29

That a determinate being should in general be the determinate being of the free will – this is right. Right is thus, in general, freedom, as Idea.

|35| The Kantian definition (see Kant’s Doctrine of Right, Introduction) – and one more generally adopted as well – according to which the chief element is the limitation of my freedom or arbitrary will such that it may coexist with the arbitrary will of everyone else in accordance with a universal law1 – this definition contains, on the one hand, only a negative determination, that of limitation, while on the other hand its positive element, the universal or so-called law of reason, the correspondence of the arbitrary will of the one with that of the other, amounts merely to the familiar formal identity and the principle of non-contradiction. This definition of right embodies the view that has been widespread chiefly since Rousseau, according to which it is not the will as rational, existing in and for itself, nor spirit as true spirit, but rather the will of the particular individual, in his own distinctive arbitrariness, that is supposed to be the substantial basis and the primary thing. Once this principle is adopted, the rational can of course appear only as a limitation upon this freedom, and not as something immanently rational, but only as an external, formal universal. That view is as devoid of all speculative thought, and as thoroughly rejected by the philosophical concept, as it has been productive – both in people’s minds and in actuality – of appearances whose dreadfulness finds its only parallel in the shallowness of the thoughts on which they were founded.

  1. cf. Metaphysics of Morals, Part I: Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, § B ↩︎

DE ES


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6 responses to “29”

  1. P. Wannenmann

    [Wannenmann § 8]

    Right in general expresses a relation constituted by the freedom of the will and its realization. Duty is such a relation insofar as it is to count for me as essential, as something I have to recognize, respect or bring about. The mere formalism of right, as opposed to true right, arises from the fact that the realization of freedom has stages, or that the spirit of freedom is more abstract or more concrete.

    In positive right, right is what is in the laws. In philosophical right, law is what is right; in it no law is the standard of right. Law has to express the rational will and the way in which it enters [into] existence. Strict right demands at first only a negative conduct, although positive actions can also be required in it, e.g. through contracts.

    Right is sacred because it rests on the freedom of the will; this is also in the basic determination of the essence of God; the free, pure spirit is the basic concept of God.

    Right has many stages; it is more abstract or more concrete and can therefore [be] wrong; e.g. slavery can be lawful although it is absolutely wrong, and positive right can contain something unholy. That something is positive and old right does not make it right in and for itself.

    Through the change of conditions, the right arising from them ceases of its own accord. The guarantee and confirmation of right, formalism, is opposed to true right; this contradiction very much does occur. The realization of freedom has necessary stages; to come to know this realization is the purpose of our science.

    Morality and right are often opposed to each other. But there are also moral points of view which restrict abstract right; e.g. if a debtor would be ruined by payment, the strict right of the creditors is restricted by this point of view; the craftsman must be left his tools; and so strict right recognizes morality, and strict formal right is not held to be sacred. Moral right is to that extent more concrete than abstract strict right.

    Still more concrete is the formation of a whole state, and this concrete spirit has a much higher right than abstract right, and so private right is restricted by the right of the state. The spirit of the state and its realization is something higher than the spirit of the individual.

    And still higher than the spirit, the right of a people, is the right of the universal state, the spirit of the world, and this spirit strikes down the subordinate spirits insofar as they oppose it, stand in its way. These are the great ethical collisions. There was, for example, no greater right than that Rome should be a republic; but Caesar had the right, for the spirit of the world whose instrument he was, to overthrow it, and Brutus as an individual gave Caesar his due. That the individual makes himself the bearer of the will of the world causes the individual to perish.

    So that right is not formalism, there are more concrete spirits which outstrip the more abstract ones. Therefore in right philosophical insight into the various standpoints is what is essential. But the general feeling of right from a lower standpoint can make a man believe he is suffering wrong. In this, insight differs from general opinion.

  2. C.G. Homeyer

    [Homeyer § 14]

    This, that an existence is existence of the will that is in and for itself, is right; and duty is such a relation insofar as it [is] valid for me as essential, insofar as I have to recognize, respect or bring it about.

    [W] That a concept, a determination, is valid must first be deduced in philosophy. [H] It must first be deduced that a concept, an Idea, is necessary, as we have deduced the Idea of the free will in what precedes. Then one says1 what corresponds to this Idea in representation.

    [W] The will that is in and for itself must be there; [it] gives itself an existence in right. [H+W] In ordinary life, too, one calls right what corresponds to a measure, a concept, or what is in accordance [with it]; the [measure] can then also be applied to external, sensuous things. [W] I have a right as a person; for the person is the existence of spirit, freedom.

    [H+W] Duty is the correlate of right; for what is not actual as free will does not recognize the free will in others either. Freedom cannot be violated; in violating it I commit something foolish. [But] existence is a being for others; hence it has a side at which it can be grasped, violated by [an]other. It is [the] drive of the will that is in and for itself to realize itself; hence [it is] also [its] duty. Duty is that I respect something in which the free will is the universal will, and so also my will. Hence the human being who has no rights has no duties; for he is actual as free will.

    1) GW 26,1, p. 250: „Dann sieht man“ (“Then one sees”).

