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261

In relation to the spheres of private right and private welfare, of the family and of civil society, the state is, on the one hand, an external necessity and their higher power, to whose nature their laws and interests are subordinate and on which they are dependent; but, on the other hand, it is their immanent end, and has its strength in the unity of its universal ultimate end with the particular interest of individuals — in the fact that they have duties toward it to the same extent that they also have rights (§ 155).

It has already been remarked above (see § 3, Remark) that it was above all Montesquieu, in his famous work The Spirit of the Laws, who kept in view the thought that the laws of private right in particular are dependent on the determinate character of the state, and the philosophical outlook of considering the part only in its relation to the whole, and who also attempted to work this out in detail. Since duty is, in the first instance, conduct toward something that is, for me, substantial, universal in and for itself, while right, by contrast, is the existence as such of this substantial element, and hence the side of its particularity and of my particular freedom, both appear, at the formal stages, distributed between different sides or persons. The state, as ethical, as the interpenetration of the substantial and the particular, contains the truth that my obligation toward the substantial is at the same time the existence of my particular freedom — that is, that in it duty and right are united within one and the same relation. But because, furthermore, the differentiated moments also attain, within the state, their own distinctive shape and reality, so that the distinction between right and duty reasserts itself, they are, while in themselves, i.e., formally, identical, at the same time different in content. In the sphere of private right and morality, the actual necessity of the relation is lacking, and hence there is present only an abstract equality of content: what, in these abstract spheres, is a right for the one is also supposed to be a right for the other, and what is a duty for the one is also supposed to be a duty for the other. That absolute identity of duty and right occurs only as an equal identity of content, in the determination that this content is itself wholly universal — namely, the single principle of duty and right, the personal freedom of the human being. Slaves therefore have no duties, because they have no rights, and conversely — (religious duties are not at issue here). But in the concrete Idea, developing within itself, its moments become differentiated, and their determinacy becomes at the same time a different content: within the family, the son does not have rights of the same content as the duties he has toward his father, nor does the citizen have rights of the same content as the duties he has toward the prince and the government. This concept of the union of duty and right is one of the most important determinations, and contains the inner strength of states. The abstract side of duty stops short at overlooking and banishing particular interest as an inessential, indeed unworthy, moment. Concrete consideration, the Idea, shows the moment of particularity to be equally essential, and hence its satisfaction to be absolutely necessary: in fulfilling his duty, the individual must in some way at the same time find his own interest, his satisfaction, or his account, and from his relation within the state a right must accrue to him, whereby the universal cause becomes his own particular cause. Particular interest ought truly not to be set aside or even suppressed, but rather brought into accord with the universal, whereby both it and the universal are preserved. The individual, a subject with respect to his duties, finds, as a citizen, in their fulfillment the protection of his person and property, consideration for his particular welfare, and the satisfaction of his substantial essence, as well as the consciousness and self-awareness of being a member of this whole; and in this performance of duties as services and undertakings for the state, the state has its preservation and its subsistence. On the abstract side, the interest of the universal would consist merely in the fact that its affairs — the services it requires — are performed as duties.

DE

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3 responses to “261”

  1. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Everything depends on the unity of universality and particularity in the state. In the ancient states, the subjective end was simply one with the will of the state, whereas in modern times we demand a view of our own, a will and conscience of our own. The ancients had none of this in this sense; for them the ultimate was the will of the state. Whereas in the Asiatic despotisms the individual has no inwardness and no entitlement within himself, in the modern world man wants to be honored in his inwardness. The connection of duty and right has this double aspect, that what the state demands as duty is also directly the right of individuality, since it is nothing other than the organization of the concept of freedom. The determinations of the individual will are brought by the state into an objective existence and only through it attain their truth and actualization. The state is the sole condition for the attainment of the particular end and welfare.

  2. Karl Marx Avatar
    Karl Marx

    The previous paragraph teaches us that concrete freedom consists in the identity (which ought to be, a two-sided one) of the system of particular interest (of the family and civil society) with the system of universal interest (of the state). The relation of these spheres is now to be more closely determined.

