my will – freedom – absolute – but here already the other does not belong – love and love in return
    Separability of the thing as something external from my will – but in the higher [sphere], the state – what is right, is also duty.
    β) Limitation of freedom – consequence itself again in relation to others – and indeed entirely only in the form of freedom – which still has arbitrariness for its determination with regard to the particular –
    2) Existence is the subjective will – for it duty – this reality – subjective self-consciousness is necessarily an essential moment of the idea

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