  3. Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 29] The great standing of right – spirit making itself actual; – nature is what it is; it is comprehended – that spirit – as a nature – should be the system of a world, – custom, order – representation, idea necessary – for itself. Whether that which is, in idea, a necessary determination, is what people call right –
    Right appears in the nearest representation as a possibility to do or also not to do. I do nothing wrong if I do not assert my right – higher, concrete determinations are not only r[ights], but also duties –
    Contingency, whether it holds or not – only not to violate the right of the other. Right shall hold – α) I will, β) valid, γ) why valid? Universality – freedom – α) wrong – β) proceeding from my will; α) will alone the ground of validity – that one lets it hold –
    Concrete right the absolute necessity of spirit α) existence in external things – I can assert only this or that right, give up the right to it itself – bestow it – but it is necessary that I be a legal person – that I have the right – that it also have existence – will, subjective, it may be that it does not hold. But it shall hold, because will, what I do – this is not merely an entitlement or permission. Not because it is a right, but because [it is] formal. This constitutes the side of its contingency – absolute right also determined as to its content. – Ethical life has a right, – existence2)
    α) in an external thing, property
    β) idea, substantial relation in me; subject, insight, conviction, brought up, habit, custom, – here there can be no [question] of permission – whether this or that existence of freedom is to be, this is here self-consciousness –
    γ) –
    It is a necessary moment α) on the side of ethical life – its existence – β) on the side of self-consciousness, its essence, its concept, to make itself into the idea.
    That spirit come to its right, that is, that its determinations of reason, the developed ones, be set forth – not remain enveloped – with a simple people this is the case – and that this hold, that is, be as this will and custom of self-consciousness – – a realm of spirits in its laws – laws the substance, – self-consciousness the reality.
    What right is – definition – one must not turn to the jurists – right from laws
    Here: what is right in and for itself, that is, how can law be?
    Limitation, – a monstrous error – bondage One hears talk of it everywhere, – Cortes in Lisbon.

    [zu § 29 Anm.] α) Freedom – its existence – is necessary in and for itself.
    α) Freedom for the free [one], but
    β) as something objective – that is, external, also determination and difference
    γ) ways of these differences, make up the division
    β) Is this, then, what we call right? – Feeling, representation in formal thinking – my freedom therein –
    γ) This definition could also be arrived at in the ordinary way.
    But in the representation of right – many other determinations, which are only consequences, and onto which reflection first falls, in order to take them as the essential determination – insight, that [it is] a consequence
    α) What I have a right to, that I may do, entitled, permitted – but it [is] not commanded – but the other not – why not? – because my will – freedom – absolute – but here already the other does not belong – love and love in return
    Separability of the thing as something external from my will – but in the higher [sphere], the state – what is right, is also duty.
    β) Limitation of freedom – consequence itself again in relation to others – and indeed entirely only in formal freedom – which still has arbitrariness for its determination with regard to the particular –
    2) Existence is the subjective will – for it duty – this reality – subjective self-consciousness is necessarily an essential moment of the idea

  4. D.F. Strauß

    But in what is sacred to the will there is a second, higher side; these drives are still in the form of a natural determination. Man finds himself so. The higher nature of man is his freedom, which is for itself and has only itself, no drives, for its purpose. Here everything now depends on whether man’s representation of his freedom is the right one.

    This is [illegible] the source of right for us who philosophize. This source has, especially since Kant’s time, become the foundation of the determination of right1. To know this concept, to know what freedom is and what follows from it, is a need, just as much as zw one seeks to comprehend nature.

    1) GW 26,3, p. 1494: “Grundlage der Rechtsbestimmungen” (of the determinations of right).

  5. The Logical Development

    Definition of right as the existence of the free will — right is freedom as Idea, not the restriction of arbitrariness.

    From everything preceding, the concept is now drawn for whose sake the Introduction was conducted. Right does not mean a rule that forbids the will something, but every existence in which freedom is there — that is why later morality, ethical life and the interest of the state can each be called a right (§ 30). The Remark makes the difference from Kant clear: if right is determined as the restriction of my arbitrariness so that it can coexist with the arbitrariness of all, then what determines is something negative, and the universal that results remains a merely external agreement that comes down to the principle of contradiction. Hegel’s determination is, conversely, positive: right is not what posits limits to freedom, but that in which freedom consists.

  6. Hegel (Simple)

    § 29: What right is

    Now comes the sentence that the whole introduction leads up to. It is very short.

    Wherever freedom takes shape, there is right. So right is freedom that really exists. It is freedom as Idea: the core together with its actualization.

    This sounds unfamiliar. For we usually think of bans and limits.

    The usual view:

    Kant defined right like this: Right limits my freedom so that it can coexist with everyone else’s freedom. Here right is like the lines in a parking lot. Everyone has their own space. The lines make sure that nobody gets in anyone else’s way.

    What is missing?

    First, this definition only says something negative. Here right means: limit, barrier. Second, its only positive thought is very thin. The wills should not contradict each other. That is all.

    Behind this lies a picture of man that has been widespread since Rousseau. At the beginning stands the single human being with whatever he happens to like. The rational only comes in afterward, as a fence from outside.

    We see it the other way around. The rational is not a barrier to freedom. It is the shape in which freedom first becomes real.

    The hard judgment:

    The usual view is shallow thinking. And it has done terrible things, in people’s minds and in the world. Think of the terror after the French Revolution. The horror was as great as the thought was shallow.

    Summary: Right is freedom that really exists. It is not first of all a limit, but a shape of freedom. Whoever starts from what the individual happens to like can only see the rational as a chain.

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