Abstract right is a right of coercion, because the wrong done against it is a violence against the existence of my freedom in an external thing, so that the preservation of this existence against the violence is itself likewise an external act and a violence superseding that first violence.
To define abstract or strict right straightaway, from the outset, as a right to which one may coerce, is to grasp it by a consequence that only enters by the detour of wrong.
Coercion against wrong; – taxes, military service – are placed at the disposal of the state. – One asks: to what is it permissible to compel? Why not to moral help, religious observances, and so on? It is said that failing to do these is likewise a wrong; – moral wrong, religious wrong, inward wrong; – also external actions which are essentially supposed to proceed from my moral inwardness, having no other ground, that is, which, as regards their content, are not confined to personality and property, to external services to which I am obligated; they are not merely these abstractions. Even rightful actions – keeping a contract, paying taxes, military service – are supposed to be moral, to proceed from my moral will; but the ground is not essentially disposition, but abstract personality – this likewise cannot be directly compelled, that is, [I cannot be compelled] to make something my property, but only on account of a wrong already done – against a right already acquired by another in an external thing. A right to moral help is to be acquired only through my arbitrary will, which is still something inward; the arbitrary will, here the essential moment, – an acquired right.
Because the personal will is abstract, it is exhausted in the external thing, and conversely, it is only an external will, not a concrete, spiritual will.
Objectivity – of the right of property – of freedom.
Strict right, – abstract right – does not yet concern the inward – a moral claim, an ethical claim upon feeling or love – because there I want to find my claim – or right, if I wish to call it that – in the feeling, in the love of the other – he is supposed to have this disposition toward me – a claim, a right to compassion – that is, to their feeling – action being merely a consequence of it – I do not have a right, a direct claim to a thing itself – a claim to right would be a right to right – a claim in general is only an incomplete right –
Here the distinction between the rightful and the moral must chiefly be kept in view. In the moral, that is, in reflection into myself, there is likewise a duality, for the good is an end for me, and I am to determine myself in accordance with this idea. The existence of the good is my resolve, and I actualize it within myself; but this existence is wholly inward, and hence no coercion can take place here. The laws of the state cannot, therefore, seek to extend to disposition, for in the moral sphere I am purely for myself, and force has no meaning here.
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