For property, as the existence of personality, my inward representation and will that something should be mine is not sufficient; taking possession of it is also required for this. The existence which that willing thereby acquires includes recognizability for others. – That the thing of which I can take possession be ownerless is (as with § 50) a self-evident negative condition, or rather relates to the anticipated relation to others.
Necessary – taking possession – to make my will manifest on a thing. This here [is] acquiring in general. My body [is] immediately mine – things not – manner and way of making them mine
Manner of existence.
That the person places his will into a thing is only the concept of property, and what follows is precisely its realization. My inner act of will, which says that something is mine, must also become recognizable for others. If I make a thing my own, I give it this predicate, which must appear on it in external form and not merely remain within my inner will. Among children it tends to happen that, against another’s taking possession, they insist on their earlier willing; but for adults this willing is not sufficient, for the form of subjectivity must be removed and must work itself out into objectivity.
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