    On the one hand, the state is, as against the sphere of the family and civil society, an »external necessity«, a power to which its »laws« and »interests« are »subordinated and dependent«. That the state is, as against family and civil society, an »external necessity« lay already partly in the category of »transition«, partly in their conscious relation to the state. »Subordination« to the state still fully corresponds to this relation of »external necessity«. But what Hegel understands by »dependence« is shown by the following sentence of the Remark to this paragraph:

    »That the thought of dependence, in particular also of private-law statutes, on the determinate character of the state, and the philosophical view of considering the part only in its relation to the whole — chiefly Montesquieu […] had in view« etc.

    Hegel thus speaks here of the inner dependence, or the essential determination, of private right etc. on the state; but at the same time he subsumes this dependence under the relation of »external necessity« and opposes it, as the other side, to the other relation in which family and civil society stand to the state as their »immanent end«.

    By »external necessity« can only be understood that the »laws« and »interests« of the family and of society must, in case of collision, yield to the »laws« and »interests« of the state, are subordinated to it, that their existence is dependent on its own, or that its will and its laws appear to their »will« and their »laws« as a necessity!

    But Hegel is not speaking here of empirical collisions; he is speaking of the relation of the »spheres of private right and private welfare, of the family and of civil society« to the state; it is a matter of the essential relation of these spheres themselves. Not only their »interests«, but also their »laws«, their »essential determinations«, are »dependent« on the state and »subordinated« to it. It relates to them as a »higher power« over their »laws and interests«. Their »interest« and »law« relate as its »subordinate«. They live in »dependence« on it. Precisely because »subordination« and »dependence« are external relations that constrain the self-subsistent essence and run counter to it, the relation of »the family« and of »civil society« to the state is that of »external necessity«, a necessity that runs against the inner essence of the matter. This very fact, that »the private-law statutes depend on the determinate character of the state«, are modified according to it, is therefore subsumed under the relation of »external necessity«, precisely because »civil society and the family«, in their true, i.e. in their self-subsistent and complete development, are presupposed to the state as particular »spheres«. »Subordination« and »dependence« are the expressions for an »external«, forced, apparent identity, of which Hegel rightly uses »external necessity« as the logical expression. In »subordination« and »dependence« Hegel has developed further the one side of the two-sided identity, namely the side of estrangement within the unity,

    »but on the other hand it is their immanent end and has its strength in the unity of its universal final end and the particular interest of individuals, in that they have duties toward it just insofar as they likewise have rights«.

    Hegel here sets up an unresolved antinomy. On the one hand external necessity, on the other immanent end. The unity of the universal final end of the state and the particular interest of individuals is supposed to consist in this: that their duties toward the state and their rights against it are identical (so that, for example, the duty to respect property would coincide with the right to property).

    This identity is explicated in the Remark [to § 261] as follows:

    »Since duty is, in the first place, conduct toward something that is for me substantial, universal in and for itself, while right, on the other hand, is the existence in general of this substantial element, and hence is the side of its particularity and of my particular freedom, both appear, at the formal stages, distributed to different sides or persons. The state, as ethical, as the interpenetration of the substantial and the particular, contains this: that my obligation toward the substantial is at the same time the existence of my particular freedom, i.e. that in it duty and right are united in one and the same relation.«

  3. Karl Marx Avatar
    Karl Marx

    In the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher I announced the critique of jurisprudence and political science in the form of a critique of the Hegelian philosophy of right. In working it up for the press, the mingling of a critique directed solely against speculation with the critique of the various subject-matters themselves proved thoroughly unsuitable, hampering the development of the argument and making comprehension more difficult. Moreover, the wealth and diversity of the subjects to be treated would have permitted their compression into a single work only in a wholly aphoristic manner, and such an aphoristic presentation would in turn have created the appearance of an arbitrary systematizing. I shall therefore let the critique of right, of morality, of politics etc. follow one another in a series of independent pamphlets, and shall finally attempt, in a separate work, to present once more the connection of the whole, the relation of the individual parts, as well as, lastly, a critique of the speculative treatment of that material.

    [Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844; MEW vol. 40 (Supplementary Volume 1), p. 467 – thanks for the pointer!]

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